دانلود کتاب EU Energy Law, Volume II: Competition Law and Energy Markets

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Part 1
Introduction
Part 2
The definition of the relevant market
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
CHAPTER 2
The relevant product market – Electricity
1. Introduction
2. The supply of electricity
2.1 Wholesale supply markets
2.1.1 Introduction
2.1.2 Definition and scope of the wholesale market
2.1.2.1 Generation and wholesale
2.1.2.2 Supply to large end customers
2.1.3 Submarkets within the wholesale market
2.1.3.1 Power exchanges and wholesale
2.1.3.2 Distinction according to the level of distribution
2.1.3.3 Regulated part of the market
2.1.3.4 Peak hours and off-peak hours
2.2 Retail supply to final customers
2.2.1 Supply to eligible customers and to the regulated market
2.2.2 Distinction according to size of customers
2.2.2.1 Sub-markets according to the customers’ size
2.2.2.2 Criteria
2.3 Conclusion
3. Electricity trading
3.1 Introduction
3.2 A trading market distinct from wholesale supply
3.3 Financial and physical trade
3.4 On-line trading portal products
3.5 Facilitation of wholesale electricity trading
3.6 Wider energy trading market
4. Network infrastructure and related services
4.1 Transmission and distribution
4.2 Balancing
4.3 Network asset management, operation and services
4.3.1 Introduction
4.3.2 Network services
4.3.3 Connection services
4.3.4 Metering reading and operation
CHAPTER 3
The relevant geographic market – Electricity
1. Supply
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Relevant criteria
1.2.1 Entry barriers
1.2.1.1 Regulatory trade barriers
1.2.1.2 Transmission rules and charges
1.2.1.3 Interconnection capacity
1.2.1.4 Critical size and local generation activities
1.2.2 Low prices
1.2.3 Switching behaviour and customer loyalty
1.3 Relevant evidence
1.3.1 Dominant national companies
1.3.2 Actual flow of trade
1.3.3 Customer switching
1.3.4 Price differences between neighbouring areas
1.3.5 Different regulatory frameworks
1.3.6 General market structure, regional exchanges and market coupling
1.4 Case-by-case examination of Member States
1.4.1 Austria
1.4.2 Belgium
1.4.3 Croatia
1.4.4 Cyprus
1.4.5 Czech Republic
1.4.6 Denmark
1.4.7 England, Wales, Scotland
1.4.8 Estonia
1.4.9 Finland
1.4.10 France
1.4.11 Germany
1.4.12 Greece
1.4.13 Hungary
1.4.14 Ireland
1.4.15 Italy
1.4.16 Latvia
1.4.17 Lithuania
1.4.18 Luxembourg
1.4.19 Malta
1.4.20 The Netherlands
1.4.21 Norway
1.4.22 Poland
1.4.23 Portugal
1.4.24 Romania
1.4.25 Slovakia
1.4.26 Slovenia
1.4.27 Spain
1.4.28 Sweden
2. Trading
3. Facilitating Electricity Trading
4. Transmission and distribution
5. Balancing
6. Network management and operation and networks services
CHAPTER 4
The relevant product market – Gas
1. Introduction
2. High and low calorific value gas
3. Gas supply
3.1 Wholesale market
3.1.1 Scope of the wholesale market
3.1.2 Trading markets and hubs
3.1.3 Submarkets within the wholesale market
3.2 End (retail) customers
3.2.1 Power plants and large industrial customers
3.2.2 Small business customers
3.2.3 Domestic customers
3.2.4 Regulated and open segments of the market
4. Gas transportation
5. Distribution
6. Gas storage
6.1 Gas storage and gas flexibility
6.2 HCV and LCV gas storage
6.3 Pore and cavern storage
7. Network asset management and operation and network services
CHAPTER 5
The relevant geographic market – Gas
1. Introduction
2. Gas supply
2.1 No wider than national markets
2.2 Smaller than national markets
2.3 Trading and gas hubs
3. Transport and storage infrastructures and related services
3.1 Gas transportation
3.2 Gas storage and flexibility tools
