دانلود کتاب Handbook of Industrial Organization

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Contributors
Introduction to the series
Preface
10 Market design
1 Introduction
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Taxonomy of market design problems
2.1.1 Matching or allocation?
2.1.2 Transferable utility or non-transferable utility?
2.1.3 Single-unit vs. multi-unit demand?
2.1.4 Endowments?
2.1.5 Clarification: are schools in school-choice agents or objects?
2.2 Canonical market design problems
2.3 Canonical market-design mechanisms
2.3.1 Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance
Key property: stability
Key property: strategy-proof or approximately strategy-proof
Key property: no justified envy
Many-to-one variant
Azevedo-Leshno price-theoretic interpretation of Gale-Shapley (“cutoff structure”)
Hatfield-Milgrom connection between Gale-Shapley and simultaneous ascending auctions
2.3.2 Immediate acceptance (“Boston mechanism”)
Key difference versus deferred acceptance
The cutoff structure of immediate acceptance
Discussion: strategic manipulability and efficiency
2.3.3 Random serial dictatorship
Connection to deferred acceptance
Key properties: strategy-proof and ex-post Pareto efficient
2.3.4 Top trading cycles
Connection to competitive equilibrium
Key properties: strategy-proof and ex-post Pareto efficient
2.3.5 Hylland and Zeckhauser pseudomarket
The pseudomarket equilibrium
Connection to the immediate acceptance algorithm
Properties: ex-ante efficient, SP-L
2.3.6 Draft approaches to multi-unit assignment
2.3.7 Competitive equilibrium approaches to multi-unit assignment
Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (A-CEEI)
