دانلود کتاب Implementation, contracts and renegotiation in environments with complete information

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This is a chapter from the book "Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress, Vol. 1", edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont. - Cambridge Collections Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006.This chapter deals with one of the problems of mechanism design, namely, the full implementation of social choice functions.
Part one of the chapter is written in an easy style, to try to demystify the subject (it is based on the lecture given at the World Congress). The Biblical story of the Judgement of Solomon is used as a running example for presenting different notions of implementation. Inevitably, perhaps, this part of the chapter contains a number of statements that are rather loose. This is compensated for by the more formal part two, which amplifies certain results and topics – though here, too, some degree of detail has been sacrificed for the sake of readability.
The chapter deals with situations in which agents are presumed to have complete information about each other's preferences. Thomas Palfrey's chapter in this volume, "Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equilibrium Problem in Mechanism Design," is a companion to this, and looks at environments with incomplete information.
Even though the complete-information environment is a restrictive case, the literature on it is vast and still growing. The chapter should be seen as an overview of recent research, not as a comprehensive survey.