دانلود کتاب Discrimination in International Trade, The Policy Issues: 1945-1965

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PREFACE\nTable of contents\nABBREVIATIONS FREQUENTLY USED\nI. THE SETTING\nII. DISCRIMINATION FOR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS REASONS\n Introduction\n The Problem Foreseen\n The Arrangements Made\n The Benefits Achieved\n Some Costs Paid\n The \"Incidental Protection\" Problem\n Discrimination Imperials Achieving Convertibility\n Discrimination Needed to Maintain Convertibility?\n Why Did It Take So Long to Abandon Discrimination?\n Conclusions\nIII. DISCRIMINATION AS A STEPPING-STONE TO NONDISCRIMINATION: TEMPORARY REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS\n Introduction\n The Sterling Area Dollar Pool\n European Payments Union-OEEC Trade Liberalization Scheme\n Origin of the Arrangements\n Major Characteristics of the Scheme\n Improvements Over Earlier System\n Effects on Hard Currency Earnings?\n Two Critical Episodes\n German Deficit and Inflation Issue—Belgian Surplus and Forced Regional Balance Issue Mounting Costs of Discrimination\n EPU Abandoned as Costs Mount, Benefits Decline\n The Search for a Place of Retreat\n Conclusions\n Note on International Monetary Fund-European Payments Union Relations\nIV. DISCRIMINATION AND PERMANENT REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 1\n Introduction\n The European Coal and Steel Community\n Conditions Imposed for Agreeing to Discrimination\n Impact on Exports\n Impact on Imports\n Common Markets and Free Trade Areas\n Rationale\n Major Areas of Nonmembers\' Concern\n The Level of Tariff Barriers Against Nonmembers\n Introduction\n Minor Issues for Free Trade Areas\n Initial Attack on EEC\'s Proposed Common External Tariff\n Community Makes Modest Concessions\n Major Assault Mounted: Kennedy Round\n Some Preliminary Conclusions\nV. DISCRIMINATION AND PERMANENT REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 2\n Introduction\n Balance of Payments Difficulties and the Discriminatory Use of Quantitative Restrictions\n The Problem Foreseen\n Issue Left \"en suspense\"\n No Great Conflicts—Yet\n Exceptions to Intra-Area Free Trade\n EEC Common Agricultural Policy\n MAJOR PROVISIONS AND EARLY WORRIES—Third Country Fears Receive Support—Issues in Negotiating for Greater Access EFTA Arrangements Create Few Issues\n Exceptions Extensive but Tolerated in LAFTA\n Size of Region and Prior Preferential Arrangements\n Existing Preferences a Major Obstacle to Formation of Europe-wide Bloc\n Existing Preferences Small Problem for EFTA\n Major Problems Flow from Associating Overseas Territories with European Common Market\n Third Countries Fear Effects on Trade and Investment Studies of Effects Inconclusive: International Friction Mounts Bilateral Efforts to Limit Adverse Effects Discrimination Reduced in New Convention of Association Some Tentative Conclusions Conclusions\nVI. DISCRIMINATION AS A TOOL FOR PROTECTION\n Introduction\n Policy Toward Japan\n Political and \"Unfair Practices\" Issues\n Low-Wage Issue\n Variations on Low-Wage Theme\n The Matter of \"Safeguards\"\n Japan Gains Qualified Admission to GATT Club\n Facts Challenged; Principles Stressed and Costs Cited\n Some Pragmatic Solutions: \"Sensitive\" Goods and \"Voluntary\" Export Restraints\n Avoidance of Market Disruption Policy Emerges\n First Formalized Market Disruption Agreement: Cotton Textiles Arrangement\n Conclusions\nVII. DISCRIMINATION TO FACILITATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT\n Introduction\n Early Post-war Precedents\n Other Forces at Work\n Shortcomings of Established Commercial Policies\n The Case for Preferences from Developed to Developing Nations\n Initial Response, Reservations, Doubts of Developed Nations\n Less-Developed Countries Not Impressed\n Selective and Negotiated vs. General and Automatic Issue\n Differences Emerge Among Preference-Receivers\n World Trade Conference Recommendations\n Preferences Among Developing Countries\n Some Tentative Conclusions\nVIII. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS\nINDEX