دانلود کتاب Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and his Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries ... Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2.reihe)

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Cover\nTitel\nPreface\nTable of Contents\nAbbreviations and Primary Sources Table\nPart I: Mapping the Apostle Paul’s Moral Milieu\n Chapter 1: An Introduction to Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind\n 1. What Is Ancient Philosophy of Mind?\n 2. Which Moral Transformation Systems and Why\n 3. Power, Human Agency, and Divine Correspondence\n Chapter 2: Contingency, Coherence, and Philosophical Systems\n 1. Methods and Models\n 1.1. A Proviso on the Use of the Term System\n 1.2. Toward an Abstracted Model of Moral Transformation\n 2. Components to Moral Transformation\n 2.1. Why Begin with the Passions: Defining Their Structure and Power\n 2.2. Philosophical Reactions to Popular Views on the Passions\n 2.3. Self-Mastery, Moral Action, Virtue, and Other Components\n Fig. 1: Self-Mastery, Temperance, and Character Formation\n Summary Remarks for Part I\nPart II: Moral Transformation in Middle Platonism\n Chapter 3: The Body-Beating Platonist: The Non-Cognitive Structure of the Passions and the Platonic Counter-Cycle of Virtue Against Vice\n 1. Introducing Middle Platonism\n 1.1. The Founder and His Followers: Plato, Plutarch, Alcinous, and Galen\n 1.2. Unifying Doctrines and Common Commitments\n 2. Self-Mastery as Moderation of the Passions\n 2.1. The Platonic Non-Cognitive Theory of Emotions\n 2.2. The Platonic View of Self-Mastery\n 3. Vice, Virtue, and Character Formation\n 3.1. The Cycle of Error and Vice\n 3.2. The Counter-Cycle of Virtuous Action, Habit, and Character Formation\n Fig. 2: The Middle Platonic Program of Behavior Modification\n 3.3. Debilitating Desire and Exercising Reason’s Power\n Fig. 3: Plato’s Anthropology\n Fig. 4: Middle Platonic Anthropology\n Chapter 4: “Becoming like God” and Nurturing Moral Progress in Middle Platonism\n 1. The Goal to “Become like God”\n 1.1. Plato’s Tension between the Virtuous Life and a Life of Contemplation\n 1.2. Assimilation through Contemplation\n 1.3. Assimilation through the Moral Life\n 2. Diverse Ways of Imitating the Divine: How the Middle Platonists Resolved Plato’s Tension\n 2.1. Moral Likeness to a Lesser, Demiurgic God according to Alcinous\n Excursus: Plato’s Theology\n Table 1: Plato’s Metaphysical Framework\n Table 2: Plato’s Religious / Mythic Framework\n Table 3: Alcinous’ Theology\n 2.2. Moral Likeness to the Thoughts of the First God according to Alcinous\n 2.3. Moral Likeness to the Divine Attributes of God according to Plutarch\n Table 4: Plutarch’s Theology\n 2.4. A Non-Platonist Account of Assimilation to God according to Galen\n 3. Nature versus Nurture: Mentors, Friends, and the Hard-Wired Limitations to Moral Progress\n 3.1. “To Know Thyself” Requires the Help of Others\n 3.2. Moral Mentors and Frank Friends\n 3.3. Nature’s Limits on Moral Progress\n Summary Remarks for Part II\nPart III: Moral Transformation in Stoicism\n Chapter 5: The Superhuman Stoic: The Cognitive Structure of the Passions and the Perfection of Moral Judgment\n 1. Introducing the Roman Stoa of the Early Imperial Period\n 1.1. The Founders and Their Followers: The Old Stoa, Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Other