دانلود کتاب Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox

فهرست مطالب :

Half title
Title page
Imprints page
Contents
Contributors
Introduction
Overview of the Contributions
Chapter 1 Rational Belief and Statistical Evidence
Introduction: The Lottery Paradoxes and Statistical Evidence
Bias and Belief
The Proof Paradox and the Law
Blame
Conclusion
Chapter 2 Knowledge Attributions and Lottery Cases
Introduction
Experiment
Method
Results
Conclusion
Appendix
Chapter 3 The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox
Shifting and Controversial Intuitions
Speaking of Believing and Thinking
The Difficulty of Belief Attributions and Beliefs Themselves
Intuitive and Reflective Cognition
The Knowledge Version of the Paradox
The Belief Version of the Problem
Kyburg’s Sunrise and the Problem of Avoiding Skepticism
Chapter 4 Three Puzzles about Lotteries
Introduction
Solutions to Kyburg’s Lottery Puzzle that Modify the Threshold Constraint
The Odds Threshold Rule
The Stability Theory
Two More Puzzles
The Harman–Vogel Paradox
The Statistical Evidence Problem
What’s Left of the Simple Threshold Thesis?
Conclusion
Chapter 5 Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs Are Justified
Introduction
Justification and Knowledge
Justification and Surprise
Justification, Risk, and Normic Support
Justification and Epistemic Resilience
Conclusion
Chapter 6 Rethinking the Lottery Paradox
Introduction
The Lottery Paradox: A Troubled Past
The End?
Is the Mind One and Undivided?
Some Psychological Evidence
The Remaining Connection
Chapter 7 Rational Belief in Lottery- and Preface-Situations
Introduction: Rational Belief – Qualitative and Quantitative
The Lottery Paradox and the Preface Paradox
Impossibility Results for Rational Belief
Impossibility Results for Cautious Versions of Locke’s Condition
Locke’s Condition with Differentiated Bounds
Defeater Restrictions of Locke’s Condition
Contextualist Accounts of Belief
Two Ways Out of the Inconsistency
Practical Contexts: Probabilistically Safe Restrictions of Conjunctive Closure Combined with Reliability Enhancement
Belief in Approximate Truth in Epistemic Contexts
Conclusion
Chapter 8 Stability and the Lottery Paradox
Introduction
Stability
The Poss-Variant of the Humean Thesis and the Lottery Paradox
The Bel-Variant of the Humean Thesis and the Lottery Paradox
Chapter 9 The Lottery, the Preface, and Epistemic Rule Consequentialism
Introduction
The Lottery Paradox
Douven-Style Epistemic Rule Consequentialism
Douven-Style Rule Consequentialism in Trouble
A Knowledge-Centric Version of Epistemic Rule Consequentialism
The Preface Paradox
A Rule Consequentialist Solution to the Preface
An Objection and Reply
Conclusion
Chapter 10 Beliefs, Probabilities, and Their Coherent Correspondence
Introduction
The Setting
Belief
Synchronically Coherent Belief
Diachronically Coherent Belief
Credence
Synchronically Coherent Credence
Diachronically Coherent Credence
Doxastic Correspondence
Basic Correspondence Principles
Coherence Preservation Principles
Odds Threshold Correspondences
Flattened Odds Threshold Correspondences
Lockean Coherence Principles
Uniform Lockeanism
Content-Dependent Lockeanism
Closed Lockeanism
Credence-dependent Lockeanism
Neo-Lockeanism
Conclusion
Chapter 11 The Relation between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs
Introduction
The Formalism
A General Impossibility Result
The Special Case of Functionality
Escape Routes from the Impossibility
The First Route: Relaxing Universality
The Second Route: Relaxing Belief Consistency and Deductive Closure
The Third Route: Relaxing Propositionwise Certainty Preservation
The Fourth Route: Relaxing Nonlooseness
The Fifth and Most Compelling Route: Relaxing Locality
Holistic Threshold Relations
Relations with Partially Complete Binary Beliefs
Distance-Based Relations
Stability-Theoretic Relations
A Further Generalization
Concluding Remarks
Appendix
Appendix 1: Negation-Connected Agendas
Appendix 2: Proofs
Reducing the Relational Theorem to the Functional Theorem
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Theorem 2*: Sufficiency
Proof of Theorem 2*: Necessity
Bibliography
Index