3.3 Network asset management and operation and network services
Part 3
Agreements, decisions concerted practices and abuse of dominance
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1. Overview
• Market concentration
• Vertical foreclosure
• Market integration
• Downstream markets
• Balancing markets
2. The basic requirements of Articles 101 and 102
CHAPTER 2
Horizontal agreements
1. Introduction
2. Cartels and hard-core restraints
3. Co-operation agreements between energy companies
3.1 General principles and factors
3.1 Factors relevant to the assessment under Article 101(1) FEU
3.3 Efficiency defence under Article 101(3) FEU
4. Commercialisation of energy
4.1 Joint selling
4.2 Distribution of energy by a competitor
4.2.1 Market partitioning
4.2.2 Safe harbour (block exemption regulation) for unilateral distribution agreements and individual assessment
4.2.3 A distributor becoming a competitor through liberalisation
4.3 Other cooperations for the commercialisation of energy
5. Production of energy
5.1 Competition issues of production cooperations
5.2 Safe harbour for production cooperations
6. Production and sale of energy
6.1 The Corrib case
6.2 The DUC case
7. Construction, ownership and exploitation of energy
infrastructure
7.1 Merger or antitrust law?
7.2 Hardcore restrictions
7.3 Analysis of likely effects of infrastructure cooperations
7.3.1 Cooperations granting third party access to infrastructure
7.3.2 Special competition issues of cooperations granting third party access
7.3.3 Captive use of infrastructure
CHAPTER 3
Vertical agreements
1. Introduction
2. Exclusive energy purchasing and supply arrangements
2.1 Non-compete obligation imposed on energy buyers
2.1.1 Competition issues of non-compete obligations in energy supply and distribution contracts
2.1.2 Safe harbour: the Vertical block exemption Regulation
2.1.3 Analysis in individual cases
2.1.4 Efficiency defence – Article 101(3) EC
2.2 Individual cases dealt with by the Commission
2.2.1 Distrigas
2.2.2 Repsol
2.2.3 Gas Natural-Endesa
2.2.4 Electrabel/Mixed intercommunal electricity distribution
companies
3. Partitioning of energy markets by territory or by customer
3.1 Direct market partitioning by territory
3.1.1 The Commission proceedings against destination clauses
3.1.2 The GDF/ENI/ENEL cases and Gazprom case
3.2 Indirect market partitioning by territory
3.3 Customer and use restrictions
4. Exclusive energy distribution agreements
4.1 Competition issues of exclusive energy distribution agreements
4.2 Safe harbour: Vertical block exemption Regulation
4.3 Analysis outside the safe harbour
Wingas/EDFT
4.4 Efficiency defences – Art. 101(3) TFEU
4.5 Capacity reservation agreements
CHAPTER 4
Article 102 TFEU
Abuse of a dominant position
1. Introduction
2. Structure and context of Article 102 TFEU
2.1 Rule and example
2.2 Public measures and conduct by firms
2.3 Structural control and conduct control
2.4 Conduct control and the merger test
2.5 Differences between Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
2.6 Union law and national law: geographic impact
2.7 Union law and national law: effect on trade
2.8 Union law and national law: substantive differences
2.9 Competition law and sector specific law
3. The existence of a dominant position
3.1 Concept
3.1.1 Dominance, a special responsibility
3.1.2 Dominant position and relevant market
3.2 Horizontal dominance
3.3 Vertical dominance
3.3.1 Essential facilities
3.3.1.1 Essential facilities: infrastructure
3.3.1.2 Essential facilities: information
3.3.1.3 The Bronner case
3.3.2 Essential facilities in the energy sector
3.4 Individual and collective dominance
