دانلود کتاب Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age: Leniency Religion

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Cover\nHalf-title\nTitle\nCopyright\nForeword\nContents\nList of Contributors\nPart I: Introduction\n 1. Leniency Policies: Revolution or Religion?\n I. BACKGROUND\n II. AIMS OF THIS BOOK\n III. STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK\n IV. REFLECTIONS\nPart II: Leniency Convergence and Divergence\n 2. Leadership of Leniency\n I. INTRODUCTION\n II. THE HISTORY AND PROLIFERATION OF THE UNITED STATES LENIENCY POLICY\n III. BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE LENIENCY POLICY\n IV. TRANSPARENT POLICIES: THE KEY TO CONTINUED LENIENCY SUCCESS\n V. CONCLUSION\n 3. Leniency Policy with Chinese Characteristics\n I. INTRODUCTION\n II. THE THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR LENIENCY IN CARTEL ENFORCEMENT\n III. COMPETITION LAW AND LENIENCY COME TO CHINA\n IV. CHINESE LENIENCY IN PRACTICE\n V. CONCLUSION\nPart III: Leniency and the Competition Authority\n 4. What do we know about the Effectiveness of Leniency Policies? A Survey of the Empirical and Experimental Evidence\n I. INTRODUCTION\n II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON LENIENCY POLICIES\n III. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON LENIENCY POLICIES\n IV. CONCLUSION\n 5. Anti-Cartel Enforcement in Japan: Does Leniency Make the Difference?\n I. INTRODUCTION\n II. THE JAPANESE LENIENCY PROGRAMME\n III. A SIMPLE, CLEAR AND TRANSPARENT LENIENCY PROGRAMME\n IV. THE LENIENCY PROGRAMME: APPLICATIONS AND FINAL DECISIONS\n V. THE JAPANESE LENIENCY PROGRAMME AND DETECTION\n VI. THE JAPANESE LENIENCY PROGRAMME AND DETERRENCE\n VII. THE LENIENCY PROGRAMME’S CONTRIBUTION TO A DIVERSIFIED ENFORCEMENT POLICY\n VIII. CONCLUSION\n 6. Leniency, Profi ling and Reverse Profiling in Multi-Product Markets: Strategic Challenges for Competition Authorities\n I. INTRODUCTION\n II. BACKGROUND\n III. LITERATURE\n IV. SUMMARY OF THE MODEL\n V. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFILING\n VI. CONCLUSION\n APPENDIX A: FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE MODEL\n APPENDIX B: PROOF\n 7. A Case for Capping the Dosage: Leniency and Competition Authority Governance\n I. INTRODUCTION\n II. THE DOJ LENIENCY REFORMS OF THE 1990S\n III. LENIENCY SIDE-EFFECTS AND COMPETITION AGENCY GOVERNANCE\n IV. LENIENCY AS ONE ELEMENT OF A DIVERSIFIED ANTI-CARTEL PROGRAMME\n V. TOWARD AN INTEGRATED UNDERSTANDING OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONDUCT\nPart IV: Leniency and the Corporation\n 8. Leniency Decision-Making from a Corporate Perspective: Complex Realities\n I. INTRODUCTION\n II. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF LENIENCY POLICIES\n III. LENIENCY AS A RATIONAL CHOICE\n IV. DO LENIENCY POLICIES DESTABILISE AND DETER CARTELS?\n V. IS THERE REALLY A ‘ RACE ’ TO THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY?\n VI. CONCLUSION\n 9. Leniency: The Poisoned Chalice or the Pot at the End of the Rainbow?\n I. INTRODUCTION\n II. GENERAL FEATURES OF THE EU LENIENCY REGIME\n III. ‘SETTLEMENTS’ OF EU CARTEL CASES\n IV. PROS AND CONS OF APPLYING FOR LENIENCY\n V. PROCEDURAL CONCERNS LINKED TO THE PROCESS OF APPLYING FOR LENIENCY\n VI. THE (UNDUE) WEIGHT GIVEN TO LENIENCY STATEMENTS\n VII. CRITERIA TO ASSESS PROBATIVE VALUE\n VIII. CONCLUSION\n 10. Reconditioning Corporate Leniency: The Possibility of Making Compliance Programmes a Condition of Immunity\n I. INTRODUCTION\n II. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMMES AND CURRENT CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICIES\n III. THE LAXITY OF CURRENT CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICIES\n IV. THEORIES OF OPTIMAL INCENTIVISATION OF CORPORATE ACTION\n V. MAKING AN ADEQUATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME A CONDITION OF CORPORATE LENIENCY\n VI. CONCLUSION\nPart V: Leniency and the Individual\n 11. Leniency, Whistle-Blowing and the Individual: Should We Create Another Race to the Competition Agency?\n I. INTRODUCTION\n II. WHY TWO RACES ARE INSUFFICIENT TO DETER CARTELS\n III. ENCOURAGING A THIRD RACE— BETWEEN THE CARTEL PARTICIPANTS AND WHISTLE-BLOWERS\n IV. CONCLUSION\nPart VI: Leniency and Crime\n 12. Leniency and Criminal Sanctions in Anti-Cartel Enforcement: Happily Married or Uneasy Bedfellows?\n I. INTRODUCTION\n II. LENIENCY AND CRIMINALISATION—WHICH THE CART AND WHICH THE HORSE?\n III. LENIENCY AND CRIMINALISATION: TENSIONS, AMBIGUITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS\n IV. CONCLUSION\nPart VII: Leniency and Compensation\n 13. Why Leniency does not Undermine Compensation\n I. INTRODUCTION\n II. LENIENCY AND COMPENSATION: THE MECHANICS\n III. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE: THE BROAD VIEW\n IV. ANTITRUST AS A COMPENSATORY SYSTEM\n 14. Leniency and the Two Faces of Janus: Where Public and Private Enforcement Merge and Converge\n I. INTRODUCTION\n II. COMPENSATION AND OPTIMAL DETERRENCE\n III. REASSESSING THE MYTHS FROM A WELFARE-BASED PERSPECTIVE\n IV. BEYOND THE PURELY ECONOMIC WELFARE PERSPECTIVE: TOWARDS A MORE PLURALISTIC APPROACH\n V. CONCLUSION\nPart VIII: Leniency and Compliance\n 15. The Air Cargo Cartel: Lessons for Compliance\n I. INTRODUCTION\n II. METHODOLOGY\n III. BACKGROUND\n IV. LUFTHANSA CASE STUDY\n V. CONCLUSION\n 16. Combining Leniency Policies and Compliance Programmes to Prevent Cartels\n I. INTRODUCTION\n II. AN OVERVIEW OF COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMMES\n III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LENIENCY AND COMPLIANCE\n IV. COMPETITION AUTHORITIES AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAMMES\n V. THE CASE FOR INCORPORATING COMPLIANCE PROGRAMMES INTO LENIENCY POLICIES\n VI. CONCLUSION\nIndex