دانلود کتاب How Aristotle Gets By In Metaphysics Zeta (Oxford Aristotle Studies Series)

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Cover\nContents\nIntroduction\n 1 An Oblique Approach to Substance\n 2 Some Alien Presences\n 3 Some Unexpected Absences\nPart One: The Shape of Zeta\n 1 The Hitch-Hiker’s Guide to Metaphysics Zeta\n The Approach to Substance in Zeta\n 1 Metaphysics Zeta 1: A Minimum Metaphysical Theory\n 2 The Definition of Substance: The Agenda of Zeta, and a First Look at Levels\n The Three Segments of Zeta: A Bird’s-Eye View\n 3 Substance and Subjects\n 4 Substance and Essence\n 5 Substance and Universals\n The Anti-Platonism of Zeta, and Some Other Participants in the Debate\n 6 A Place for Polemics\n 7 Expanding the Dramatis Personae\n Two Constraints on the Account of Substance? Levels and Non-Linearity\n 8 Levels\n 9 Non-Linearity: Inaccessibility and the Common Conclusion Assumption\n 10 The Logic of Non-Linearity\n Some Alternative Argumentative Strategies\n 11 “Mapping” the Old Onto The New, and A Use For Abductive Argument\nPart Two: Substance as Subject\n 2 Subjects in Metaphysics Zeta 3\n 1 Sources of the Received View: Aristotle’s Categories, and the Early Philosophers of Nature\n 2 Aristotle’s Target in Zeta 3\n 3 The Distribution of “Received” and “Partisan” in Zeta 3; On “Stripping Away”\n 4 The Shift from “Received” to “Partisan”: the Cross-Theoretical Identification Between the Result of Stripping Away and Matter\n 5 The Trouble with Matter\n 6 Bare Substrates and Bare Substrate Ontology\n 7 The Homonymy of Matter, and Some Difficulties for Metaphysical Predication\n 8 Conclusion\nPart Three: Substance as Essence\n 3 A Start on Essence in Metaphysics Zeta 4\n 1 “How (Informed) People Speak” About Essence: Two Points of Contact with the Tradition\n 2 Beyond Received Views: Partisan Developments\n 3 How to Talk About Essence: Ownership versus Content\n 4 A First Approach, Conducted Logik(omitted)s: Essence and “What a Thing is per se”\n 5 A Second Approach to Essence: the Connection with Definition\n 6 Does a Compound of a Substance with an Accident have an Essence?: Essence and the Thisness Test\n 7 Two Conditions on Definition and Essence: Unity and Primacy\n 8 Grades of Being, of Essence, and of Definition\n Appendix: Greek Hoper and the Pseudo-Cleft Constructions in English\n 4 Sameness, Substitution, and Essence (I): Zeta 5, the SE, and “A Nose by Any Other Name”\n The Puzzles of Essence, and an Apparent Discrepancy\n 1 The Three Puzzles in Zeta 5\n 2 What Aristotle Knows About Snub in the SE\n How to Make Room for the Puzzles in Zeta 5\n 3 The No-Solution Solution\n 4 Accidents and Compounds\n 5 Contextual Definition\n 6 Making Room for the Puzzles in Zeta 5: the Issue of Validity\n Back to the SE\n 7 Double Trouble\n 8 Saying the Same Thing Again Again\n Sameness and Substitution\n 9 The Puzzles, Sameness, and Definition\n 10 The Puzzles and Some Principles of Sameness\n 11 Sameness and Definition: Substitution and the Extended Sameness Test\n The Zeta 5 Puzzles Revisited, and a Defence of Babbling\n 12 The Remaining Strategy\n 13 A Nose By Any Other Name: Substitution and Reformulation in the Three Puzzles\n 14 In Defence of Babbling\n Afterword: Reservations and Retractions\n 15 Does Aristotle’s Argument Hit Too Wide a Target?\n 16 Does the Argument Hit No Target At All?\n 17 Systematic Considerations\n 5 Sameness, Substitution, and Essence (II): The SE, and the Pale Man Argument from Zeta 6\n Some Background Ideas\n 1 Aristotle’s Hierarchy of Essences, and “Things that are the Same as Their Essences”\n The Pale Man Argument\n 2 Things that are Not (Essentially) the Same as Their Essences: the Pale Man Argument\n 3 So Many Arguments, So Many Ways To Go Wrong\n Referential Opacity and the Pale Man Argument\n 4 Referential Opacity, and the Fallacy of Accident\n 5 From the Fallacy of Accident to the Non-Sameness Result: the Supporting Argument\n Referential Opacity and the Theory of Essence\n 6 “Under a Description”\n 7 Ownership versus Content Again\n 8 Composite Essences and Their Owners\n 9 Conclusion\n 6 Plato as Friend: Is There Room for Plato in an Aristotelian Theory of Essence?