3.4.1 Collective dominance: groups of undertakings
3.4.2 Collective dominance: economic and legal links
3.4.3 Collective dominance and the significant impediment to effective competition test
3.5 Indicators of dominance
3.5.1 Market share
3.5.2 Size and importance of competitors
3.5.3 Stability of market share and price wars
3.6 Temporary dominance
3.7 Potential competition and barriers to entry
3.8 Barriers to entry
3.9 Goodwill, trade marks and vertical integration
4. Abuse
4.1 Concept
4.2 Abuse on connected markets
4.3 Abuse and collective dominance
5. Types of abuses
5.1 The Sector Inquiry
5.2 Exclusive dealing
5.2.1 Customer foreclosure
5.2.1.1 The Gas Natural case
5.2.1.2 The E.ON-Ruhrgas case
5.2.1.3 The Distrigaz settlement
5.2.1.4 The EDF settlement
5.2.2 Input foreclosure
5.2.3 Network foreclosure agreements
5.2.3.1 The UK-French Interconnector
5.2.3.2 The GDF and E.ON cases
5.2.3.3 The CEZ case
5.3 Tying
5.3.1 Tying and market power
5.3.2 Contractual and economic tying
5.3.3 De facto tying
5.3.4 Tying scenarios in the energy sector
5.4 Refusal to supply
5.4.1 General considerations
5.4.2 Refusal to supply and tying
5.4.3 Refusal to license
5.4.4 Refusals to supply and essential facilities
5.4.4.1 The principle
5.4.4.2 The sector inquiry report
5.4.4.3 The Marathon commitments
5.4.4.4 The TTPC case
5.4.4.5 The E.ON case
5.4.4.6 The RWE case
5.4.4.7 The ENI case
5.4.4.8 The BEH Electricity case
5.4.4.9 The BEH Gas and Romanian gas interconnector cases
5.4.4.10 Upstream gas supplies in Central and Eastern Europe
5.5 Discrimination
5.5.1 Discrimination and competition on downstream markets
5.5.2 Discrimination without competition on downstream markets
5.5.3 Discrimination and price retaliation
5.5.4 Discrimination according to nationality: the Svenska Kraftnet, OPCOM and DE/DK interconnector cases
5.6 Exclusionary pricing practices
5.6.1 Predatory pricing
5.6.1.1 The AKZO case
5.6.1.2 After AKZO
5.6.1.3 Predatory prices and cross subsidies
5.6.2 Exclusionary pricing practices and the energy sector
5.6.3 The price squeeze
5.6.4 Loyalty rebates
5.6.5 Target rebates
5.6.6 Quantitative rebates
5.7 Unfair prices
5.7.1 The test
5.7.1.1 Introductory observations
5.7.1.2 Excessive and unfair prices
5.7.1.3 A difficult test to apply
5.7.2 Unfair pricing in the energy sector
5.7.2.1 The sector inquiry
5.7.2.2 National networks
5.7.2.3 The Spanish temporary congestion case
5.7.2.4 The Elsam case
5.7.2.5 Upstream gas supplies in Central and Eastern Europe
5.7.3 Capacity withdrawals: the E.ON wholesale market case
6. Conclusion
CHAPTER 5
Procedure
1. Introduction
2. The procedure before the Commission
2.1 Origin of cases
2.1.1 Complaints
2.1.2 Own-initiative proceedings
2.1.3 Investigations into sectors of the economy and into types of agreements
2.1.4 No notification system/possibility of informal guidance
2.2 Initial assessment
2.2.1 Requests for information
2.2.2 Inspections
2.2.3 Power to take statements
2.2.4 Meetings and other contacts with the parties and third parties
2.3 Infringement proceedings
2.3.1 The opening of formal proceedings
2.3.2 The statement of objections
2.3.3 Access to the Commission’s file
2.3.4 The reply to the statement of objections
2.3.5 Oral hearings
2.3.6 Consultation of the advisory committee
2.4 Procedural safeguards
2.5 Commission decisions
2.5.1 Common requirements
2.5.2 Finding of inapplicability
2.5.3 Interim measures
2.5.4 Commitments decisions
2.5.5 Finding and termination of infringement
2.5.6 Decisions imposing fines
2.6 Judicial review
Part 4
Merger control
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
CHAPTER 2
Jurisdiction: When does a merger fall under the merger Regulation?
