دانلود کتاب Constitutional Rights and Constitutional Design: Moral and Empirical Reasoning in Judicial Review

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Preface\nContents\n1. Introduction\n I. Removing the Blindfold\n II. Scope of the Argument\n III. Recovering Montesquieu\n2. The Adjudication of Constitutional Rights\n I. Constitutional Rights and Ordinary Legal Rights\n II. Proportionality in Practice\n III. Proportionality in the US?\n IV. Absolute and Prima Facie Rights\n V. Rights, Proportionality and Utilitarianism\n VI. Rights as Interests\n VII. Moral and Empirical Reasoning\n VIII. Other Adjudicative Methods\n IX. Conclusion\n3. Are Rights Trumps?\n I. The Shielded-Interest Theory\n II. The Filtered-Preference Theory\n III. Constitutional Rights and Statistics\n IV. Revision of the Filtered-Preference Theory\n4. Judicial Capacity and Empirical Research\n I. Empirical Research and the Origins of Proportionality\n II. Empirical Evidence in the US Supreme Court\n III. Adjudicative Facts and Legislative Facts\n IV. Finding Legislative Facts\n V. The Courts and Social Science\n VI. Case Studies\n VII. Conclusion\n5. Comparative Analysis of Institutional Capacities\n I. The Basic Structure of Judicial Reasoning\n II. The Basic Structure of Legislative Reasoning\n III. Capacity for Empirical Reasoning\n IV. Capacity for Moral Reasoning\n V. The Tyranny of the Majority?\n VI. Capacity to Protect Minorities\n VII. An Historical Perspective\n VIII. Conclusion\n6. The Problem of Entrenchment\n I. Legal Change and the Rule of Law\n II. Rawls and the Perpetual Constitution\n III. The Rarity of Constitutional Amendment\n IV. The Legislative-Judicial Method of Reversing Nullification Decisions\n V. Conclusion\n7. Judicial Review and Constitutional Design\n I. The American and Kelsenian Models\n II. Designing a Constitutional Court\n III. Council of Revision\n IV. Does the Legislature Need a Check?\n V. Deference\n VI. Conclusion\nIndex