دانلود کتاب Law in Theory and History: New Essays on a Neglected Dialogue

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PREFACE\nContents\nBIOGRAPHIES\nPart I: Introducing the Dialogue Between Legal Theory and Legal History\n 1\n Legal Theory and Legal History: Prospects for Dialogue\n I\n II\n III\n 2\n Beyond Universality and Particularity, Necessity and Contingency: On Collaboration Between \rLegal Theory and Legal History\n I. Introduction\n II. Strategies for Enabling Dialogue\n III. History in Theory\n IV. Theory in History\n V. Conclusion\n 3\n Legal Theory and Legal History: A View from Anthropology\n 4\n Legal Theory and Legal History: Which Legal Theory?\n I. \"What Law Is\" and \"What Law Does\": A Meaningful Distinction?\n II. Rejecting the Notion of \"The Central Case\"\n III. The Entanglement of Legal Theory and History\n IV. Legal Pluralism\nPart II: \rMethodology and Historiography\n 5\n Historicism and Materiality in Legal Theory\n I. Historicism and Structuralism\n II. Difference\n III. Fabricating Difference\n IV. A Historical Materialism\n V. Legal Theory and Historical Materialism\n 6\n Legal Consciousness: A Metahistory\n I. Analysing the Issue\n II. Theory/History Distinctions I\n III. Theory/History Distinctions II\n IV. Theoretical versus Historical Stances\n 7\n Modelling Law Diachronically: Temporal Variability in Legal Theory\n I. Introduction\n II. History and General Jurisprudence\n III. Varieties of Temporality\n IV. Applications: Reasoning, Relations, Discourse\n V. Conclusion\n 8\n Is Comparative Law Necessary for Legal Theory?\n I. Introduction: The Separation of Comparative Law and Legal Theory\n II. So Why is it Important for a Jurisprudent to Look at Comparative Law?\n III. Comparative Law as \"Data\" for Jurisprudence\n IV. So How Should a Jurisprudent Work?\n V. Comparative Law and the Normative Ambitions of Jurisprudence\nPart III: The History of Theory\n 9\n Reading Juristic Theories In and Beyond Historical Context: The Case of Lundstedt\"s Swedish Legal Realism\n I. Introduction\n II. The View from Afar: Lundstedt Abroad\n III. Lundstedt in Swedish Context\n IV. A Wider Context: The Jurist\"s Role\n 10\n Legal Realism and Natural Law\n I. Introduction\n II. Karl Llewellyn: The Romantic Natural Lawyer\n III. Jerome Frank: Pragmatic Scholasticism\n IV. Conclusion: The Philosophy of Reconstructing the Past\n 11\n The Role of Rules: Legal Maxims in Early-modern Common Law Principle and Practice\n I. Identifying Maxims\n II. The Incontrovertibility of Maxims\n III. The Content and Scope of Maxims\n IV. Maxims and Equity\n V. The Relationship Between Theory and Practice, and the Prominence of Maxims\n VI. Postscript: Why did Theory Diverge from Practice?\n 12\n Theory in History: Positivism, Natural Law and Conjectural History in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-century English Legal Thought\n I\n II\n III\n IV\n V\nPart IV: \rUses and Limits of Theory in History\n 13\n Legal History and Legal Theory Shaking Hands: Towards a Gentleman\"s Agreement About a \rDefinition of the State\n I. The Legal State as a Process of Hierarchisation of Norms\n II. The Legal State as a Set of Doctrines\n 14\n Law, Self-interest, and the Smithian Conscience\n I. How Does the Common Law Regard Self-interest?\n II. How Does the Common Law Constrain Self-interest?\n III. Self-interest and Its Infirmities: The Utilitarians\n IV. Self-interest and Self-consciousness: Adam Smith\n V. A Sympathetic Law? Smith\"s Jurisprudence\n VI. The Conscience of Chancery and Smithian Conscience\n VII. Conclusion\n 15\n The Practical Dimension of Legal Reasoning\n I. Introduction\n II. Privity of Contract\n III. Vicarious Liability\n IV. Contractual Interpretation\n V. Malicious Prosecution\n VI. Constructive Trusts\n VII. The Importance of Historical Evidence\n VIII. Implications for the Study of Law\n IX. Conclusion\n 16\n Corrective Justice-An Idea Whose Time Has Gone?\n I. What Is Corrective Justice?\n II. Assumptions\n III. Pedagogy is Not Philosophy\n IV. Modern Obligations\n V. Conclusion\nAfterword\n 17\n How History Bears on Jurisprudence\n I. Law is Historical or Temporal\n II. Law and Jurisprudence Interact Over Time\n III. Jurisprudence is Influenced by Social-historical Circumstances\n IV. Historical Jurisprudence\n V. Must Legal Philosophy Be Historical? (No)\n VI. Should Legal Philosophy Be Historical? (Yes)\nIndex