دانلود کتاب Passions and Persuasion in Aristotle's Rhetoric (Oxford Aristotle Studies Series)

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Cover\nPassions and Persuasion in Aristotle´s Rhetoric\nCopyright\nDedication\nContents\nAcknowledgements\nIntroduction\n Principal Claims of the Book\n The Significance of the Conclusions\n Synopsis\nPart: 1\n 1: Rhetoric and the State-Aristotle and His Predecessors\n 1.1 The Background to Aristotle´s Rhetoric on Rhetoric\n 1.2 Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and the Handbook Writers\n 1.3 Plato\n 2: Proof-reading Aristotle´s Rhetoric\n 2.1 Introduction\n 2.2 Aristotle´s Arguments in Rhetoric 1.1\n 2.3 Rhetoric 1.1, 1354a11-18\n 2.3.1 Argument (i)\n 2.3.2 Argument (ii)\n 2.3.3 The nature of rhetoric and the sense of πστiota between 1.1 and the rest of the Rhetoric\n 2.3.4 Aristotle´s overall characterization of rhetoric\n 2.4 Aristotle´s Theory of Proof (1355a3-18)\n 2.4.1 A theory of pistis: what constitutes proper grounds for conviction?\n 2.4.2 Proposed characterization of Aristotelian pistis:\n 2.5 Rhetorical, Dialectical Expertise, and the Nature of Pisteis: 1355a3-14\n 2.6 Apparent Enthymemes\n 2.7 The Proposed Characterization of Pistis and the Use of Premises Not Believed By the Speaker\n 2.8 Conclusion\n 3: Rhetoric and the State\n 3.1 Aristotle´s Justification of his Proof-centred View of Rhetoric\n 3.2 A Sketch of Aristotle´s View of the Relationship between Rhetorical Expertise and the Proper Functioning of the State\n 3.3 Rhetoric´s Purpose and the Justification of Aristotle´s Proof-centred View\n 3.3.1 The Areopagus Argument\n 3.3.2 The Carpenter´s Rule simile (1354a24-6)\n 3.3.3 The brief argument from the speaker´s role: 1354a26-31\n 3.3.4 Aristotle´s conclusion (1354b16-22)\n 3.4 Conclusion: the Implications of Rhetoric´s Political Function\n 4: Aristotle against His Rivals\n 4.1 Comparing Aristotle, Plato, and Gorgias and Thrasymachus on Rhetoric\n 4.2 Aristotle and Plato´s Gorgias\n 4.3 Aristotle and Plato´s Phaedrus\n 4.4 Is Aristotle´s Rhetoric about Rhetoric?\n 5: The Interpretation of Aristotle´s Rhetoric\nPart: 2\n 6: How Can Emotion-Arousal Provide Proof?\n 6.1 Aristotle´s Three Kinds of Proof\n 6.2 Proofs in the Character of the Speaker\n 6.3 How Character-Proofs Fit the Proposed Account of Pistis\n 6.3.1 Êthos- (Character-) Proofs\n 6.3.2 Pathos- (emotion-) proofs\n 6.4 How This then Sets a Challenge for Pathos-Proofs\n 6.4.1 An apparent problem solved\n 6.4.2 A constraint arising from the claim that arousing passions is a way of providing proof\n 7: A Supposed Contradiction about Emotion-Arousal in Aristotle´s Rhetoric\n 7.1 Introduction\n 7.2 The Contradiction Problem and the `Contradiction View´\n 7.3 `Slander, Pity, Anger and Similar Passions of the Soul´\n 7.4 Who Are the Targets of Aristotle´s Criticism?\n 7.4.1 Ancient rhetorical set-pieces in general\n 7.4.2 Thrasymachus\n 7.4.3 Gorgias\n 7.5 `Accessories´ and the Elements of Rhetoric\n 7.6 Some Objections\n 7.7 Conclusion\nPart: 3\n 8: The Passions in Aristotle´s Rhetoric\n 8.1 Introduction\n 8.2 The Definition of the Passions in Aristotle´s Rhetoric\n 8.3 Context and Structure\n 8.4 Pain and Pleasure\n 8.5 Difference in Relation to Judgements\n 8.6 The Adequacy of Aristotle´s Definition of the Passions\n 9: Aristotle´s Theory of the Passions-Passions as Pleasures and Pains\n 9.1 Introduction\n 9.2 Claim 1: Emotions as Pleasures and Pains\n 9.2.1 Pi (`Accompanies´) in Aristotle\n 9.2.2 Pleasure and pain in the individual accounts of types of passion\n 9.2.3 Aristotle´s general position on emotions and pleasure and pain\n 9.2.4 Summary of how the proposed view fits the evidence of Rhetoric 2.2-11\n 9.3 The Representational Pain and Pleasure Involved in the Passions\n 9.3.1 Rhetoric 2 on the pains and pleasures involved in emotions\n 9.4 Aristotle on Pleasure and Pain\n 9.5 Pleasure and Pain in Rhetoric 1.11\n 9.5.1 The account of pleasure (and pain) in Rhetoric 1.11\n 9.5.2 The restoration of nature view\n 9.5.3 Problems with a `restoration of nature´ view\n 9.5.4 Aristotle´s `contents of experience´ view of pleasure in Rhetoric 1.11\n 9.5.5 The `activity view´ and the `features view´\n 9.5.6 Exegetical reasons (from elsewhere in Aristotle) for preferring the features view\n 9.6 Philosophical Advantages of Understanding the Emotions as Pleasures and Pains\n 9.7 Conclusion\n 10: Feeling Fantastic Again-Passions, Appearances, and Beliefs in Aristotle\n 10.1 Introduction\n 10.2 What Is the Significance of These Claims?\n 10.3 Aristotelian Passions Involve Exercising Phantasia\n 10.3.1 Passions and parts of the soul\n 10.3.2 Passions, pleasure, and pain\n 10.3.3 Arguments appealing to visual illusions\n 10.4 What Kind of Attitude Do Aristotelian Passions Involve towards their Representational Contents?\n 10.4.1 Affirming the representational contents of phantasia\n 10.4.2 Aristotle´s use of phantasia and phainesthai in the Rhetoric\n 10.4.3 Phantasia, passions, and paintings in De Anima 3.3\n 10.4.4 Limitations to the use of visual illusions in De Anima 3.3 as a model for Aristotle´s understanding of the passions\n De Anima 3.3: Phantasia, Doxa and the size of the sun\n The sun example and the problem of belief\n Applying the De Anima 3.3 arguments about phantasia to the passions\n 10.5 Phantasia and the Regulation of the Passions\n 10.5.1 Two features of phantasia\n 10.5.2 The `covering-over´ of reason\n 10.5.3 Phantasia and `listening to reason´\n 10.6 Resources for Explaining Conflict between Passions and Reason\n 10.7 Some Philosophical Merits of Aristotle´s View\n 10.8 Conclusion\nConclusions\nBibliography\nIndex Locorum\nGeneral Index