دانلود کتاب Ontology Made Easy

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Cover
Ontology Made Easy
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction: The Forgotten Easy Approach
I.1 The Historical Backstory
I.2 The Rise of Neo-Quineanism
I.3 The Easy Approach to Ontology: A Preliminary Sketch
I.4 The Plan of This Book
Part I Developing Easy Ontology
1 Whatever Happened to Carnapian Deflationism?
1.1 Carnap’s Approach to Existence Questions
1.2 Quine and the Ascendency of Ontology
1.3 Putnam Takes Deflationism on an Unfortunate Turn
1.4 ‘Exists’ as a Formal Notion: A Brief History
1.5 Is Carnap Committed to Quantifier Variance?
1.6 Conclusion
2 The Unbearable Lightness of Existence
2.1 A Core Rule of Use for ‘Exists’
2.2 What Are Application Conditions?
2.3 Do Application Conditions for ‘K’ Include That Ks Exist?
2.4 Answering Existence Questions Easily
2.5 Against Substantive Criteria of Existence
2.6 Lines of Reply
3 Easy Ontology and Its Consequences
3.1 Using Trivial Inferences to Answer Existence Questions
3.2 Three Forms of Easy Ontology
3.3 First Result: Simple Realism
3.4 Second Result: Metaontological Deflationism
4 Other Ways of Being Suspicious
4.1 Denying That Ontological Disputes Are Genuine Disputes
4.2 Denying That We Can Know the Answers
4.3 Denying That There Are Answers to Know
4.4 Understanding Hard Ontology
5 Fictionalism versus Deflationism
5.1 Motives for Fictionalism
5.2 The Fictionalist’s Case against Easy Arguments
5.3 A Problem for the Fictionalist’s Analogy
5.4 How the Fictionalist Incurs a Debt
5.5 A Reply for the Fictionalist
5.6 The Deflationary Alternative
5.7 Conclusion
Part II Defending Easy Ontology
6 Do Easy Arguments Give Us Problematic Ontological Commitments?
6.1 Are We Over-Committed?
6.2 Why Easy Arguments Require No Magic
6.3 Do We Get the Objects We Wanted?
6.4 Conclusion
7 Do Doubts about Conceptual Truths Undermine Easy Arguments?
7.1 Why Easy Ontology Needs Conceptual Truths
7.2 Williamson’s Attack on Analyticity
7.3 How Easy Inferences Survive
7.4 Caveats and Conclusions
8 Are Easy Arguments Threatened by the Bad Company Objection?
8.1 The Bad Company Challenge for the Easy Approach
8.2 Avoiding Bad Company
8.3 The Limited Impact of Bad Company Objections
9 Do Easy Arguments Fail to Answer Ontological Questions?
9.1 Hofweber’s Solution to the Puzzle about Ontology
9.2 Focus and Ontology
9.3 Ways to Read the Quantifier
10 Can Hard Ontological Questions Be Revived in Ontologese?
10.1 Existence Questions in Ontologese
10.2 Just More Metaphysics?
10.3 Avoiding the Joint-Carving Quantifier
10.4 Problematizing the Joint-Carving Quantifier
Conclusion: The Importance of Not Being Earnest
C.1 The Empirical, Conceptual, and Pragmatic Case for Deflationism
C.2 Metaphysics in a New Key?
Bibliography
Index