دانلود کتاب Strategic Voting

فهرست مطالب :

Preface Acknowledgments Introduction Basic Notation Social Choice Game Theory Game Forms are Voting Rules The Quest for Truthful Voting Strategyproofness and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem Voting Manipulations The Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem Frequency of Manipulation Group Manipulations Safe Manipulations Irresolute Social Choice Correspondences Exercises Regaining Truthfulness in Voting Domain Restriction Single-Peaked Preferences on a Line Other Single-Peak Domains Dichotomous Preferences Complexity Barriers Few Candidates and Coalitional Manipulations Randomized Voting Rules Gibbard's Characterization Stronger Impossibility Results Output Approximation Almost–Strategyproof Rules Approximation with Almost–Strategyproof Rules Differential Privacy Exercises Voting and Mechanism Design Payments The VCG Mechanism Range Voting Approximation by Randomized Voting Rules Facility Location Location in a General Metric Space Location on a Line Location on a Circle Other Variations Judgment Aggregation Formal Framework Incentives and Manipulation Exercises Voting Equilibrium Models Simultaneous Voting Games Desiderata for Voting Models Implementation Nash Implementation Strong Implementation Implementation in Undominated Strategies Other Notions of Implementation Fallback Strategies Truth Bias/Partial Honesty Laziness and the Paradox of Voting The ``Calculus of Voting'' The Expected Value of Voting Equilibrium Stability Social Networks Quantal Response Equilibrium Other Equilibrium Models Minimax Regret Robust Equilibrium Iterated Removal of Dominated Strategies Exercises Iterative and Sequential Voting Convergence and Acyclicity Examples Plurality Veto Borda Convergence Results Convergence in Plurality Other Voting Rules Simultaneous Moves Welfare Implications Sequential Voting Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Iterated Majority Voting Exercises Voting Heuristics Heuristic Voting Models Ad Hoc Heuristics Local Dominance Other Dominance-based Heuristics Equilibrium and Convergence Sampling Equilibrium Implications of Heuristic Voting Exercises Summary: Toward a Complete Theory of Strategic Voting Empirical and Experimental Findings Conclusion Bibliography Author's Biography Blank Page