Multi-unit generalization of Hylland-Zeckhauser probability shares market
Feeding America artificial-currency market
3 Empirical frameworks and applications
3.1 Non-transferable utility models
3.1.1 Random utility model
3.1.2 Analysis with data from assignment mechanisms
3.1.3 Analysis with data on final outcomes
Continuum many-to-one matching
One-to-one or few-to-one matching
3.2 Transferable utility models
3.2.1 Models with separable unobserved heterogeneity
3.2.2 Semi-parametric approaches
3.3 Extensions
4 Designing markets
4.1 Diagnosing market failures
4.2 Evaluating and comparing designs
4.3 Proposing new market designs
5 Conclusion
References
11 Empirical perspectives on auctions
1 Introduction
2 Timber auctions
2.1 Reserve price and revenue optimization
2.2 Bidders\' entry
2.3 Tests of common value and affiliation
2.4 Bidders\' risk aversion
2.5 Collusion
2.6 Market design insights
2.6.1 Set asides and subsidies
2.6.2 Scale bidding
2.6.3 Sequential vs. simultaneous bid submission
2.6.4 Resale
3 Procurement auctions of construction projects and services
3.1 Asymmetries across bidders and unobservable heterogeneity
3.2 Private or common values?
3.3 Entry and competition
3.4 Collusion
3.5 Cost synergies and combinatorial auctions
3.6 Dynamic auctions
3.7 Subcontracting
3.8 Scaling and scoring rules
3.9 Ex post uncertainty, incomplete contracts, and renegotiation
3.10 Bidding preferences toward minority-owned and small businesses
4 Oil and gas lease auctions
4.1 Common value and winner\'s curse
4.2 Bidding and drilling
4.3 Miscellaneous
5 Online auctions
5.1 Bidding dynamics and sniping in online proxy auctions
5.2 Structural econometric models of proxy auctions
5.3 Online trust
5.4 Auctions vs. fixed prices
5.5 Beyond proxy auctions
6 Internet advertising auctions
6.1 Modeling sponsored search auctions
6.2 Empirical work
6.3 Reserve prices in sponsored search auctions
7 Electricity auctions
7.1 Models of bidding in electricity markets
7.2 Tests of theory
7.3 Estimating generation costs
7.4 Forward contracts and sequential markets
7.5 Transmission constraints
8 Auctions in financial markets
8.1 Treasury auctions
8.1.1 Discrete bids
8.1.2 Private vs. common values and the role of dealers
8.2 Municipal bond auctions
8.3 Auctions in central bank operations
8.4 Derivatives markets
8.5 Takeover auctions
8.5.1 Auctions of insolvent banks
9 Spectrum auctions
9.1 Empirical work on spectrum auctions
9.2 Incentive auctions
10 Auctions of used goods
10.1 Used car auctions
10.2 Auctions of collectible goods: a case study in collusion
11 Concluding remarks
Acknowledgments
References
12 Collusion, mergers, and related antitrust issues
1 Introduction
2 Collusion
2.1 How much collusion is there?
2.2 How does collusion work?
2.2.1 How agreements start
2.2.2 How agreements are structured
2.2.3 How agreements are enforced
2.2.4 Cartels and the threat of entry
2.3 Detection
2.4 Impact of collusion on market performance
3 Mergers
3.1 Efficiencies and other mitigating factors
3.2 Screens
3.3 Unilateral effects analysis
3.3.1 The basic theory of unilateral effects
3.3.2 Empirical implementation: merger simulation and UPP
3.3.3 Horizontal mergers under free entry
3.3.4 Dynamic considerations
3.3.5 Endogenizing the choice of merger
3.3.6 Investment and innovation
3.3.7 Product quality and positioning
3.3.8 Bargaining power effects
3.4 Coordinated effects analysis
3.5 Vertical mergers
3.5.1 Vertical mergers and the elimination of double margins
3.5.2 Foreclosure effects
3.5.3 Coordinated effects
3.6 Remedies
3.7 Overall impact and merger retrospectives
3.8 Emergent issues relating to mergers
4 Conclusion
A Summary of merger retrospectives
References
13 Innovation: market failures and public policies
1 Introduction
1.1 Market failures and innovation
1.2 Innovation and growth
1.3 Empirical challenges
1.3.1 Measurement challenges
1.3.2 Inference challenges
1.4 Overview of this chapter
2 Science as a non-market incentive
2.1 What drives the rate and direction of scientific research?
2.2 Knowledge production: the burden of knowledge hypothesis
2.3 How should science be funded?
3 Theory and evidence on market-based innovation policies
3.1 Taxes and innovation
3.2 Intellectual property rights
3.2.1 Patents: a primer
3.2.2 Intellectual property: theory
3.2.3 Intellectual property: evidence
3.3 Competition policy
3.4 Labor market policies
4 Innovation, diffusion, and growth
4.1 Measuring diffusion
4.2 Theories of diffusion
5 Innovation and inequality
5.1 Does innovation increase inequality?
5.2 Is inequality causing society to lose potential innovators?
6 Conclusion
References
14 The IO of selection markets
1 Introduction
2 Some (brief) intellectual history
2.1 Selection market theory
2.2 The empirical testing literature
3 Theoretical framework
3.1 Setting and notation
3.2 Definitions and terminology
3.3 Road map
4 Empirical models of demand in selection markets
5 Pricing and equilibrium with selection
5.1 Perfect competition
5.2 Imperfect competition
5.3 Endogenous contract design
5.4 Rejections and customized pricing
6 Welfare
6.1 Customized pricing and reclassification risk
6.2 Demand vs. welfare
7 Looking ahead
References
15 The industrial organization of financial markets
1 Introduction
2 A model of financial intermediation
3 Wholesale funding markets
3.1 Market for government debt
3.1.1 Using auction data to study financial markets
3.1.2 Estimation of willingness-to-pay
3.1.3 Evaluating the performance of the auction mechanism
3.1.4 Quantifying market power
3.1.5 Quantification of front-running and testing for private values
Private versus interdependent values in treasury bill auctions
Quantifying the order flow
3.1.6 Mapping bids into a demand system for government securities
3.2 Secondary market and demand for liquidity
3.2.1 Auction mechanisms
3.2.2 Over-the-counter markets
4 Retail funding markets
4.1 Framework
4.2 Sources of market power
4.2.1 Measuring product differentiation
Entry models
4.2.2 Measuring switching costs
4.2.3 Other sources of market power
4.3 Market power in retail funding markets and financial stability
5 Retail credit markets
5.1 Modeling framework
5.2 Asymmetric information and default risk
5.3 Market power and search frictions
Evidence: price dispersion and search
Model: price competition with search frictions
Extensions: adverse-selection, price ceilings, and repayment risk
6 Regulation of financial markets
6.1 Financial stability and regulation
6.1.1 Deposit insurance
6.1.2 Capital regulations
6.1.3 Competition and stability
Entry regulations
Competition from shadow banks
6.2 Lending price regulations
6.3 Intermediaries and agency problems
7 Conclusion
Acknowledgments
References
16 The industrial organization of health care markets
