دانلود کتاب Game Theory in Action: An Introduction to Classical and Evolutionary Models

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Contents\nPreface and acknowledgments\nChapter 1. Backward induction\n 1.1 Tony’s Accident\n 1.2 Games in extensive form with complete information\n 1.3 Strategies\n 1.4 Backward induction\n 1.5 Big Monkey and Little Monkey 1\n 1.6 Threats, promises, commitments\n 1.7 Ultimatum Game\n 1.8 Rosenthal’s Centipede Game\n 1.9 Continuous games\n 1.10 Stackelberg’s model of duopoly 1\n 1.11 Stackelberg’s model of duopoly 2\n 1.12 Backward induction for finite horizon games\n 1.13 Critique of backward induction\n 1.14 Problems\nChapter 2. Eliminating dominated strategies\n 2.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma\n 2.2 Games in normal form\n 2.3 Dominated strategies\n 2.4 Israelis and Palestinians\n 2.5 Global Warming\n 2.6 Hagar’s Battles\n 2.7 Second-price auctions\n 2.8 Iterated elimination of dominated strategies\n 2.9 The Battle of the Bismarck Sea\n 2.10 Normal form of a game in extensive form with complete information\n 2.11 Big Monkey and Little Monkey 2\n 2.12 Backward induction\n 2.13 Critique of elimination of dominated strategies\n 2.14 Problems\nChapter 3. Nash equilibria\n 3.1 Big Monkey and Little Monkey 3 and the definition of Nash equilibria\n 3.2 Finding Nash equilibria by inspection: Important examples\n 3.3 Water Pollution 1\n 3.4 Arguing over Marbles\n 3.5 Tobacco Market\n 3.6 Iterated elimination of dominated strategies\n 3.7 Big Monkey and Little Monkey 4\n 3.8 Finding Nash equilibria using best response\n 3.9 Big Monkey and Little Monkey 5\n 3.10 Water Pollution 2\n 3.11 Cournot’s model of duopoly\n 3.12 Problems\nChapter 4. Games in extensive form with incomplete information\n 4.1 Utility functions and lotteries\n 4.2 Buying Fire Insurance\n 4.3 Games in extensive form with incomplete information\n 4.4 Buying a Used Car\n 4.5 The Travails of Boss Gorilla 1\n 4.6 Cuban Missile Crisis\n 4.7 Problems\nChapter 5. Mixed strategy Nash equilibria\n 5.1 Mixed strategy Nash equilibria\n 5.2 Tennis\n 5.3 Other ways to find mixed strategy Nash equilibria\n 5.4 One-card Two-round Poker\n 5.5 Two-player zero-sum games\n 5.6 The Ultimatum Minigame\n 5.7 Colonel Blotto vs. the People’s Militia\n 5.8 Water Pollution 3\n 5.9 Equivalent games\n 5.10 Software for computing Nash equilibria\n 5.11 Critique of Nash equilibrium\n 5.12 Problems\nChapter 6. More about games in extensive form with complete information\n 6.1 Subgame perfect Nash equilibria\n 6.2 Big Monkey and Little Monkey 6\n 6.3 Subgame perfect equilibria and backward induction\n 6.4 Duels and Truels\n 6.5 The Rubinstein bargaining model\n 6.6 Discount factor and repeated games\n 6.7 The Wine Merchant and the Connoisseur\n 6.8 The Folk Theorem\n 6.9 Maximum value of a function\n 6.10 The Samaritan’s Dilemma\n 6.11 The Rotten Kid Theorem\n 6.12 Problems\nChapter 7. Symmetries of games\n 7.1 Interchangeable players\n 7.2 Reporting a Crime\n 7.3 Sex Ratio 1\n 7.4 Other symmetries of games\n 7.5 Problems\nChapter 8. Alternatives to the Nash equilibrium\n 8.1 Correlated equilibrium\n 8.2 Epistemic game theory\n 8.3 Evolutionary stability\n 8.4 Evolutionary stability with two pure strategies\n 8.5 Sex Ratio 2\n 8.6 Problems\nChapter 9. Differential equations\n 9.1 Differential equations and scientific laws\n 9.2 The phase line\n 9.3 Vector fields\n 9.4 Functions and differential equations\n 9.5 Linear differential equations\n 9.6 Linearization\nChapter 10. Evolutionary dynamics\n 10.1 Replicator system\n 10.2 Microsoft vs. Apple\n 10.3 Evolutionary dynamics with two pure strategies\n 10.4 Hawks and Doves revisited\n 10.5 Side-blotched Lizards\n 10.6 Equilibria of the replicator system\n 10.7 Cooperators, Defectors, and Tit-for-Tatters\n 10.8 Dominated strategies and the replicator system\n 10.9 Asymmetric evolutionary games\n 10.10 Big Monkey and Little Monkey 7\n 10.11 Hawks and Doves with Unequal Value\n 10.12 The Ultimatum Minigame revisited\n 10.13 Problems\nAppendix. Sources for examples and problems\nReferences\nIndex