1. Concept of a concentration
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Control
1.3 Full-function joint ventures
1.4 Non-controlling minority shareholdings
2. Turnover thresholds
2.1 Notification thresholds
2.2 Turnover calculation
3. Referrals
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Referral from the Commission to the Member States
3.3 Referral from the Member States to the Commission
4. Legitimate interests
CHAPTER 3
Substantive assessment of concentrations
1. Introduction
2. The relevant market
3. The substantive test
4. Efficiencies
5. Remedies
6. Acquisition of a failing company
7. Ancillary restraints
8. Judicial Review
CHAPTER 4
Merger control in the electricity and gas sectors
1. Introduction
2. Categories of mergers and acquisitions common to the energy sector
3. Factors relevant to the assessment of market power in the gas and electricity sectors
3.1 Relevant factors
3.1.1 Market share
3.1.2 The size and importance of competitors
3.1.3 Closeness of competition between merging parties
3.1.4 Commercial advantages of the company in question
3.1.4.1 Vertical integration: ownership of transmission and distribution facilities
3.1.4.2 Economies of scale, balancing
3.1.4.3 Advantageous generation portfolio
3.1.4.4 Horizontal integration
3.1.4.5 Existence of long-term retail/industrial supply contracts
3.1.4.6 Supplier of last resort/regulated tariff supplier
3.1.5 Entry barriers
3.1.5.1 Regulatory barriers
3.1.5.2 Interconnection capacity
3.1.5.3 Customer loyalty
3.1.5.4 Maturity of the market
3.1.5.5 Stranded costs
3.1.5.6 Availability of wholesale capacity
3.1.6 Relevant evidence
3.1.6.1 Changes in market share
3.1.6.2 Market surveys
3.1.6.3 Price levels
3.1.7 The Energy Sector Inquiry and merger review ever since: a more sophisticated approach to defining market power
4. Horizontal mergers
4.1 Horizontal mergers within the same relevant geographic market
4.2 Horizontal mergers between companies active on neighbouring geographic markets
5. Vertical mergers
6. Conglomerate mergers between electricity and gas companies
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Merger between a dominant and a non-dominant undertaking,
or between two non-dominant firms
6.3 Merger between a dominant gas and a dominant electricity
company
6.4 Cases dealt with by the Commission
6.4.1 EDP/GDP
6.4.2 DONG/Elsam/Energy E2
6.5 Cases dealt with by national competition authorities
6.6 Conclusions
7. Coordinated effects and oligopolistic dominance
8. Conclusion
CHAPTER 5
Remedies in energy mergers
1. Introduction
2. Divestiture of shareholdings
2.1 Divestiture and severance of structural links
2.2 Accompanying commitments to divestiture
2.3 Up-front buyer
3. Other remedies in relation to shareholdings
4. Access to generation capacities
5. Access to infrastructure / divestiture of infrastructure
5.1 Access to transmission and storage infrastructure
5.2 Improvement of the functioning of the infrastructures
5.3 Release of capacity at interconnectors
5.4 Increase of interconnector capacity
5.5 Divestiture of infrastructure
6. Remedies related to contracts
7. Remedies related to tariffs and prices
8. Insufficient remedies
CHAPTER 6
Merger procedure
1. Pre-notification contacts
2. Notification
2.1 Mandatory notification
2.2 Suspension effect
2.3 Content of the notification
2.4 Language
3. Simplified procedure
4. Standard procedure
4.1 Phase I
4.2 Phase II
5. Third party involvement in the proceedings
6. Business secrets
7. Sanctions for violation of procedural obligations
