دانلود کتاب Development, Capitalism, and Rent: The Political Economy of Hartmut Elsenhans

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Contents
List of Contributors
1 Introduction: Rent, Capitalism and the Challenges of Global Uneven Development—Hartmut Elsenhans’ Work in Context
1.1 Euthanasia of the Rentier?
1.2 Contradictions of Capitalism
1.3 Global Uneven Development
1.4 Structure of the Book
References
Part I Contradictions of Capitalism
2 Contradictions of Self-Centered Development
2.1 Self-Centered Development and the Satisfaction of Basic Needs with Rising Mass Incomes in the Third World Is Important for the Maintenance of Political Equilibria and Growth in the Western Industrialized Countries
2.2 Some Hints on the Nature of Development Processes in General
2.3 An Outline of the Perspective of Overcoming Underdevelopment
2.4 The Contradiction Between Planning and Equality
2.5 State-Class and Rent
2.6 Rapid Industrialization and the Rural-Urban Gap
2.7 The Demobilization of the Peasantry
2.8 The Foreign Economic Relations Contradictions
2.9 The Ideological Contradiction
2.10 Concluding Remark
References
3 Markets and Morals
3.1 The Invisible Limits for Capitalists
3.2 Threats to the Operation of the Capitalist System by Its Own Development
3.3 Obstacles for Moralization of Capitalism in Case of Imperfect Competition
References
4 Individualist Household Strategies for Future Security: A Basis for the Decline of Welfare Capitalism
4.1 Increased Savings of Private Households
4.2 Basic Assumptions of the Model
4.3 Increased Savings and Unrealistically Explosive Growth in Contradiction Even with Endogenous Growth Theory
4.4 Increased Savings May Lead to Underconsumptionist “Overaccumulation” with an Inevitably Declining Rate of Profit
4.5 The Impossibility of a Redistribution of the Stock of Fixed Capital Through Savings
4.6 Short-Term Solutions Aggravate the Problem: The Demand Gap Cannot Be Closed by Rising Real Wages if There Is a Rising Propensity to Save Out of Household Incomes
4.7 The Transfer of Household Savings to Financial Markets Leads to the Intensification of Deflationary Tendencies in the Real Economy
4.8 Conclusion
4.9 Perspectives
4.10 List of Symbols
References
Part II Rent, Marginality, and Pitfalls of Development
5 Overcoming Marginality as an Objective of the Struggle Against Poverty
5.1 The Emergence of Marginality and Rent in the Transition to Capitalism
5.1.1 A Basic Model with Marginality in Agriculture
5.1.2 The Results of Increasing Productivity
5.1.3 The Analysis of the Industrial Sector
5.1.4 Growth of the Industrial Sector by Luxury Consumption
5.2 International Exchange of Surplus Sharpens the Marginality Trap
5.3 The Impact of Income Redistribution
5.4 Late-Comers’ Investing of Rents in Case of Low Productivity Backlog
5.5 No Rents in Case of Plentiful Agriculturally Useful Land
5.6 Marginality and the External Sector
5.7 The Central Importance of the Agricultural Question for Poverty-Oriented Policies
References
6 Global South: The Transition to Capitalism Against Rent
6.1 The Ubiquity of Rent
6.2 Profit Depends on the Expansion of Mass Incomes
6.3 Marginality as Founding Mechanism of Underdevelopment and the Permanence of Rents
6.4 The Weberian Impasse
6.5 The International Dimensional of the Reinforcement of Rent
6.6 Centralization of the Rents by the State
6.7 The Contemporary Globalization of New Forms of Rent
References
Part III The International System Between Capitalism and Rent
7 Economic Rent: Obstacle to Development or Fuel for Long-Term Growth
7.1 The Inevitable Emergence/Persistence of Rent in the Transition to Capitalism
7.2 Integrating Foreign Trade into the Model
7.3 Bureaucratic Development Societies Under the Dominance of State Classes
7.4 Antistatist Political Movements and Export-Oriented Industrialization: The Permanence of Rent
7.5 The Transfer of the Rent-Appropriating State to the West as Result of the Persistence of Rent in the South
References
8 Terms-of-Trade and Underdevelopment: How to Benefit from Improving Terms-of-Trade: A Discussion of the Link Between Terms-of-Trade and the Development Blocking Internal Social and Economic Structures
8.1 The Precapitalist Character of the Argument that Improving Terms-of-Trade Are an Instrument for Overcoming Underdevelopment
8.2 Deteriorating Terms-of-Trade as the Basis of Industrial Development in the Center
8.3 The Marginality-Cum-Rent Syndrome as the Key Characteristic of Underdevelopment
8.4 The Lack of Solidarity of the Marginalized and the Exploited in a Marginality-Cum-Rent Situation
8.5 Overcoming the Marginality Trap Through a Redistribution of Rent and the Empowerment of Labor
8.6 The Reinforcement of Rent-Based Political Structures Through Rent-Financed Industrialization
8.7 The Priority of Investment as an Ideological Heritage
8.8 The Necessity of Accepting Deteriorating Terms-of-Trade as an Instrument of Catching up
8.9 Export-Led Manufacturing: Productively Dissipating a Rent Through Declining Terms-of-Trade
8.10 Pragmatism, State, Market and Overcoming Underdevelopment
References
Part IV Postscript
9 Postscript by Hartmut Elsenhans
9.1 At Odds with Neoliberalism and Marxism
9.2 On the Limits of Mainstream Rent Theory
9.3 Profit Depends on Rising Mass Incomes
9.4 On the Emergence of Raw Material Rents and the Transfer of the System of Relative Prices from the Center to the Periphery
9.5 On the Failure of Using Rent for Overcoming Rent, or the Contradictions of Rent-Based State Classes
9.6 The Shift to Export-Oriented Manufacturing and the Threats to Developed Industrial Countries
9.7 On the Export of Rent Structures to the West
9.8 Rising Mass Incomes, Greener Growth and the Philosophy of History
9.9 On the Danger of Turning Back to Rent-Based Structures
References
Index