دانلود کتاب Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters

فهرست مطالب :

Contents\nSeries Foreword\nPreface\nCHAPTER 1 Development Clusters\n 1.1 Salient Correlations\n 1.2 The Main Questions\n 1.3 Fiscal Capacity\n 1.4 Legal Capacity\n 1.5 Political Violence\n 1.6 State Spaces\n 1.7 Development Assistance\n 1.8 Political Reform\n 1.9 Main Themes\n 1.10 Final Remarks\n 1.11 Notes on the Literature\nCHAPTER 2 Fiscal Capacity\n 2.1 The Core Model\n 2.1.1 Basic Structure\n 2.1.2 Politically Optimal Policy\n 2.1.3 Fiscal-Capacity Investments\n 2.1.4 Normative Benchmark: A Pigouvian Planner\n 2.1.5 Three Types of States\n 2.1.6 Taking Stock\n 2.2 Developing the Model\n 2.2.1 Microfoundations for Fiscal Capacity\n 2.2.2 More General Models for Public Goods\n 2.2.3 Polarization/Heterogeneity\n 2.2.4 Income Inequality\n 2.2.5 Differences in Group Size\n 2.2.6 Tax Distortions\n 2.2.7 From Trade to Income Taxes\n 2.2.8 An Infinite-Horizon Model\n 2.3 Empirical Implications and Data\n 2.4 Final Remarks\n 2.5 Notes on the Literature\nCHAPTER 3 Legal Capacity\n 3.1 The Core Model with Legal Capacity\n 3.1.1 Politically Optimal Policy\n 3.1.2 Investments in State Capacity\n 3.1.3 Comparative Statics\n 3.1.4 Taking Stock\n 3.2 Developing the Model\n 3.2.1 Microeconomic Foundations\n 3.2.2 The Genius of Taxation\n 3.2.3 Private Capital Accumulation\n 3.2.4 Predation and Corruption\n 3.3 Empirical Implications and Data\n 3.4 Final Comments\n 3.5 Notes on the Literature\nCHAPTER 4 Political Violence\n 4.1 The Core Model with Political Violence\n 4.1.1 Model Modifications\n 4.1.2 Policy\n 4.1.3 Investments in Political Violence\n 4.1.4 Empirical Implications\n 4.2 Developing the Model\n 4.2.1 Asymmetries\n 4.2.2 Polarization, Greed, and Grievance\n 4.2.3 Anarchy\n 4.2.4 Conflict in a Predatory State\n 4.2.5 Investing in Coercive Capacity\n 4.3 From Theory to Empirical Testing\n 4.4 Data and Results\n 4.4.1 Data\n 4.4.2 Cross-Sectional Correlations\n 4.4.3 Econometric Estimates\n 4.5 Final Remarks\n 4.6 Notes on the Literature\nCHAPTER 5 State Spaces\n 5.1 State Capacity in the Comprehensive Core Model\n 5.1.1 Equilibrium Political Turnover\n 5.1.2 Investments in State Capacity Revisited\n 5.2 Developing the Model\n 5.3 Empirical Implications\n 5.4 Putting the Pieces Together\n 5.5 Final Remarks\n 5.6 Notes on the Literature\nCHAPTER 6 Development Assistance\n 6.1 The Core Model with Aid\n 6.1.1 Cash Aid\n 6.1.2 Technical Assistance\n 6.1.3 Military Assistance\n 6.1.4 Postconflict Assistance\n 6.2 Final Remarks\n 6.3 Notes on the Literature\nCHAPTER 7 Political Reform\n 7.1 The Core Model and Political Reform\n 7.1.1 Political Reform under a Veil of Ignorance\n 7.1.2 Strategic Political Reform\n 7.2 Developing the Model\n 7.2.1 Micropolitical Foundations for θ\n 7.2.2 Micropolitical Foundations for γ\n 7.2.3 Constitutional Rules\n 7.2.4 Political Violence\n 7.2.5 Trust\n 7.2.6 Governance\n 7.3 Political Reform in Practice\n 7.4 Final Remarks\n 7.5 Notes on the Literature\nCHAPTER 8 Lessons Learned\n 8.1 What We Have Learned\n 8.1.1 Answers to the Three Main Questions\n 8.1.2 Our Analysis and Traditional Development Research\n 8.2 The Pillars of Prosperity Index\n 8.2.1 Defining the Index\n 8.2.2 Predicting the Index\n 8.3 Where Next?\n 8.4 Concluding Remarks\nReferences\nName Index\nSubject Index