7.1 Failure to notify
7.2 Implementation of a concentration
7.3 Failure to implement a remedy
7.4 Supply of incorrect or misleading information
8. Judicial review
8.1 Decisions open to appeal
8.2 Standing to appeal
8.3 Scope of judicial review
8.4 Consequences of the annulment of a merger decision
Part 5
State aid
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
CHAPTER 2
Coal and Nuclear Aid
Section I: Coal: the ECSC Treaty
1. Introduction
2. EC Council Regulation 1407/02 and the Coal Decision 2010
2.1 Substantive provisions
2.2 Procedural provisions
3. Individual decisions under Regulation 1407/02
3.1 New Member States
Section II: Nuclear: the Euratom Treaty
1. Introduction
2. Commission decisions
2.1 Decisions pre-Lisbon
3. Hinkley Point C
3.1 The General Court judgment
4. Recent Commission Decisions
5. Transparency
CHAPTER 3
State aid in the TFEU
1. Introduction
2. The beneficiary
3. State resources
3.1 State resources and tradeable certificates
4. Imputability
4.1 Imputability and Taxation on Energy Products
4.2 Imputability and Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs)
5. The concept of advantage
5.1 Disposal of public land or assets at less than full market value
5.2 State participation and the market economy investor test
5.2.1 Introduction
5.2.2 The private investor test or the ‘MEIT’ and investments by State Undertakings
5.2.3 The market investor test and the PPAs
5.2.4 The EDF rulings
6. Selectivity
6.1 Selectivity issues and the EC Directive 2003/87
7. Effect on trade
8. The de minimis Regulation
9. Conclusion
10. Forms of state aid
10.1 Introduction
10.2 The Communication on state guarantees
10.2.1 Background
10.2.2 The Commission’s 2008 Notice on State Guarantees
10.2.3 Benchmarks
10.3 Infrastructure aid
10.4 Aid granted through energy sector companies
10.4.1 Introduction
10.4.2 Cross-subsidisation
11. The Relationship between Article 107(1) TFEU
with other Treaty Articles
11.1 Introduction
11.2 The free movement principles
11.3 Para-fiscal charges and indirect taxation
11.4 The Competition rules
11.4.1 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
11.4.2 The Merger Regulation
11.4.3 Conclusion
CHAPTER 4
The application of EU state aid lawto the energy sector
1. Introduction
1.1 The automatic exceptions – Article 107(2) TFEU
1.2 The discretionary exceptions – Article 107(3) TFEU
1.3 The exemption regulations
2. The individual exemptions
2.1 Article 107(3)(a): Regional aid
2.2 The Financial Crisis – the Temporary Frameworks
2.3 Article 107(3)(b) TFEU: Projects of common interest
2.4 Article 107(3)(c) TFEU: Development of economic activities or areas
2.5 The Regional Aid Guidelines
2.6 The Regional Aid Guidelines for 2014-2020
2.7 Research and Development and Innovation Framework
3. Guidelines with relevance to the energy sector
3.1 Rescue and restructuring aid
3.1.1 Introduction
3.1.2 Rescue aid
3.1.3 Restructuring aid
4. The methodology on stranded costs
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The criteria for stranded cost exemption
4.3 The individual decisions
4.3.1 Austria
4.3.2 Belgium
4.3.3 Greece
4.3.4 Hungary
4.3.5 Ireland
4.3.6 Italy
4.3.7 Luxembourg
4.3.8 The Netherlands
4.3.9 Poland
4.3.10 Portugal
4.3.11 Slovenia
4.3.12 Spain
4.3.13 United Kingdom
5. Public service obligations
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The SGEI frameworks and decisions
5.3 The energy sector and Article 106(2) TFEU
5.4 The Commission’s guidance notes on Directives 2003/54 and 2003/55
6. The Clean Energy Package