Greco-Roman Stoics\n 1.2. Neostoic Orthodoxy and Innovations\n 2. The Stoic Cognitive Theory of Emotions\n 2.1. The Taxonomy of Emotions\n 2.2. The Mind Experiences an Appearance (Stage 1)\n 2.3. The Mind Judges the Impression (Stage 2)\n 2.4. The Judgment Produces an Impulse (Stage 3)\n 2.5. The Impulse Moves the Human Agent toward Action (Stage 4)\n 2.6. A Stoic Example from Euripides on the Cognitive Origin of Emotion\n 3. The Stoic View of Self-Mastery\n 3.1. Aiming for Stoic ’Aπάθεια\n 3.2. Extirpating the Passions\n 3.3. Self-Mastery and Temperance as the Consistent Exercise of Knowledge\n Chapter 6: The Good, the Bad, and the Indifferent: Stoic Moral Psychology of Action and Character Formation\n 1. The Cognitive Formation of Virtue versus Vice\n 1.1. Virtues as Types of Knowledge and Virtue as a Stable State\n 1.2. Vices as Types of Ignorance and Viciousness as an Unstable State\n 2. The Instantaneous and Comprehensive Character of Stoic Perfection\n 2.1. The Taxonomies and Unity of the Virtues\n 2.2. Transformation as Radical Change not Gradual Progress\n 2.3. Stoic Perfection: Available to All, Attainable by Few\n 3. Moral Valuation, Action, and Choice\n 3.1. Defining the Good, the Bad, and the Indifferent\n 3.2. Distinguishing Preferred versus Dispreferred Indifferents\n Fig. 5: Goods, Evils, and Indifferents (Preferred, Dispreferred, or Neither)\n 3.3. Types of Moral Acts: Right, Erroneous, Appropriate, and Unsuitable\n Fig. 6: Appropriate vs. Inappropriate Acts: Right, Intermediate, and Erroneous\n 3.4. A Very Short Epitome of Stoic Ethics\n Chapter 7: Neostoic Innovations to Chrysippan Moral Psychology\n 1. The Prominence of Power Language in Neostoic Accounts\n 1.1. The Exaggerated Power of Appearances, Assent, and Impulses\n 1.2. The Excessive Power of the Passions and Epictetus’ Deconstruction of Medea as a Denial of ’Aκρασία\n 1.3. Rational Power according to Musonius Rufus and Marcus Aurelius\n 2. Componential Theories on the Formation of the Passions\n 2.1. Panaetius on Impulsive Power versus Rational Power\n 2.2. Posidonius on Cognitive Passions Charged by Bodily Impulses\n 2.3. Seneca on the Pre-Passions\n 3. Componential Theories on Non-Cognitive Aids to Self-Mastery\n 3.1. Diogenes of Babylon on Music’s Contribution to Self-Mastery\n 3.2. Posidonius on Moderating Affective Movements with Music\n 3.3. Seneca on Pacifying the Pre-Passions with Poetry\n Chapter 8: Neostoic Innovations in Habit, Practice, and Mentoring\n 1. Non-Intellectual Virtues and Vicious Habitudes\n 1.1. Defining Non-Intellectual Virtues as Skills or Habitudes\n 1.2. Proclivities, Sick Habits, and Infirmed Conditions\n 2. Spiritual Exercises and Practicing Philosophy\n 2.1. Practicing Philosophy and Why Knowing Is Not Enough\n 2.2. Types of Spiritual Exercises\n 3. Mentoring Students to Practice Philosophy\n 3.1. Seneca on Mentorship in Stoicism and Other Philosophical Traditions\n 3.2. From Mentors and Students to a Society of Stoic Friends\n Chapter 9: The Stoic Self\n 1. Oίκείωσις and the Formation of the Integrated Self\n 1.1. Hierocles on Oίκείωσις, Self-Preservation, and the Constitution of Self\n 1.2. The Doxographers on Appropriation and Appropriate Acts\n 1.3. Stoic Ethics as the Rational Outworking of Pre-Rational Oίκείωσις\n 1.4. The Integrated Self: From Individual to Social Oίκείωσις\n 2. Stoic