دانلود کتاب Corporate Bankruptcy Law in China: Principles, Limitations and Options for Reform

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Preface\nContents\nList of Abbreviations\nJudicial and Political Guiding Documents\nTables and Figures\n1. Introduction\n 1.1. Theoretical Framework: Economic Analysis of Law\n 1.2. Why Bankruptcy Law Matters\n 1.3. Methodology\n 1.4. Structure of the Book\nPART I:\rBACKGROUND\n 2. China\'s Socio-Economic, Political and Legal Environment\n 2.1. Economic and Political Transformation of China\n 2.2. Power and the Party-State\n 2.3. Laws and Rules in China\n 2.4. Courts, the Party-State and Limited Law Enforcement in China\n 2.5. Corporate Ownership and Control in China\n 3. Debt Finance and Enforcement in China\n 3.1. Debt Finance in China\n 3.2. Companies\' Access to Credit in China\n 3.3. Debt Enforcement Mechanisms in China\n 3.4. General Challenges to Debt Enforcement in China\nPART II:\rTHE EBL AND ITS PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS\n 4. Bankruptcy Law in China\n 4.1. History of Bankruptcy Law in China\n 4.2. Black-letter Overview of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006\n 4.3. Supreme People\'s Court\'s Interpretations and Judicial Cases\n 4.4. Personal Bankruptcy Law\n 5. Limited Use of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 and its Causes\n 5.1. Limited Use of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006\n 5.2. Reasons for the Limited Use\rof the EBL – The Four ‘Constraints’\n 6. The First Constraint – Creditors and Debtors Feel Insufficiently Protected under the EBL\n 6.1. Implications of Courts’ Duties to Protect Employees\n 6.2. Heightened Threat of Scrutiny and Liability under the EBL\n 6.3. Insolvency as De Facto Entry Requirement for Reorganisation\n 7. The Second Constraint – Reduced Recoveries under the EBL\n 7.1. General Flaws in Debt Enforcement that Negatively Affect Recoveries under the EBL\n 7.2. Shortcomings that Specifically Affect EBL Enforcement\n 7.3. The EBL not Viable for Certain Types of Debt Contracts\n 8. The Third Constraint – Limitations and Biases of EBL Enforcers\n 8.1. Courts\' and Lawyers\' Internal Limitations\n 8.2. Administrators\' Passivity\n 8.3. The Party-state\'s Influence over Court Enforcement of the EBL\n 9. The Fourth Constraint – Non-EBL Debt Enforcement Mechanisms\n 9.1. Private Alternatives and their Perceived Advantages\n 9.2. Politically Driven Alternatives and their Perceived Advantages\nPART III:\rDESIRABILITY AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM\n 10. Desirability of Reforming Bankruptcy Law in China\n 10.1. Is a Greater Use of Bankruptcy Law in China Desirable?\n 10.2. Benefits of Greater Use of (Reformed) EBL\n 10.3. Nature of Further Reform\n 11. Options for Reform\n 11.1. Reforms Aimed at Improving EBL Provisions\n 11.2. Reforms Aimed at Improving EBL Enforcement Practices and Surrounding Rules\n 11.3. Reforms Aimed at EBL Enforcers\n 12. Recent Reform Initiatives 2015–20\n 12.1. What Set Off Recent Bankruptcy Law Reform?\n 12.2. Summary of Key Reforms 2015–20\n 12.3. Reform 1: Encourage Greater Use of the EBL – Resolving Zombie Companies\n 12.4. Reform 2: Specialised Bankruptcy Courts and Administrator Associations\n 12.5. Reform 3: EBL Platform\n 12.6. Reform 4: Judicial and Political Guidance\n 12.7. Reform 5: Local Conferences and Experience-sharing Events\n 12.8. Reform 6: Simplified EBL Procedure\n 12.9. Reform 7: Personal Bankruptcy\n 12.10. Reform 8: Bankruptcy Assistance Fund\n 12.11. Reform 9: Judges\' Evaluation System for Resolving EBL Cases\n 12.12. Reform 10: Cooperation with Local Party-state\n 12.13. The Future\nPART IV:\rFOREIGN STAKEHOLDERS AND THE EBL\n 13. The Role of Foreign Parties in Corporate Bankruptcy Cases in China\n 13.1. Foreign Influence in the Making of the EBL\n 13.2. Rules and Guidance that Govern Cross-border Bankruptcies in China\n 13.3. Foreign Stakeholders in Corporate Bankruptcy Cases in China\nConclusion\nBibliography\nIndex