CHAPTER 5
State aid for environmental protection
1. Introduction
2. The 2014 Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Legal basis and common assessment principles
2.1.2 The General Compatibility provisions
2.2 Key features in the 2014 Guidelines
2.2.1 Changes in the mechanisms for renewable energy support
2.2.2 Aid for generation adequacy
2.2.3 Competitiveness of European Industry and the exemption from funding of RES
2.2.4 Cross-border energy infrastructure
2.2.5 Individual aid measures covered by the 2014 Guidelines
2.2.6 (a) Objective of common interest
2.2.7 (b) Need for State intervention
2.2.8 (c) appropriateness of the aid measure (Section 3.2.3);
2.2.9 (d) incentive effect (Section 3.2.4);
2.2.10 (e) proportionality of the aid (aid kept to the minimum)
(Section 3.2.5);
2.2.11 (f) avoidance of undue negative effects on competition and
trade between Member States (Section 3.2.6);
2.2.12 (g) transparency of aid (Section 3.2.7)
2.3 Measures previously covered by the 2008 Guidelines
2.3.1 Aid for efficiency measures, including cogeneration and district heating and cooling
2.3.2 Aid for resource efficiency and in particular for waste management
2.3.3 Aid for environmental studies
2.3.4 Aid for early adaptation/ going beyond Union standards or for higher environmental protection in the absence of Union standards (including aid for the acquisition of new transport vehicles)
2.3.5 Aid for the remediation of contaminated sites
2.3.6 Aid for the relocation of undertakings
2.3.7 Aid involved in tradable permit schemes
2.3.8 Aid for carbon capture and storage
2.4 New Measures under the 2014 Guidelines
2.4.1 Capacity mechanisms
2.4.2 Tax reductions or exemptions and in particular exemptions from RES funding
2.4.3 Exemption from network charges for large electricity consumers
2.4.4 Aid for energy infrastructure
3. Concluding remarks
CHAPTER 6
State aid procedure
1. Introduction
2. The Treaty regime
3. New aid
4. Existing aid
4.1 Existing or New Aid and Preferential Tariffs
4.2 Existing aid in the new Member States
4.3 Existing versus New Aid in the Hungarian and Polish PPA cases
4.4 New aid
4.4.1 Formal notification is often preceded by an informal pre-notification procedure.
4.4.1.1 Pre-Notification
4.4.1.2 The preliminary investigation
4.4.2 The formal or contentious phase
4.4.3 Information requirements
4.4.4 Procedures in relation to existing aid schemes
4.5 Recovery of unlawful aid
4.5.1 Introduction
4.5.2 Recovery in the Hungary PPA case
4.5.3 Contractual termination
4.5.4 International Law aspects
4.5.5 Legitimate expectations
4.5.6 Recovery from a subsequent owner
4.5.7 The ‘Deggendorf’ Principle
4.5.8 Para-fiscal charges and recovery
4.6 Judicial review
4.6.1 Introduction
4.6.2 Locus Standi
4.6.3 The “Plaumann” Test
4.6.4 Trade associations and NGOs
4.6.5 The role of the national courts
4.6.6 Energy cases
5. Ex Post Monitoring
5.1 Evaluation Plans
5.2 Monitoring of Aid Schemes
Part 6
Article 106 TFEU
Chapter 1
Special and exclusive rights
1. Introduction
2. The Treaty Article
3. Article 106(1) TFEU
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Public undertakings
3.3 Special and exclusive rights
3.4 The scope of Article 106(1) TFEU
3.4.1 Article 106(1) TFEU and Treaty rules on the four freedoms
3.4.2 Article 106 (1) and Article 102 EC
3.4.2.1 Accumulation of rights
3.4.2.2 Manifest failure to satisfy demand
3.4.2.3 The Corbeau-type cases
4. Article 106(2) TFEU
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Article 14 TFEU and the Protocol 26 on SGIs
