دانلود کتاب Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse

فهرست مطالب :

Contents\nPreface\nCredits\n1 Bidding in Common-Value Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research\n2 First-Price Common-Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior and the “Winner’s Curse”\n3 The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions\n4 Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price Common Value Auctions\n5 Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study\n6 Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions\n7 Common Value Auctions with Insider Information\n8 Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions?\n9 Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation\n10 Learning in Common Value Auctions: Some Initial Observations\n11 Cross-Game Learning: Experimental Evidence from First-Price and English Common Value Auctions\n12 A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis\n13 Bidding in Common Value Auctions: How the Commercial Construction Industry Corrects for the Winner’s Curse\nInstructions\nIndex