دانلود کتاب Dream, death, and the self

فهرست مطالب :

Cover......Page 1
Title Page......Page 4
Copyright Page......Page 5
Contents......Page 8
Preface......Page 16
Int.1 Discovering What We Already Know......Page 20
Int.2 The Socratic Conception of Philosophical Discovery......Page 21
Int.3 Wittgenstein: Insidership and Philosophical Discovery......Page 22
Int.4 Philosophical Discovery and Resistance......Page 25
Int.5 The Presumptuousness of a Claim to Philosophical Discovery......Page 26
Int.6 Conceptual Analysis and the Communal Horizon......Page 28
Int.7 The Personal Horizon......Page 30
Int.8 Philosophical Anticipations of the Personal Horizon......Page 32
Int.9 Two Types of Philosophical Puzzle......Page 37
Int.10 The Extraphilosophical Puzzles......Page 39
PART ONE: Dream......Page 44
1.1 Our Purpose in Raising the Dream Hypothesis......Page 46
1.2 That the Dream/Reality Contrast Is Extrinsic to the Subject Matter of the Dream Hypothesis......Page 47
1.3 The Argument from Internality......Page 50
1.4 Dream and the Law of Excluded Middle......Page 53
1.5 The Dream Hypothesis and Space......Page 59
1.6 The Dream Hypothesis and Time......Page 62
1.7 The Dream Hypothesis and the World......Page 67
2.1 A Puzzle about Identity......Page 72
2.2 Representation and Identity......Page 73
2.3 A Way out of the Puzzle......Page 76
2.4 The Dream Hypothesis and the First-Person Singular......Page 80
2.5 The Subject versus the Dreamer of a Dream; The Positional Conception of the Self......Page 83
2.6 Emerging from a Dream and the First Person......Page 87
3.1 Dreams and the Infinity of Time......Page 90
3.2 Time and the Confusion of Standpoint......Page 93
3.3 Descartes and the Dream Hypothesis......Page 95
3.4 Dream Skepticism versus Memory Skepticism......Page 97
3.5 Real-Life Uncertainty about the Dream Hypothesis......Page 99
4.1Is the Argument from Internality Valid?......Page 103
4.2 The Subject Matter of the Dream Hypothesis and Grammatical Illusion......Page 105
4.3 Alternative Formulations of the Dream Hypothesis......Page 107
4.4 Reality......Page 110
4.5 What Is the Subject Matter of the Dream Hypothesis?......Page 113
4.6 The Horizonal versus Phenomenal Conception of Mind......Page 116
5.1 The Skeptical Argument......Page 120
5.2 The Usual Argument for Dream Skepticism; Immanent versus Transcendent Dream Skepticism......Page 124
5.3 The Uniqueness of Transcendent Dream Skepticism......Page 127
5.4 Dream Skepticism and the External World......Page 129
5.5 Nozick on the Tank Hypothesis......Page 132
6.1 Is the Dream Hypothesis a Pseudo Hypothesis?......Page 138
6.2 Whether It Would Matter if THIS Were a Dream......Page 141
6.3 The General Form of My Response to the Dream Hypothesis......Page 145
6.4 I Am with Others: Metaphysical Equality and the Claim to Preeminence......Page 147
6.5 The Commitment to (O)......Page 150
6.6 Raising the Dream Hypothesis in Conversation: Forcing a Withdrawal to the First Person......Page 153
6.7 Withdrawing to the First Person and the Horizonal Use of the First Person......Page 155
6.8 Why It Is Rationally Impossible to Believe the Dream Hypothesis......Page 157
6.9 The Space of Horizons......Page 160
6.10 Other Minds......Page 163
6.11 Skepticism and Solipsism......Page 165
PART TWO: Death......Page 170
7.1 Dream and Death; Discovering the Meaning of Death......Page 172
7.2 Being Disturbed by the Prospect of Death......Page 173
7.3 That the Prospect of Death Holds Up Something Not Just Awful but Incomprehensible; Death and Self-Deception......Page 176
7.4 Reacting to the Prospect of Death: A Text......Page 179
7.5 Philosophical Reflection and Real-Life Disturbance......Page 184
8.1 The Prospect of Death......Page 187
8.2 I Will Cease to Be......Page 190
8.3 Death and the Stream of Mental States......Page 192
8.4 The World and the Subject Matter of Death......Page 196
8.5 The “Mineness” of My Death and the Horizonal Use of the First Person......Page 200
9.1 My Horizon and the Horizon......Page 204
9.2 The Solipsism of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus......Page 207
9.3 Solipsism and Self-Consciousness......Page 211
9.4 Kripke on the Solipsism of the Tractatus......Page 214
9.5 Negativism......Page 217
10.1 Solipsism and My Life with Others......Page 220
10.2 Relativized Solipsism......Page 223
10.3 Solipsism and the Meaning of Death......Page 225
10.4 Qualifying the NOTHINGNESS of Death......Page 228
11.1 The Awfulness of Death......Page 234
11.2 The Two Forms of the Impossibility of Death......Page 238
11.3 The Temporal Impossibility of Death......Page 239
11.4 Consciousness and Causation......Page 241
11.5 The Solipsistic Impossibility of Death......Page 246
11.6 The “Aloneness” of the Dying Subject......Page 247
11.7 The Puzzles of Death and the Causation of Consciousness......Page 251
PART THREE: The Self......Page 254
12.2 The Cartesian Argument......Page 256
12.3 Imagination and Proof......Page 259
12.4 Exhibiting Possibilities in Imagination......Page 261
