دانلود کتاب Microeconomics

فهرست مطالب :

Cover......Page 1
MICROECONOMICS......Page 4
Contents......Page 6
Preface to the third edition......Page 10
Concepts and methods......Page 12
The economic and social framework......Page 19
The preference ordering......Page 22
The feasible set......Page 33
The consumption decision......Page 36
The comparative statics of consumer behaviour......Page 40
Offer curves and net demand curves......Page 47
Appendix 1: The lexicographic ordering......Page 52
Appendix 2: Existence of a utility function......Page 54
The expenditure function......Page 57
The indirect utility function, Roy’s identity and the Slutsky equation......Page 63
Measuring the benefits of price changes......Page 69
Composite commodities, separability and homotheticity......Page 77
Revealed preference......Page 82
The consumer as a labour supplier......Page 88
Consumption and the allocation of time......Page 93
Households......Page 97
Introduction......Page 103
The production function......Page 107
Variations in scale......Page 112
Variations in input proportions......Page 116
The multi-product case......Page 118
Introduction......Page 122
Long-run cost minimization......Page 125
Short-run cost minimization......Page 137
Cost minimization with several plants......Page 146
Multi-product cost functions......Page 149
Supply and firm objectives......Page 154
Long-run profit maximization......Page 155
Short-run profit maximization......Page 159
The multi-product firm......Page 162
The profit function and comparative statics......Page 165
The entrepreneurial firm......Page 170
Labour-managed firms......Page 175
Short-run equilibrium......Page 181
Stability of equilibrium......Page 186
Long-run equilibrium......Page 195
Conclusions......Page 200
Introduction......Page 201
Price and output determination under monopoly......Page 202
Price discrimination......Page 205
Monopoly welfare loss......Page 216
Demand for inputs......Page 221
Monopsony......Page 227
Unions as monopoly input suppliers......Page 231
Bilateral monopoly......Page 234
Optimal consumption over time......Page 238
The optimal investment decision......Page 242
Capital market equilibrium under certainty......Page 251
Extension to many periods......Page 256
Introduction......Page 261
Walrasian equilibrium of a competitive economy......Page 262
Existence of Walrasian equilibrium......Page 265
Stability of Walrasian equilibrium......Page 271
Edgeworth exchange theory......Page 277
Exchange, equilibrium and the core......Page 280
Pareto efficient resource allocation......Page 290
Welfare functions and the Pareto criterion......Page 300
Pareto efficiency and competitive markets......Page 304
Distribution and markets......Page 310
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem......Page 316
The causes of market failure......Page 325
Instances of market failure......Page 329
The theory of the second best......Page 346
Government action and government failure......Page 351
Introduction......Page 357
Game representation and solutions......Page 359
Games of imperfect and incomplete information......Page 373
Mixed strategies......Page 386
Cooperative bargaining games......Page 388
Bargaining as a non-cooperative game......Page 396
Delay and disagreement in bargaining......Page 403
Introduction......Page 411
One-shot games......Page 412
Oligopoly as a repeated game......Page 428
Entry......Page 444
Conclusions......Page 455
Introduction......Page 457
A formalization of ‘uncertainty’......Page 458
Choice under uncertainty......Page 460
Properties of the utility function......Page 467
Risk aversion and indifference curves......Page 477
Measures of risk......Page 484
Comparative statics under uncertainty......Page 494
Competitive firm under uncertainty......Page 502
Production with futures markets......Page 514
The insurance decision......Page 518
Incomplete insurance markets......Page 525
Risk spreading: the Arrow-Lind Theorem......Page 531
Risk pooling and diversification......Page 536
Asymmetric information in insurance markets: adverse selection......Page 541
Asymmetric information in insurance markets: moral hazard......Page 551
Signalling......Page 558
Critique of the classical theory of the firm......Page 564
Agency theory and the separation of ownership from control......Page 566
The moral hazard principal–agent model......Page 579
The adverse selection principal–agent model......Page 590
Introduction......Page 613
Complete markets in state-contingent income claims......Page 615
State-contingent commodities......Page 625
Efficiency with production......Page 638
The stock market......Page 648
Incomplete stock markets......Page 659
References and further reading......Page 9
The structure of an optimization problem......Page 668
Solutions to optimization problems......Page 671
Existence of solutions......Page 681
Local and global optima......Page 683
Uniqueness of solutions......Page 686
Interior and boundary optima......Page 688
Concave programming and theKuhn–Tucker conditions......Page 697
Second-order conditions andcomparative statics......Page 707
The envelope theorem......Page 719
Fixed points and Brouwer’s Theorem......Page 721
Bayes’ Theorem......Page 723
Bibliography......Page 730
Index......Page 738