دانلود کتاب A Critical Introduction to Formal Epistemology

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Cover\nHalf-Title\nSeries\nTitle\nImprint\nContents\nSeries editor’s preface\nAcknowledgments\nIntroduction\n What is formal epistemology?\n Why do we need probability?\n How to use this book\n1 Belief and probability\n 1.1 Degrees of belief\n 1.2 Conditional probability and conditional belief\n 1.3 Confirmation\n 1.4 Epistemology of beliefs\n Summary\n2 Belief and acceptance\n 2.1 Acceptance\n 2.2 Belief and acceptance: The Threshold Theory\n 2.3 Argument against the Threshold Theory of Acceptance: The Lottery Paradox\n 2.4 Responses to the Lottery Paradox\n 2.5 Actual and ideal agents\n Summary\n Study questions\n Advanced questions\n Further reading\n3 Rationality constraints I: Probabilism\n 3.1 Probabilism\n 3.2 Dutch Book Argument\n 3.3 Joyce’s Accuracy Argument for probabilism\n 3.4 Representation Theorem Argument\n Summary\n4 Rationality constraints II: Conditionalization\n 4.1 Conditionalization\n 4.2 Diachronic Dutch Book Argument for conditionalization\n 4.3 Objections to Diachronic Dutch Books\n 4.4 Counter-example to conditionalization: Waiting for a train\n Summary\n Study questions\n Advanced questions\n Further reading\n5 Rationality constraints III: Subjective and inductive probability\n 5.1 Inductive probabilities\n 5.2 Second argument for inductive probabilities: Arbitrariness\n 5.3 First objection to inductive probabilities: Evidence and regress\n 5.4 Second objection to inductive probabilities: Disagreement about values\n 5.5 Third objection to inductive probabilities: Failure of principles of indifference\n Summary\n Study questions\n Advanced questions\n Further reading\n6 The problem of induction\n 6.1 Beliefs about the future\n 6.2 Extending the problem\n 6.3 Circularity\n 6.4 Sampling\n 6.5 Semantic justification\n 6.6 Skeptical responses\n Summary\n Study questions\n Advanced questions\n Further reading\n7 Grue: The new problem of induction\n 7.1 Bad inferences\n 7.2 Warm-up: Greenblue\n 7.3 Grue\n 7.4 First response: Projectible properties\n 7.5 Second response: Sampling\n Summary\n Study questions\n Advanced questions\n Further reading\n8 The paradox of the ravens\n 8.1 The Paradox\n 8.2 Deny equivalence\n 8.3 Instance-observed\n 8.4 Instance-unobserved\n Summary\n Study questions\n Advanced questions\n Further reading\n9 Chance and credence\n 9.1 Chance and credence\n 9.2 Actual Frequency Theory\n 9.3 Actual frequentism and the Principal Principle\n 9.4 Objections and hypothetical frequentism\n 9.5 Two metaphysical views\n 9.6 Propensity theory of chance\n 9.7 Propensities and the Principal Principle\n Summary\n Study questions\n Advanced questions\n Further reading\n10 Reflection and disagreement\n 10.1 Reflection\n 10.2 Disagreement\n Summary\n11 Confirmation and the old evidence problem\n 11.1 Deductive theories\n 11.2 Surprising and unsurprising evidence\n 11.3 The old evidence problem\n Summary\n Study questions\n Advanced questions\n Further reading\n12 Justification and probability\n 12.1 Foundationalism\n 12.2 Coherentism\n 12.3 Infinitism\n Summary\n13 Knowledge and probability\n 13.1 Conspiracy\n 13.2 Knowledge-requires-certainty\n 13.3 Knowledge-skepticism\n 13.4 Defense of knowledge-skepticism: Assertibility\n 13.5 Relevant Alternatives Theory of Knowledge\n 13.6 Evaluating theories of relevant alternatives\n Summary\n Study questions\n Advanced questions\n Further reading\nNotes\nReferences\nIndex