1 Introduction
2 Insurers and providers: competition and antitrust
2.1 Facts about insurer and provider prices and competition
2.1.1 Insurer concentration and premium variation
2.1.2 Insurer network differentiation
2.1.3 Provider price dispersion and provider consolidation
2.2 Demand: consumer choice of providers
2.2.1 Discrete choice models: consumer demand for hospitals
Specification differences across papers
Willingness-to-pay (WTP)
Related papers
Impact on antitrust policy
2.2.2 Physician - patient interactions
2.2.3 Other related issues
Price transparency
Surprise billing
2.3 Demand: consumer choices in insurance markets
2.4 Supply: insurer-hospital price negotiations and premium setting
2.4.1 A model of price and premium negotiations
Profit equations
Employer-insurer bargaining over premiums
Insurer-hospital bargaining over hospital prices
2.4.2 Equilibrium negotiated premiums and hospital prices
Insurer premiums
Hospital prices
Effects of reducing insurer competition
2.4.3 Other related papers
2.4.4 Revisiting provider consolidation
2.4.5 Network formation
A model of price negotiation and network formation: Nash-in-Nash with threat of replacement
Distinguishing features of NNTR versus Nash-in-Nash bargaining
2.5 Provider markets and quality
2.6 Medical organization responses to price regulation
2.7 Vertical consolidation between providers
2.8 Medical devices: prices and bargaining
3 Consumer choice in health insurance markets
3.1 Health insurance demand: baseline model
3.1.1 Health insurance demand: moral hazard
3.1.2 Health insurance demand: plan choice
3.2 Choice frictions: active choice issues
3.3 Choice frictions: inertia and passive choice issues
4 Health insurance market design and regulation
4.1 Frameworks for studying insurance market design
4.1.1 Modeling imperfect competition
4.2 Managed competition exchanges: examples
4.3 Regulation of competitive insurance markets
4.4 Choice frictions and health insurance market design
4.4.1 Consumer mistakes and adverse selection
4.4.2 Choice frictions and firm pricing
4.4.3 Choice set restrictions and targeted defaults
4.5 Imperfect competition and welfare
4.6 Group markets
4.7 Long-term guaranteed renewable contracts
5 Going forward
References
17 Energy and environmental markets, industrial organization, and regulation
1 Introduction
2 Extraction of energy resources
2.1 Dynamics of oil production and drilling timing
2.1.1 The ``standard\'\' Hotelling model
2.1.2 Augmenting Hotelling by separating drilling and production
2.1.3 Real options: drilling in the presence of stochastic oil prices
2.1.4 OPEC, market power, and drilling sequencing
2.2 Oil and gas mineral leasing
2.2.1 Royalties and primary terms
2.2.2 Information, common value auctions, and royalties
2.2.3 Uncertainty about the number of bidders
2.2.4 Sequential lease auctions and firms\' valuations of neighboring tracts
2.2.5 Auctions vs unstructured oil and gas leasing
2.2.6 Reassignment of leases after the initial sale
2.2.7 Opportunities for future work on oil and gas leasing
2.3 Information spillovers and externalities
2.3.1 A theoretical framework for free-riding and the incentive to delay exploration: the ``war of attrition\'\'
2.3.2 Empirical evidence on cross-firm information spillovers and strategic delay
2.3.3 Exploration spillovers across tracts governed by different extraction policies
2.4 Productivity, innovation, and learning
2.4.1 Learning about the production function and optimal input choices
2.4.2 Learning where to drill
2.4.3 Productivity in vertical relationships
2.4.4 Lessons learned and paths for future work on oil and gas productivity
2.5 Environmental regulation of resource extraction and transportation
2.5.1 Regulation of environmental damage at production sites and of site decommissioning
2.5.2 Regulation of emissions from hydrocarbon transportation
2.5.3 Interactions between downstream environmental regulations and market power in resource transportation
2.5.4 Opportunities for future work on impacts of environmental regulation on fossil fuel extraction and transportation
3 Personal transportation, energy use, and environmental regulation
3.1 Estimating consumers\' demand for fuel economy, and implications for fuel economy policy
3.1.1 Identifying consumers\' valuation of fuel costs from used vehicle prices
3.1.2 Consumer valuation of fuel costs for new vehicles
3.1.3 Lessons learned and paths forward for research on consumers\' valuation of fuel economy
3.2 Economic impacts of, and firms\' responses to, fuel economy standards
3.2.1 Fuel economy standards and automakers\' pricing and fleet mix decisions
3.2.2 Fuel economy standards and vehicle attributes
3.2.3 Attribute-based fuel economy standards
3.2.4 Gaming of fuel economy standards
3.2.5 Lessons learned on fuel economy standards, and paths for future work
3.3 Industrial organization and vehicles\' emissions of local air pollutants
3.4 Consumers\' fuel search behavior
3.5 Markets for EVs and EV charging stations
3.5.1 Indirect network effects and EV incentive policies
3.5.2 Compatibility between charging networks
3.5.3 Paths for future research on EVs and EV charging
4 Electricity markets
4.1 The restructuring of electricity markets
4.1.1 Aggregate impacts of restructuring
4.1.2 Plant-level evidence of the impacts of restructuring
4.1.3 Natural monopoly regulation in distribution
4.2 Market power in wholesale electricity markets
4.2.1 Estimating market power
4.2.2 Taking electricity auctions to heart
4.2.3 FOC approach and pass-through analysis
4.2.4 Market power and dynamics
4.2.5 Sequential markets and arbitrage
4.2.6 Modeling transmission and market power
4.3 Renewable power and the energy transition
4.3.1 Estimating the environmental impact of renewables
4.3.2 Estimating the market impacts of renewables
4.3.3 Renewables and learning-by-doing
4.3.4 Renewables and demand-side dynamics
4.4 Electricity demand
4.4.1 Estimating the elasticity of electricity demand
4.4.2 Experimental evidence on demand response
4.4.3 Competition in retail electricity markets
4.5 Cap-and-trade regulation in electricity markets
4.5.1 Emissions markets in the US electricity sector
4.5.2 Interactions between cap-and-trade regulation and regulatory regime
5 Environmental regulation of energy-intensive industries and natural resources
5.1 Environmental regulation in manufacturing and resource-intensive sectors
5.1.1 Climate regulation and leakage
5.1.2 Leakage in dynamic models
5.2 Imperfect monitoring and the enforcement of regulations
5.2.1 Evidence of cheating in environmental settings
5.2.2 Structural models of enforcement
5.3 Regulation of water markets
5.3.1 Water use and adaptation
5.3.2 Studying formal water markets
6 Concluding remarks
References
Index