Anthropology as Material and Monistic\n 2.1. The Human Person as an Ensouled Body and Embodied Soul\n 2.2. The Monism of the Soul and Rational Agency\n 2.3. An Epitome of Stoic Humanity\n Chapter 10: The Stoic God and Imitatio Dei\n 1. The Nature of God and Humanity’s Role in the Cosmos\n 1.1. A Matrix of Interentailing Propositions on the Nature of God\n 1.2. God’s Providence, Natural Determinism, and Moral Responsibility\n 1.3. Epictetus on Proai,resij and Neostoic Developments on Freedom\n 2. The Imitation of God as the Stoic Tέλος\n 2.1. Living according to Nature, Reason, and Virtue\n 2.2. Imitating the Rational and Virtuous God\n 2.3. The Role of God in Stoic Moral Progress\n Summary Remarks for Part III\nPart IV: Retrospect and Prospect\n Chapter 11: Retrospect: Models and Milieu\n 1. The Middle Platonist Model of Moral Transformation\n 1.1. Platonist Moral Psychology\n 1.2. The Platonist Cycle of Vice and Counter-Cycle of Virtue\n 1.3. Social Structures Reinforcing the Attainment of Virtue\n 1.4. Integrating Assimilation to God with Moral Formation\n 1.5. A Platonist Model of Reinforcing Concentric Cycles\n Fig. 7: The Middle Platonist Model of Moral Transformation\n 2. The Stoic Model of Moral Transformation\n 2.1. Stoic Moral Psychology\n 2.2. Stoic Moral Valuation of the Good, the Bad, and the Indifferent\n 2.3. Instantaneous Transformation and the Analogue of a Titration Point\n Fig. 8: The Early Stoic Model of Moral Psychology, Action, and Perfection\n 2.4. Neostoic Innovations to the Chrysippan Model of Perfection\n Fig. 9: Neostoic Innovations to Early Stoic Moral Psychology and Formation\n 2.5. An Integrated Stoic Model: Transformation, Imitatio Dei, and Oίκείωσις\n Fig. 10: The Stoic Model of Moral Transformation\n 3. Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul between Platonism and Stoicism\n 3.1. The Importance of Platonism and Stoicism in the Transitional Period\n 3.2. Comparisons between the Models and the Spectrum They Create\n Fig. 11: Greco-Roman Philosophies in a Non-Cognitive to Cognitive Spectrum\n Chapter 12: Prospect: Interactions, Intertextuality, and Encyclopedia\n 1. Intertextuality, Greco-Roman Allusions, and the Types of Interactions between Philosophical Schools\n 1.1. Eclecticism (Type of Interaction 1)\n 1.2. Refutation (Type of Interaction 2)\n 1.3. Competitive Appropriation (Type of Interaction 3)\n 1.4. Irenic Appropriation (Type of Interaction 4)\n 1.5. Concession (Type of Interaction 5)\n 1.6. Common Ethical Usage (Type of Interaction 6)\n 1.7. Implications for Detecting Greco-Roman Allusions in the New Testament\n 2. Where Do We Go from Here?\n 2.1. An Estimation of Epicureanism and Diaspora Judaism in the Spectrum\n Fig. 12: Epicureanism and Judaism between Platonism and Stoicism\n 2.2. Toward a Common Ancient Ethical Tradition\nClosing Remarks\n Appendix 1: The Philosopher Plato and the Legacy of the Academy: Sources for Middle Platonism\n 1. The Life and Works of Plato\n 2. The Life and Works of Plato’s Greco-Roman Heirs: Plutarch, Alcinous, and Galen\n Appendix 2: Zeno, Chrysippus, and Their Late Hellenistic and Imperial Heirs: Sources for Early, Middle, and Roman Stoicism\n 1. Zeno, Chrysippus, and the Early Stoa\n 2. Sources for Middle Stoicism\n 3. Sources for Roman Stoicism\nBibliography\nIndex of Ancient Sources\nIndex of Modern Authors\nIndex of Subjects