دانلود کتاب Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy: The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History Volume IV

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Cover\nHalf Title\nSeries\nTitle\nCopyright\nContents\nList of Contributors\nGeneral Editor’s Preface\nIntroduction: Theorizing about Theorizing about Knowledge\n Notes\n References\n1 Pragmatism and Epistemology\n 1. Introduction\n 2. The classical pragmatists: Peirce\n 3. The classical pragmatists: James\n 4. The classical pragmatists: Dewey\n 5. Neopragmatism: knowledge and social entitlement\n 6. Neopragmatism: pragmatic encroachment\n Notes\n References\n2 On Our Epistemological Debt to Moore and Russell\n 1. Introduction: the view from here\n 2. Acknowledging a Russellian milestone (or two, or three)\n 3. Moore’s Paradox\n 4. Mooreanism and scepticism\n 5. Concluding remarks: reverence renewed?\n Notes\n References\n3 What Knowledge Is Not: Reflections on Some Uses of the Verb ‘To Know’\n 1. Introduction\n 2. The relevance of expressions\n 3. Reflections on first-person and third-person (singular) uses of ‘to know’, ‘to be certain’, and ‘to believe’\n 4. Scepticism\n 5. Conclusion\n Notes\n References\n4 Naturalistic Descriptions of Knowledge\n 1. Introduction\n 2. What is naturalistic epistemology?\n 2.1 Quine’s impact\n 2.2 Forms of naturalistic epistemology\n 2.3 Waves of naturalistic epistemology\n 3. The first wave of naturalistic epistemology: programmatic debates\n 3.1 The intuition debate\n 3.2 The normativity debate\n 4. The second wave of naturalistic epistemology: building on empirical research\n 4.1 Knowledge as a natural kind\n 4.2 Memory as a source of knowledge\n 5. A third wave of naturalistic epistemology? Conducting empirical research\n 5.1 Experimental philosophy as experimental epistemology\n 5.2 Experimental psychology as experimental epistemology\n 6. Conclusion\n References\n5 Knowing the Unobservable: Confirmation and Theoretical Virtues\n 1. Introduction\n 2. Foundationalist conceptions of scientific knowledge\n 3. Holistic confirmation\n 4. Theoretical virtues\n 5. Probabilistic confirmation\n 6. Prior probabilities and plausibility\n 7. Concluding thoughts\n Notes\n References\n6 Social Knowledge and Social Norms\n 1. Introduction\n 2. Justification versus knowledge (the anti-luck condition)\n 3. What is testimony?\n 4. The possibility of knowledge transmission\n 5. Testimonial justification: reductionism versus anti-reductionism\n 6. Counterexamples to transmission\n 7. A safe-basis account of testimonial knowledge\n 8. The reliability of testimony and social norms\n Notes\n References\n7 Knowledge-How and Perceptual Learning\n 1. Introduction\n 2. Belief-based knowledge-how\n 3. Perceptual and proprioceptive learning\n 4. Conclusion\n Notes\n References\n8 Self-Knowledge\n 1. Introduction\n 2. A rough consensus, and a challenge\n 3. Assessing the case for scepticism\n 3.1 Knowledge of the attitudes\n 3.2 Knowledge of conscious experience\n 3.3 Knowledge of causes and dispositions\n 4. Conclusion\n Notes\n References\n9 Knowledge as Contextual\n 1. The beginning: epistemic contextualism\n 2. Subject-Sensitive Invariantism\n 3. Relativism about ‘knowledge’ attributions: assessment-sensitivity\n 4. Strict invariantism\n Notes\n References\n10 Knowledge and Probability\n 1. Introduction\n 2. Knowledge and action\n 3. Probabilistic knowledge to the rescue?\n 3.1 The first problem\n 3.2 The second problem\n 3.3 Moss’ solution and a worry concerning factivity\n 3.4 Two other worries\n 4. Conclusion\n Notes\n References\n11 The Analysis of Knowledge\n 1. The analytical project in epistemology\n 2. The Gettier problem\n 3. Scepticism about the analytical project\n 4. Resolving the analytical project: robust and anti-luck virtue epistemology\n 5. Concluding remarks\n Notes\n References\n12 Conceiving of Knowledge in Modal Terms?\n 1. Two generic modal dimensions to knowing?\n 2. Being less generic about those possible modal dimensions of knowledge\n 3. Possible worlds\n 4. Gettier cases\n 5. Post-Gettier modal accounts of fallible knowledge\n 6. Post-Gettier modal accounts of knowledge’s structure\n 7. The redundancy problem for modal accounts of knowing\n Notes\n References\n13 Knowledge and Normativity\n 1. Introduction\n 2. Justification and knowledge\n 3. Reasons, justification, and knowledge\n 4. Rational support and knowledge\n 5. Knowledge norms\n Notes\n References\n14 Intellectual Virtue and Knowledge\n 1. Introduction\n 2. Two sorts of knowledge and two sorts of intellectual virtue\n 3. Defining knowledge in terms of intellectual virtue: Sosa’s view and objections\n 4. Defining knowledge in terms of intellectual virtue: Zagzebski’s view and objections\n Notes\n References\nIndex