دانلود کتاب Being in time : dynamical models of phenomenal experience

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Being in Time
Editorial page
Title page
LCC data
Table of contents
Introduction
Conclusion
Time after time
1. Introduction: Ubiquitous time
2. A middle way: Dynamical systems
3. Brainspace
4. Temporality now!
5. Countdown to implementation
6. Crossing the explanatory gap
Acknowledgements
References
Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness
1. Introduction- the optimistic outlook
2. The creative nature of visual perception
3. A colossal library
4. Building templates- hierarchically
5. A combinatorial explosion
6. The ambiguity inherent in isolated responses. 7. Neuronal reflections8. Experimental consequences
9. What is so unique about the cerebral cortex?
10. Is consciousness a local or global phenomenon?
11. Is visual awareness dependent on higher levels of the cortical hierarchy?
References
From probabilities to percepts
1. Introduction
2. The ubiquity of sensory ambiguity and its absence from sensory consciousness
3. An orthogonal order of estimates and the 'precedence of the gaze'
4. Design features of a global best estimate buffer
4.1 The neural numerology of sensory experience. 4.2 Our panoramic, nested, ego-centric, three-dimensional visual world4.3 "Just in time" for the next gaze movement: brief career of the global best estimate
5. Cortex, colliculus and "the other thalamus"
6. Conclusion
References
Being in time
1. A few more constraints on theories of phenomenal experience
1.1 Autonomy
1.2 Timeliness
1.3 Computational tractability
2. Implications of the autonomy of experience
3. Time is of the essence
4. Waiting for Godot
4.1 The attractor hypothesis
4.2 The way ahead
5. Computational tools for distributed dynamic coordination
6. Summary. AcknowledgmentsReferences
The (lack of) mental life of some machines
1. Introduction --
special laws:
2. One bit at a time
3. How detailed is detailed enough?
4. Not all machines are born equal
5. Conclusion
Acknowledgements
References
Restless minds, wandering brains
1. Introduction
1.1 Escaping robustness
2. Perceptual switching
3. An EEG-study of perceptual mind wandering
4. The dynamics of mind-wandering
5. What happens to the laminar intervals when observers do engage in a task?
6. Conclusion
Acknowledgement
References
Fuzzy consciousness
1. Introduction. 2. Cylinder sets3. The pushing and pulling of consciousness
4. Discussion
References
Two dynamical themes in Husserl
1. Background
2. Horizon theory/constitution
3. Transcendental-eidetic phenomenology
4. Conclusion
References
Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness
1. Introduction: Unity, holism, and temporal continuity
2. Mereotopology as a new tool for the study of consciousness
2. A critical application: Does an experience have temporal parts?
3. "Self-embedding": Sketch of a positive proposal
4. Conclusion
References
The brain and its states.