دانلود کتاب Allocating Authority: Who Should Do What in European and International Law?

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Contents\nList of Contributors\n1:\rIntroducing the Idea of Relative Authority\n I. Authority in Global Governance\n II. Towards Relative Authority: Comparative Institutional Assessments\n III. Normative Traction: Towards a Framework for Assessment\n IV. Iterations in Supra- and International Practices\n V. Relative Authority in European and International Law\nPart I: Empirical and Normative Traction\n 2: Democratic Legitimacy and Executive Rule-making: Positive Political Theory in Comparative Public Law\n I. Positive Political Theory\n II. Judicial Review and the Democratic Legitimacy of Executive Rule-making: Four Cases\n III. Review for Democratic Legitimacy—Old Habits and New Challenges\n 3: In Search of a New Model of Checks and Balances for the EU: Beyond Separation of Powers\n I. Introduction\n II. Reconsidering the European Union\'s Institutional Balance\n III. Autonomy and Accountability in the EU\'s System of Separated Powers\n IV. A Procedural Model of Checks and Balances?\n 4: Bolstering Authority by Enhancing Communication: How Checks and Balances and Feedback Loops can Strengthen the Authority of the European Court of Human Rights\n I. Theoretical Framework: Public Authority as Object of Empirical Inquiry\n II. Empirical Analysis: Instances of Controversy and Defiance of the ECtHR\n III. Pathways to Legal Diplomacy: The Cyprus Case\n IV. Head-On Collisions: Judicial Adaptations in France\n V. Irreconcilable Norms: Prison Votes and the Impossibility of Agreement\n VI. \'Constitutional Politics\': The Brighton Declaration and its Consequences\n VII. Strengthening Authority by Enhancing Communication and Participation\n VIII. Conclusion\n 5: Authority Monism in International Organisations: A Historical Sketch\n I. The Authority Configuration in the First International Organisations\n II. The Evolution of the Authority-configuration in the Twentieth Century\n III. Conclusion-Controls through those \'Affected\'\r by IO Policies\n 6: No Institution is an Island: Checks and Balances in Global Governance\n I. Introduction\n II. Types of Checks and Balances in Global Governance\n III. Examples of Select Types of Checks and Balances in Global Governance\n IV. Explaining the Scarcity of Horizontal Checks and Balances beyond the State\n V. Conclusion\nPart II: Iterations in Practice\n 7: The Role of the Court of Justice in Shaping the Institutional Balance in the EU\n I. Introduction\n II. Justification of Institutional Variation: The Treaties and Nothing But the Treaties\n III. Drawing the Borderline between Legislative and Administrative Action\n IV. Umpiring Disputes between the Political Institutions\n V. Legitimising \'Creative\' Institutional Practice\n VI. Conclusion\n 8: Refining Relative Authority: The Judicial Branch in the New Separation of Powers\n I. Conceptualising Law-making\'s Diffusion\n II. What of the Elected Hierarchy?\n III. Blending Horizontal and Vertical Accountabilities\n IV. The Role of the Judicial Branch\n V. As Operationalised by the Court of Justice\n VI. Concluding Remarks\n 9: Judicial Review of EU Administrative Discretion: How Far Does the Separation of Powers Matter?\n I. Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion and Separation of Powers between the Legislature and the Executive\n II. Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion and Separation of Powers Between the Judge and the Administration\n III. Conclusion\n 10: First or Second Best? Judicial Law-making in European Private Law\n I. European Courts in Times of Societal Change\n II. Institutional Constraints: Dividing Powers among Legislatures and Judiciaries\n III. Institutional Realism: Judicial Law-making in European Private Law\n IV. Institutional Imagination: Rethinking the Role of the Judiciary\n V. Realists and Visionaries\n 11: Relative Authority in Global and EU Financial Regulation: Linking the Legitimacy Debates\n I. Global Regulation, the EU, and the New Separation of Powers\n II. A Preliminary Caveat: Global Financial Standards between Soft and Hard Law\n III. The Fragmentation of Powers in the Global Financial Regulatory Architecture\n IV. The Distribution of Powers in the EU Financial Regulatory Architecture\n V. Global Financial Governance and Legitimacy Concerns\n VI. The EU Financial Regulatory Architecture and the Global Financial Architecture: Source of Inspiration or Part of the Solution?\n VII. Concluding Remarks\n 12: Relative Authority and Institutional Decision-making in World Trade Law and International Investment Law\n I. Public Authority in Trade and Investment Rule-making\n II. Trade and Investment Rules, Decisions, and Authoritative Decision-makers\n III. Legitimacy Assets, Accountability, and Reform in Trade and Investment\n IV. Conclusion\nIndex