4.3 What are services of general economic interest?
4.4 The requirements of Article 106(2) TFEU
4.4.1 Specific task or mission
4.4.2 Task entrusted by a public measure
4.4.3 The Necessity and Proportionality Tests
4.4.4 The Union interest
5. Article 106(3) TFEU
6. Services of general economic interest in the energy sector
6.1 Introduction
6.2 The “electricity cases” of 1997
6.3 Article 106(2) and the IEM Directives
6.4 Federutility, v Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas (C-265/08)
6.5 Financing public service obligations and Article 106(2) TFEU
6.6 Trends in Commission Practice before and after Altmark
7. Conclusion
Appendix 1
TFEU Articles
1. Anti-trust Law
1.1 Article 101 (ex Article 81 TEC)
1.2 Article 102 (ex Article 82 TEC)
1.3 Article 103 (ex Article 83 TEC)
1.4 Article 104 (ex Article 84 TEC)
1.5 Article 105 (ex Article 85 TEC)
1.6 Article 106 (ex Article 86 TEC)
2. State Aid
2.1 Article 14 (ex Article 16 TEC)
2.2. Article 42 (ex Article 36 TEC)
2.3 Article 93 (ex Article 73 TEC)
2.4 Article 106 (ex Article 86 TEC)
2.5 Article 107 (ex Article 87 TEC)
2.6 Article 108 (ex Article 88 TEC)
2.7 Article 109 (ex Article 89 TEC)
Appendix 2
Implementation of the rules on competition
Appendix 3
1.    INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose and scope
1.2.   Basic principles for the assessment under Article 101
1.2.1   Article 101(1)
1.2.2 Article 101(3)
1.3 Structure of these guidelines
2.    GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON THE COMPETITIVE
ASSESSMENT OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE
2.1 Definition and scope
2.2    Assessment under Article 101(1)
2.2.1 Main competition concerns53
2.2.2 Restriction of competition by object
2.2.3 Restrictive effects on competition
2.3 Assessment under Article 101(3)
2.3.1 Efficiency gains76
2.3.2 Indispensability
2.3.3 Pass-on to consumers
2.3.4 No elimination of competition
2.4 Examples
3.    RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS
3.1 Definition
3.2 Relevant markets
3.3 Assessment under Article 101(1)
3.3.1 Main competition concerns
3.3.2 Restrictions of competition by object
3.3.3 Restrictive effects on competition
3.4.   Assessment under Article 101(3)
3.4.1.   Efficiency gains
3.4.2 Indispensability
3.4.3 Pass-on to consumers
3.4.4.   No elimination of competition
3.4.5 Time of the assessment
3.5 Examples
4.    PRODUCTION AGREEMENTS
4.1 Definition and scope
4.2 Relevant markets
4.3 Assessment under Article 101(1)
4.3.1 Main competition concerns
4.3.2 Restrictions of competition by object
4.3.3 Restrictive effects on competition
4.4 Assessment under Article 101(3)
4.4.1 Efficiency gains
4.4.2 Indispensability
4.4.3 Pass-on to consumers
4.4.4 No elimination of competition
4.5 Examples
5.    PURCHASING AGREEMENTS
5.1 Definition
5.2 Relevant markets
5.3 Assessment under Article 101(1)
5.3.1 Main competition concerns
5.3.2 Restrictions of competition by object
5.3.3 Restrictive effects on competition
5.4 Assessment under Article 101(3)
5.4.1 Efficiency gains
5.4.3 Pass-on to consumers
5.4.4 No elimination of competition
5.5 Examples
6.    AGREEMENTS ON COMMERCIALISATION
6.1    Definition
6.2 Relevant markets
6.3 Assessment under Article 101(1)
6.3.1 Main competition concerns
6.3.2 Restrictions of competition by object
6.3.3 Restrictive effects on competition
6.4 Assessment under Article 101(3)
6.4.1 Efficiency gains
6.4.2 Indispensability
6.4.3 Pass-on to consumers
6.4.4 No elimination of competition
7.    STANDARDISATION AGREEMENTS
7.1 Definition
7.2 Relevant markets
7.3 Assessment under Article 101(1)
7.3.1 Main competition concerns
7.3.2 Restrictions of competition by object
7.3.3 Restrictive effects on competition