12.5 Imagination and Experiential Possibility......Page 264
12.6 Experiential Possibilities and Possibilities of Essence......Page 266
12.7 The Paralogism of Imagination......Page 268
12.8 The Cartesian Reply......Page 270
13.1 Metaphysical Possibility......Page 274
13.2 Metaphysical Possibility and the Self......Page 276
13.3 The Logic of the Self......Page 278
13.4 Naturalizing the Self......Page 280
14.1 Nagel’s Puzzle about “Being Me”......Page 283
14.2 Individual Essence: Frege on Our “Particular and Primitive” Mode of Self-Presentation......Page 284
14.3 My Body and Me (the Human Being That I Am)......Page 288
14.4 The Multiplicity of the Phenomenology of the Subject Position......Page 290
14.5 The Standing/Operative Ambiguity......Page 292
14.6 Causal Centrality......Page 294
14.7 Causation and the Phenomenology of the Subject Position......Page 298
14.8 Orientational Centrality......Page 300
14.9 The Sense in Which the Positional and Horizonal Conceptions of the Self Are “Always in Play”......Page 301
15.1 Perceptual Centrality: The Visual and Tactual Appearing of My Body......Page 305
15.2 Perceptual Centrality: The Visual Appearing of Myself......Page 309
15.3 Perceptual Centrality: Views of Myself......Page 312
15.4 Centrality of Feeling: Figuring as the Space of Feeling......Page 316
15.5 The Centrality of Feeling: The Sense in Which the Space of Feeling (My Body-Space) Is a “Space”......Page 318
15.6 Centrality of Feeling: The Ontological Dependence of My Body-Space on My Body......Page 323
15.7 Volitional Centrality: Acting/Will and the Phenomenology of the Subject Position......Page 326
15.8 Volitional Centrality: The Phenomenology of Will......Page 328
15.9 Volitional Centrality: The “Mineness” of My Actions......Page 334
15.10 Volitional Centrality: Phenomenology and Causality......Page 338
16.1 Introduction......Page 340
16.2 The Referential Use of the First Person......Page 341
16.3 Reference and the Use of “I” as Subject/Object......Page 343
16.4 “I Am Thinking . . . /I See . . .”......Page 348
16.5 The Positional Use of the First Person......Page 353
16.6 The Horizonal Use of the First Person......Page 356
17.1 The Meaning of the Question We Are Asking......Page 361
17.2 Following the Rule for the Use of “I”......Page 362
17.3 Inner First-Person Reference......Page 365
17.4 Attitudes de Se......Page 370
17.5 First-Person Reference and the Positional Conception of the Self......Page 373
17.6 The First Person and Emptiness at the Center......Page 374
18.1 Introduction......Page 378
18.2 Tense and the Phenomenology of the Subject Position......Page 379
18.3 The Tense Asymmetry in the Phenomenology of the Subject Position......Page 383
18.4 Tense and the Horizonal Self......Page 385
19.1 The Special Philosophical Problem of Personal Identity: The Problem of First-Person Identity......Page 389
19.2 Imagining Myself Persisting through a Change of Human Beings (Bodies)......Page 392
19.3 Locke’s View of Personal Identity......Page 395
19.4 Persistence and the Horizon......Page 399
19.5 Remembering; The Past-Self Ambiguity......Page 401
19.6 Possibility, Personal Identity, and Naturalizing the Self......Page 406
20.1 The Oneness of the Horizon......Page 413
20.2 Skepticism about the Oneness over Time of My Horizon......Page 416
20.3 Kant’s Third Paralogism: The Self “in Time” and the Self That “Time Is In”......Page 419
21.1 The Availability in Memory of Past Events......Page 427
21.2 The Argument from Pastness......Page 429
21.3 Being Open to the Availability of the Past......Page 432
21.4 Memory Images......Page 436
21.5 Letting the Past Be Past......Page 439
21.6 Moving from Inside to Outside the Sphere of Phenomenological Reflection......Page 441
21.7 The Puzzle of Memory and the Puzzle of Experience......Page 445
21.8 The Puzzle of Memory and the Problems of First-Person Identity......Page 448
22.1 My Future versus the Future......Page 451
22.2 My Future and My Brain: Jumping over Death......Page 453
22.3 Parfit on My Future Self......Page 458
22.4 Nozick’s “Closest Continuer” Theory......Page 463
23.1 Personal Identity and Possibility (Review)......Page 469
23.2 The Possibility of Division......Page 470
23.3 Parfit on Division......Page 473
23.4 Other Responses to the Puzzle of Division: Nozick and Lewis......Page 477
23.5 The Puzzle of Division and the Identity-Framework......Page 482
23.6 Horizonal Doubling versus Splits within the Horizon......Page 484
23.7 The Impossibility of Horizonal Doubling......Page 487
23.8 The Unity of Consciousness......Page 489
23.9 The Puzzle of Division......Page 491
24.1 The Extra- versus Purely Philosophical Puzzles......Page 493
24.2 The Puzzle of Division as an Extraphilosophical Puzzle......Page 495
24.3 The Puzzle of Division and the Puzzle of the Causation of Consciousness......Page 497
24.4 Our Causal Entrapment in the World......Page 499
24.5 The Extraphilosophical Puzzles and the Horizonal Subject Matter......Page 501
Bibliography......Page 506
Index......Page 510