دانلود کتاب Non-Identity Theodicy: A Grace-Based Response to the Problem of Evil (Oxford Theology and Religion Monographs)

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Cover\nNon-Identity Theodicy: A Grace-Based Response to the Problem of Evil\nCopyright\nDedication\nPreface\nAcknowledgments\nContents\nPart I: A Framework For Theodicy\n 1: Introduction: The Problem of Horrendous Evils\n Successful Theodicy\n The Problem of Any Evil at All\n The Problems of Actual Evil\n Horrors Defined\n The Problem of Horrendous Evils\n The Insufficiency of Greater Goods Solutions\n The Impotence of Blame-Shifting Solutions\n Adams’s Solution\n The View from a Few Steps Back\n Project Summary\n 2: The Ethics of Horror Inducement\n Harm and Benefit\n The Metaphysics of Harm\n The Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm\n The Temporal Comparative Account of Harm\n The Non-Comparative Account of Harm\n The Trans-Comparative Account of Harm\n The Metaphysics of Benefit\n Asymmetry between Harm and Benefit\n The Disjunctive Comparative Account of Benefit\n Harm-Averting and Pure Benefits\n Causation, Permission, and Risk\n The Morality of Human-Induced Horrendous Harm\n Case A: Horrendous Harm Caused for Pure Benefit\n Defense by Harm Denial\n Defense by Rescue Analogy\n Supplementing Shiffrin: The Moral Significance of Horrendous Harm\n Appeals to Parental Rights\n Appeals to Retrospective Acceptance\n The Verdict\n Implications for the Ethics of Horrendous Evil\n Challenging the Principle\n Extreme Situations\n Case B: Horrendous Harm Permitted for Pure Benefit\n Case C: Horrendous Harm Risked for Pure Benefit\n Case D: Horrendous Harm Permitted for Harm-Averting Benefit\n Conclusions\n 3: Applying the Analogies: Causing for Pure Benefits\n Type A Theodicy\n Type A: John Hick’s Soul-Making Theodicy\n Dysteleological Evil\n Eschatology\n Evaluation\n Type A: Richard Swinburne’s Theodicy\n The Greatness of Being of Use\n Accounting for the Worst Evils\n Evaluation\n Type A: Alvin Plantinga’s “O Felix Culpa” Theodicy\n Evaluation\n Divine Right to Harm\n Summing Up\n 4: Applying the Analogies: Permission and Risk; Benefit Production and Harm Avoidance\n Type B Theodicy\n The Pieces of van Inwagen’s Theodicy\n Constructing van Inwagen’s Theodicy\n Evaluation\n Reconsidering Divine Rights and the Causing/ Permitting Distinction\n Type C Theodicy\n Divine Benefit of the Doubt\n Which Position Is God in Prior to Creation?\n Type D Theodicy\n Eleonore Stump: Divine Rescue in “The Problem of Evil”\n The Development of Stump’s Response in Wandering in Darkness\n Evaluation\n 5: High Fall Theodicy\n The Structurally Promising Theodicies\n Blame-Shift by High Fall\n Challenges to Broadly Augustinian Accounts\n Science Against High Fall\n Theological Tradition Against High Fall\n Scripture Against High Fall\n In Defense of High Fall\n Additional Plausibility Problems for the Structurally Promising Theodicies\n Peter van Inwagen’s Type C Theodicy\n Plausibility Problems with (1)\n Plausibility Problems with (2)\n Plausibility Problems with (3)\n Plausibility Problems with (4a) and (4b)\n Eleonore Stump’s Type D Theodicy: Very Tough Love\n Plausibility Problems\n Can High Fall Theodicies Maintain Their Claim to Structural Promise?\n Cognitive Limitations Limit Moral Responsibility\n From Responsibility to Blame\n The Evolutionary Problem of Evil\n Conclusions of Part I\nPart II: Beyond the Framework\n 6: Non-Identity Theodicy\n Evils Preceding Our Existence\n Evils in Our Lifetimes\n The Self-Interest Relation\n Considerations of Character\n Summary\n Objections\n Character-Based Objections to Non-Identity Theodicy\n C1. Is God Irrational?\n C2. Does God Lack Appropriate Regret?\n C3. A Divine Depleter?\n Plausibility Objections to Non-Identity Theodicy\n P1. Conditions of Personal Identity\n P2. Evil at the End\n P3. Empirically Falsifiable?\n P4. Understanding Grace\n A Non-Identity Theodicy for Molinists and Determinists\n A Non-Identity Theodicy for Non-Molinist Libertarians\n Philosophical Precursors\n Conclusion\n 7: The Good of Life: How Much Moral Difference Does Non-Identity Make?\n Preliminary Challenges to Parfit and Shiffrin\n Parfit’s No-Difference View\n Shiffrin and the Limited Good of Human Life\n An Alternative Appraisal of the Good of Human Life\n The Morality of Procreation\n The Good of God-Given Human Life Has Even Greater Justificatory Power\n The God-Given Good of Human Life\n The Payoff for Non-Identity Theodicy\n Divine Liability\n Conclusion\n 8: Conclusion: Distinctive Features of Non-Identity Theodicy\nBibliography\nIndex