دانلود کتاب The Robust Federation: Principles of Design (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

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Front Cover......Page 1
The Robust Federation......Page 2
Credits......Page 4
Title Page......Page 6
Copyright......Page 0
Table of Contents......Page 8
List of Figures......Page 10
List of Tables......Page 11
Acknowledgements......Page 12
Constituting the Robust Federation......Page 14
The Virginia Plan......Page 18
1.2 Distributing Authority......Page 19
1.3 Opportunism......Page 21
Figure 1.1. The Problem of Federal Robustness......Page 23
1.4 Safeguards......Page 24
adaptation......Page 26
1.6 Discussion......Page 29
Independence:......Page 31
Direct Governance:......Page 32
Table 2.1. List of Federations, 1990–2000......Page 36
Military Security......Page 38
Efficiency.......Page 41
Innovation.......Page 43
Figure 2.1. The Trade-Off between Centralization and Decentralization......Page 46
Intergovernmental Competition.......Page 48
Externalities Management.......Page 52
Market Preservation.......Page 55
Political Participation.......Page 57
Managing and Satisfying Diversity.......Page 58
Anti-Tyranny and Rights.......Page 62
Higher Quality Representation.......Page 64
Federalism’s Engineering Problem......Page 65
Table 2.2. Prescriptions for Centralization or Decentralization by Objective......Page 66
2.3 Building Intuition: The Evolution of the European Union......Page 69
The Federal Problem......Page 76
Table 3.1. State Compliance with Requisitions for Troops (1777–1783) and Money (1784–1789) ......Page 77
3.1 A Typology of Opportunism......Page 79
Figure 3.1. Types of Opportunism: The Triangle of Federalism......Page 81
3.2 Why Do We See Opportunism?......Page 86
Figure 3.2. Slippage and Error in Deviance Space......Page 90
Figure 3.4. Intergovernmental Retaliation Generates Inherent Opportunism......Page 95
3.4 Fitting Federalism’s Complexity: Implications for Design......Page 98
3.5 Mathematical Appendix to Chapter 3......Page 100
The Safeguards of Federalism......Page 108
4.1 Structural Safeguards......Page 111
Enumerated Powers......Page 112
Interinstitutional Oversight.......Page 113
Incompleteness.......Page 117
State Supervision, as States?......Page 118
4.2 Popular Safeguards......Page 120
Theory of Popular Control......Page 121
Evaluation of Popular Control......Page 124
Theory of Political Safeguards......Page 126
Table 4.1. Criteria Defining Integrated Parties......Page 127
Evaluation of Political Safeguards......Page 129
4.4 Judicial Safeguards......Page 132
Theory of Judicial Safeguards......Page 133
The Court as Focal Point Provider.......Page 134
Evaluation of Judicial Safeguards......Page 135
Judicial Dependence......Page 136
4.5 Again Fitting Federalism’s Complexity......Page 138
redundancy......Page 140
4.6 Mathematical Appendix to Chapter 4......Page 141
5.1 The Issue: Coverage as a Necessary Condition ......Page 145
Table 5.1. Preliminary Assessment of the Coverage Capacity of Each Safeguard ......Page 147
The European Union......Page 150
Figure 5.1. The Triangle of Federalism, Admitting Shirking and Burden-Shifting......Page 151
Figure 5.2. The Triangle of Federalism, Leaving Encroachment Exposed......Page 153
The Antebellum United States......Page 156
5.4 Discussion......Page 159
6.1 The Issue: Inefficient Safeguards......Page 160
Figure 6.1. Intergovernmental Retaliation Generates Inherent Opportunism (Duplicated......Page 161
Figure 6.2. Behavioral Response to a Weakened Safeguard......Page 163
Figure 6.3. Complementary Safeguards......Page 164
The Severe Type: Intergovernmental Retaliation.......Page 165
The Mild Types: Auxiliary Safeguards.......Page 166
Figure 6.4. Insufficient Mild Safeguard......Page 167
Subnational Fiscal Responsibility......Page 168
6.4 The Insufficient Severe Safeguard......Page 172
Figure 6.5. Insufficient Severe Safeguard......Page 173
The European Union......Page 174
6.5 Discussion......Page 177
A Model of Complementary Safeguards......Page 178
Redundancy......Page 182
7.1 The Issue: Imperfect Safeguards......Page 183
Threshold Inef.ciencies......Page 184
Diverse Observations......Page 185
7.2 Overcoming—and Embracing—Imperfection......Page 187
Problem #1: Solving the Failure to Punish......Page 188
Problem #2: Tempering Frequent Punishment......Page 190
Problem #3: Adapting the Distribution of Authority......Page 194
Problem #4: Identifying Socially Beneficial Adjustments......Page 198
Putting It Together: The Theory of Redundant Safeguards......Page 204
Figure 7.2. The System of Safeguards......Page 205
Rethinking the Court’s Role as Safeguard......Page 208
Figure 7.3. Varying Structural or Political Safeguards Threshold Affects Judicial “Activism” ......Page 212
Resisting the Alien and Sedition Acts......Page 215
Canadian Constitutional Patriation......Page 217
7.4 Discussion......Page 222
Tying the Gordian Knot......Page 226
Table 8.1. The Robust Federation: Design Principles......Page 229
References......Page 233
Index......Page 248