دانلود کتاب No Morality, No Self: Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism

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Contents\nPreface\nPART ONE: No Morality: “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958)\n1. Virtue Ethics, Eudaimonism, and the Greeks\n2. The Invention of “ Morality” and the Possibility of Consequentialism\n3. The Misguided Project of Vindicating Morality\n4. The Futility of Seeking the Extension of a Word with No Intension\n5. What’s Really Wrong with the Vocabulary of Morality?\n6. Assessing “Modern Moral Philosophy”\nPART TWO: No Self: “The First Person” (1975)\n7. The Circularity Problem for Accounts of “I” as a Device of Self-Reference\n8. Is the Fundamental Reference Rule for “I” the Key to Explaining First-Person Self-Reference?\n9. Rumfitt’s Solution to the Circularity Problem\n10. Can We Make Sense of a Nonreferential Account of “I”?\n11. Strategies for Saving “I” as a Singular Term: Domesticating FP and Deflating Reference\nEpilogue: The Anti-Cartesian Basis of Anscombe’s Skepticism\nAPPENDIX A. Aquinas and Natural Law\nAPPENDIX B. Stoic Ethics: A Law Conception without Commandments?\nNotes\nReferences\nAcknowledgments\nIndex