\n Purity in the Engagement with Plato\n 1 The Basic Argument for Sameness\n 2 Plato and the Elaboration of the Basic Argument\n “Severance”: How Platonic Separation is not a Target\n 3 “Severance” and Its Consequences: 1031b3–11\n 4 A Fresh Argument for Identity: Severance and a Principle From the Theory of Izzing and Having\n Goodbye to Severance, and in Defence of Uniformity\n 5 The Applications of Uniformity: Fallacy, or True Platonic Doctrine?\n 6 Fallacy Again, or More True Doctrine?\n 7 Aristotle on How Plato’s Forms are Inessential to His Argument\n 7 Substance as Essence: The Shift to “Partisan” Mode in Zeta 10 and 11\n 1 Zeta 10 and the Transition to “Partisan” Mode\n 2 A Partisan Question in Zeta 11\n 3 On How Aristotle Manages the Shift from the Tradition to the Partisan Point of View (i): The Full-Expansion Condition on Definition, and the Drive to Form as Primary Substance?\n 4 On How to Manage the Shift from the Tradition to the Partisan Point of View (ii): The Full-Expansion Condition on Definition, and an Isomorphism Between Theories?\n 5 Some Conclusions\nPart Four: Substance as Universal\n 8 Substance and Universals (I): Plato as Foe: Setting the Stage in Zeta 13\n 1 The Programme of Zeta 13\n 2 The Platonic View of Universals in Zeta 13–16\n “No Universal is a Substance”\n 3 Zeta 13, 1038b8–15: The Primary Argument\n 4 Does Aristotle Play Fair with Plato in the Primary Argument?: The Primary Argument and the Argument of Zeta 6\n 5 The Limits of the Primary Argument\n 6 An Ad Hominem Objection to Aristotle: the Problem of Friendly Fire\n 7 Zeta 13, 1038b16–23: A Reprise of the Primary Argument\n 8 Zeta 13, 1038b15–16: On Substance and Predication\n 9 Zeta 13, 1038b34–1039a3: Universals and the This–Such Distinction\n “No Substance can have Actual Substance as Its Parts”\n 10 Zeta 13, 1038b23–29, 29–30: A Substance and Its Parts\n 11 The Problem of Friendly Fire Again\n 12 Some General Results, 1038b30–34\n 13 Lines, Numbers, and Democritean Atoms: 1039a3–14\n 14 The Closing Dilemma of Zeta 13: More on the Structure of Universals, 1039a14–23\n Individuals and Their Kinds: Aristotle’s Alternative to Plato\n 15 A Closer Look at Kinds\n 16 Individual and Kinds, and How the Form is Predicated of the Matter: (i) An Account of Statement Predication\n 17 Individuals and Kinds, and How the Form is Predicated of the Matter: (ii) The Metaphysical Analysis of Kinds\n 18 An Injection of Theory\n 19 Some Pluses and Minuses\n Appendix: Mutual Exclusivity and Some Versions of Compatibility\n 9 Substance and Universals (II): Plato on Genus, Species, and Differentia\n 1 The Assumptions that Make Plato Vulnerable\n 2 Aristotle’s Dilemma\n 3 “The Genus is Numerically the Same in the Different Species”\n 4 “The Genus is Not Numerically the Same in the Different Species”\n 5 Two Final Negative Consequences\n 10 Substance and Universals (III): Zeta 15 and 16, and Plato’s Fundamental Mistake\n 1 “Received” and “Partisan” Mode in Zeta 15\n 2 An Aristotelian Condition on Definition?\n 3 The Revised Aristotelian Condition\n 4 A Comment on Aristotle’s Silence, and the Constructive Dilemma (CD) Strategy Revisited\n 5 The Critique Continued in Zeta 16\n 6 A Final Jab at Plato, and a Summary of Conclusions in the Segment\n Appendix: Definition, Substance, and Universals: A Puzzle, and Some Speculative Conclusions\nPart Five: Back to the Definition of Substance: The End-Game\n 11 The Posterior Analytics, and a Fresh Approach to Defining Substance\n 1 The Search for Substance: Are We There Yet?\n 2 Substance as a Cause\n 3 From the An. Po. to the Metaphysics\n 4 Some Questions of Fit\n 5 On Why Aristotle Does Not Mean for the Fit to be Exact\n 6 Causes and the Definition of Substance\n 7 Conclusion\n 12 Aristotle on the Positive Contributions of Zeta\n 1 The Retrospective in Eta 1\n 2 A Closing Note About Levels\nBibliography\nIndex\n A\n B\n C\n D\n E\n F\n G\n H\n I\n K\n L\n M\n N\n O\n P\n Q\n R\n S\n T\n U\n V\n W\n Z\nIndex Locorum