7.4 Assessment under Article 101(3)
7.4.1 Efficiency gains
7.4.2 Indispensability
7.4.3 Pass-on to consumers
7.4.4 No elimination of competition
7.5 Examples
Notes
Appendix 4
COMMISSION NOTICE
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Purpose of the Guidelines
2. Applicability of Article 101 to vertical agreements
II. VERTICAL AGREEMENTS WHICH GENERALLY FALL OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 101(1)
1. Agreements of minor importance and SMEs
2. Agency agreements
2.1 Definition of agency agreements
2.2 The application of Article 101(1) to agency agreements
3. Subcontracting agreements
III. APPLICATION OF THE BLOCK EXEMPTION
REGULATION
1. Safe harbour created by the Block Exemption Regulation
2. Scope of the Block Exemption Regulation
2.1 Definition of vertical agreements
2.2 Vertical agreements between competitors
2.3 Associations of retailers
2.4 Vertical agreements containing provisions on intellectual property rights (IPRs)
2.5 Relationship to other block exemption regulations
3. Hardcore restrictions under the Block Exemption Regulation
4. Individual cases of hardcore sales restrictions that may fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) or may fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3)
5. Excluded restrictions under the Block Exemption Regulation
6. Severability
7. Portfolio of products distributed through the same distribution system
IV. WITHDRAWAL OF THE BLOCK EXEMPTION AND
DISAPPLICATION OF THE BLOCK EXEMPTION
REGULATION
1. Withdrawal procedure
2. Disapplication of the Block Exemption Regulation
V. MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET SHARE
CALCULATION
1. Commission Notice on definition of the relevant market
2. The relevant market for calculating the 30 % market share ­threshold under the Block Exemption Regulation
3. Calculation of market shares under the Block Exemption Regulation
VI. ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN INDIVIDUAL CASES
1. The framework of analysis
1.1 Negative effects of vertical restraints
1.2. Positive effects of vertical restraints
1.3 Methodology of analysis
1.3.1. Relevant factors for the assessment under Article 101(1)
1.3.2 Relevant factors for the assessment under Article 101(3)
2. Analysis of specific vertical restraints
2.1 Single branding
2.2 Exclusive distribution
2.3 Exclusive customer allocation
2.4 Selective distribution
2.5 Franchising
2.6 Exclusive supply
2.7 Upfront access payments
2.8 Category Management Agreements
2.9 Tying
2.10 Resale price restrictions
Notes
Appendix 5
Notes
Appendix 6
1.    SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
1.1.    Scope of application
1.2.    Aid measures covered by the Guidelines
1.3.    Definitions
2.    NOTIFIABLE ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY AID
3.    COMPATIBILITY ASSESSMENT UNDER ARTICLE 107(3)C OF THE TREATY
3.1.    Common Assessment Principles
3.2. General compatibility provisions
3.3.    Aid to energy from renewable sources
3.4.    Energy efficiency measures, including cogeneration and district heating and district cooling
3.5.    Aid for resource efficiency and in particular aid to waste management
3.6.    Aid to Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)
3.7.    Aid in the form of reductions in or exemptions from environmental taxes and in the form of reductions in funding support for electricity from renewable sources
3.8. Aid to energy infrastructure
3.9.  Aid for generation adequacy
3.10. Aid in the form of tradable permit schemes
4.    EVALUATION
5.    APPLICATION
6.    REPORTING AND MONITORING
7.    REVISION
Notes
Notes
Appendix 7
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015