دانلود کتاب An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind

فهرست مطالب :

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Contents......Page 9
Preface......Page 13
1 Introduction......Page 17
EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS......Page 18
METAPHYSICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND......Page 19
A BRIEF GUIDE TO THE REST OF THIS BOOK......Page 22
2 Minds, bodies and people......Page 24
CARTESIAN DUALISM......Page 25
THE CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT......Page 27
THE DIVISIBILITY ARGUMENT......Page 29
NON-CARTESIAN DUALISM......Page 31
ARE PERSONS SIMPLE SUBSTANCES?......Page 34
CONCEPTUAL OBJECTIONS TO DUALISTIC INTERACTION......Page 37
EMPIRICAL OBJECTIONS TO DUALISTIC INTERACTION......Page 40
THE CAUSAL CLOSURE ARGUMENT......Page 42
OBJECTIONS TO THE CAUSAL CLOSURE ARGUMENT......Page 45
OTHER ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PHYSICALISM......Page 48
CONCLUSIONS......Page 52
3 Mental states......Page 55
PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE STATES......Page 56
BEHAVIOURISM AND ITS PROBLEMS......Page 57
FUNCTIONALISM......Page 60
FUNCTIONALISM AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL IDENTITY THEORIES......Page 64
THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS......Page 67
QUALIA AND THE INVERTED SPECTRUM ARGUMENT......Page 69
SOME POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THE INVERTED SPECTRUM ARGUMENT......Page 71
THE ABSENT QUALIA ARGUMENT AND TWO NOTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS......Page 75
ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM AND ‘FOLK PSYCHOLOGY’......Page 77
SOME RESPONSES TO ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM......Page 80
CONCLUSIONS......Page 82
4 Mental content......Page 85
PROPOSITIONS......Page 86
THE CAUSAL RELEVANCE OF CONTENT......Page 90
THE INDIVIDUATION OF CONTENT......Page 95
EXTERNALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND......Page 98
BROAD VERSUS NARROW CONTENT......Page 100
CONTENT, REPRESENTATION AND CAUSALITY......Page 105
MISREPRESENTATION AND NORMALITY......Page 108
THE TELEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO REPRESENTATION......Page 111
OBJECTIONS TO A TELEOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF MENTAL CONTENT......Page 115
CONCLUSIONS......Page 116
5 Sensation and appearance......Page 118
APPEARANCE AND REALITY......Page 119
SENSE-DATUM THEORIES AND THE ARGUMENT FROM ILLUSION......Page 123
OTHER ARGUMENTS FOR SENSE-DATA......Page 126
OBJECTIONS TO SENSE-DATUM THEORIES......Page 128
THE ADVERBIAL THEORY OF SENSATION......Page 130
THE ADVERBIAL THEORY AND SENSE-DATA......Page 132
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES......Page 135
SENSE-DATUM THEORIES AND THE PRIMARY/SECONDARY DISTINCTION......Page 137
AN ADVERBIAL VERSION OF THE PRIMARY/SECONDARY DISTINCTION......Page 141
DO COLOUR-PROPERTIES REALLY EXIST?......Page 142
CONCLUSIONS......Page 144
6 Perception......Page 146
PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE AND PERCEPTUAL CONTENT......Page 147
PERCEPTUAL CONTENT, APPEARANCE AND QUALIA......Page 151
PERCEPTION AND CAUSATION......Page 153
OBJECTIONS TO CAUSAL THEORIES OF PERCEPTION......Page 159
THE DISJUNCTIVE THEORY OF PERCEPTION......Page 161
THE COMPUTATIONAL AND ECOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO PERCEPTION......Page 165
CONSCIOUSNESS, EXPERIENCE AND ‘BLINDSIGHT’......Page 171
CONCLUSIONS......Page 174
7 Thought and language......Page 176
MODES OF MENTAL REPRESENTATION......Page 178
THE ‘LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT’ HYPOTHESIS......Page 180
ANALOGUE VERSUS DIGITAL REPRESENTATION......Page 183
IMAGINATION AND MENTAL IMAGERY......Page 185
THOUGHT AND COMMUNICATION......Page 191
DO ANIMALS THINK?......Page 194
NATURAL LANGUAGE AND CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES......Page 199
KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE: INNATE OR ACQUIRED?......Page 204
CONCLUSIONS......Page 207
8 Human rationality and artificial intelligence......Page 209
RATIONALITY AND REASONING......Page 210
THE WASON SELECTION TASK......Page 212
THE BASE RATE FALLACY......Page 216
MENTAL LOGIC VERSUS MENTAL MODELS......Page 219
TWO KINDS OF RATIONALITY......Page 224
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TURING TEST......Page 225
SEARLE’S ‘CHINESE ROOM’ THOUGHT-EXPERIMENT......Page 230
THE FRAME PROBLEM......Page 234
CONNECTIONISM AND THE MIND......Page 237
CONCLUSIONS......Page 243
9 Action, intention and will......Page 246
AGENTS, ACTIONS AND EVENTS......Page 247
INTENTIONALITY......Page 251
THE INDIVIDUATION OF ACTIONS......Page 256
INTENTIONALITY AGAIN......Page 259
TRYING AND WILLING......Page 262
VOLITIONISM VERSUS ITS RIVALS......Page 266
FREEDOM OF THE WILL......Page 268
MOTIVES, REASONS AND CAUSES......Page 273
CONCLUSIONS......Page 278
10 Personal identity and self-knowledge......Page 280
THE FIRST PERSON......Page 282
PERSONS AND CRITERIA OF IDENTITY......Page 286
PERSONAL MEMORY......Page 293
MEMORY AND CAUSATION......Page 298
ANIMALISM......Page 299
KNOWING ONE’S OWN MIND......Page 304
MOORE’S PARADOX AND THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUS BELIEF......Page 307
EXTERNALISM AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE......Page 309
SELF-DECEPTION......Page 312
CONCLUSIONS......Page 313
Bibliography......Page 314
Index......Page 329