دانلود کتاب EU Liability and International Economic Law

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Preface\nTable of Contents\nIntroduction\nPart One:\rEU Liability and Violations of WTO law\n 1\n Analytical Preliminaries\n I. Terminological issues-the term \'direct effect\'\n II. The line of argument\n III. Relevant damage situations\n IV. General principles common to the laws of the Member States\n V. The standard of unlawfulness\n 2\n The Lack of Direct Effect of DSB Rulings\n I. Direct effect of DSB decisions in the Court\"s jurisprudence\n II. \"Whether\" to comply with the DSB ruling\n III. No unconditionality regarding the \"how\" of a compliance obligation\n 3\n Dispensability of Direct Effect for EU Liability\n I. Introduction\n II. Effet utile and Article 216 para 2 TFEU\n III. The need for legal redress\n IV. The principle of cooperation under Article 4 para 3 TEU\n 4\n DSB Ruling and the Protection of Individual Rights\n I. The requirements of individual protection under Article 340 para 2 TFEU\n II. The protective character of WTO law and DSB decisions\n III. Interim conclusions on the quality of WTO law as a Schutznorm\n 5\n Identifiability of an Individual Right\n I. Addressee of the DSB decision\n II. The declaratory character of the DSB decision\n III. Identifiability in the bananas and hormones disputes\n 6\n Further Liability Requirements\n I. The \'sufficiently serious breach\' requirement\n II. Damage\n III. Causality\n 7\n Damage Claims and Fundamental Rights\nPart Two:\rEconomic Analysis of Liability for WTO Violations\n 8\n Analytical Foundations\n I. Economic analysis and liability\n II. Institutional economics and EU liability\n III. Incomplete information and the compliance standard\n 9\n Compensation of Financial Losses and Over-deterrence\n I. The level of welfare maximising protectionism\n II. The paralysing effect resulting from WTO liability claims\n III. Interim conclusions\n 10\n Liability Rule and Incentives\n I. No-liability rule and malincentives\n II. Incentive scheme and liability for WTO breaches\n III. Conclusions\nPart Three:\rEU Liability and Investment Treaties\n 11\n Introduction\n I. Investment Agreements as Mixed Agreements\n II. New EU Rules on Investor-State Disputes\n III. Liability Issues Under the New EU Investment Policy\n 12\n Responsibility of Union and Member States for Breaches of Mixed Investment Agreements\n I. Attributing Responsibility to the Union\n II. Attributing Responsibility to the Member State\n III. Joint and several liability of EU and Member States?\n 13\n Internal Allocation of Financial Responsibility within the EU\n I. Difficulties in attribution\n II. Apportionment of Financial Responsibility\n III. Who should be a Party to the dispute?\n IV. Cooperation in Proceedings\n V. Liability Claims between Union and Member States\n VI. Conclusions\nSummary\nReferences\nIndex