دانلود کتاب Political Economy for Public Policy

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Contents\nPolicy Applications\nPreface\n For Whom Is This BookWritten?\n AWord on Tone and Technicality\n Acknowledgments\nIntroduction\n Three Goals\n The Role of Models\n Why Rationality?\nI NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS\n 1 Normative Frameworks\n 1.1 What Is a Normative Framework?\n 1.1.1 Private vs. Public Morality\n 1.2 Utilitarianism\n 1.2.1 Why Be a Utilitarian?\n 1.2.2 Some Problems for Utilitarianism\n 1.3 Egalitarianism\n 1.3.1 Equality of Outcomes\n 1.3.2 Equality of Opportunity\n 1.4 Kantian Deontology\n 1.4.1 Deontology and the Challenges to Utilitarianism\n 1.4.2 Challenges for Deontological Thinking\n 1.5 Libertarianism\n 1.5.1 Why Be a Libertarian?\n 1.5.2 Some Problems for Libertarianism\n 1.6 Takeaways\n 1.7 Further Reading\n 1.8 Exercises\n 2 Collective Goals\n 2.1 Rational Individuals\n 2.2 Aggregation Procedures\n 2.3 Evaluative Criteria for Aggregation Procedures\n 2.3.1 Transitivity of Social Preferences\n 2.3.2 Unanimity\n 2.3.3 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives\n 2.4 Arrow’s Theorem\n 2.5 Social Decisions Instead of Social Preferences\n 2.6 The Public Interest?\n 2.6.1 Only Two Alternatives: May’s Theorem\n 2.6.2 Ruling Out Some Collections of Preferences: The Median Voter Theorem\n 2.6.3 Intensity of Preferences\n 2.6.4 Agreement\n 2.7 Takeaways\n 2.8 Further Reading\n 2.9 Exercises\n 3 Pareto Concepts\n 3.1 Pareto Concepts\n 3.2 From Pareto Efficiency to Pareto Improvements\n 3.3 A Model of Policies and Preferences\n 3.3.1 Actions and Transfers\n 3.3.2 Quasi Linearity: A Bridge from Pareto Efficiency to Pareto Improvement\n 3.4 A Bridge Too Far?\n 3.4.1 Limited Transfers and Distributional Concerns\n 3.4.2 Non Quasi Linear Preferences\n 3.5 Relationship to Cost-Benefit Analysis\n 3.6 Are Pareto Improvements Unambiguously in the Public Interest?\n 3.7 Takeaways\n 3.8 Further Reading\n 3.9 Exercises\n 3.10 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.3.1\n Summing Up Normative Foundations\nII SOCIAL DILEMMAS\n 4 Externalities\n 4.1 Collective Action\n 4.1.1 The Social Dilemma\n 4.1.2 Interpretations\n 4.2 Public Goods\n 4.2.1 Comparison to the First Best or Utilitarian Optimum\n 4.2.2 Interpretation\n 4.2.3 Concentrated vs. Diffuse Interests\n 4.3 The Tragedy of the Commons\n 4.3.1 A Pareto Improvement\n 4.3.2 The First Best\n 4.3.3 Interpretation\n 4.4 Policy Interventions\n 4.4.1 The Failure of Persuasion\n 4.4.2 Pigovian Subsidies and Taxes\n 4.4.3 Regulation\n 4.5 The Theory of the Second Best\n 4.5.1 The Second Best Pigovian Subsidy\n 4.6 Alternative Responses\n 4.6.1 Altruism\n 4.6.2 AMarket in Externalities\n 4.6.3 Ongoing Relationships and Self Organization\n 4.7 Takeaways\n 4.8 Further Reading\n 4.9 Exercises\n 5 Coordination Problems\n 5.1 Coordination Failure\n 5.1.1 Interpretation\n 5.2 Coordination Traps\n 5.2.1 A Basic Model of Coordination Traps: Investment in Developing Countries\n 5.2.2 AModel of Bank Runs\n 5.2.3 AModel of Revolutions\n 5.2.4 Interpretation\n 5.3 Policy Responses\n 5.3.1 Communication\n 5.3.2 Short Run Intervention\n 5.3.3 Insurance and the Second Best\n 5.4 Takeaways\n 5.5 Further Reading\n 5.6 Exercises\n 6 Commitment Problems\n 6.1 A Model of Conflict\n 6.1.1 Inefficient Conflict\n 6.1.2 Interpretation\n 6.2 The Hold-Up Problem\n 6.2.1 Interpretation\n 6.3 Policy Responses\n 6.4 Takeaways\n 6.5 Further Reading\n 6.6 Exercises\n Summing Up Social Dilemmas\nIII CONSTRAINTS ON GOOD GOVERNANCE\n 7 Strategic Adjustment\n 7.1 Strategic Adversaries\n 7.1.1 Do Terrorists Really Strategically Adjust?\n 7.1.2 TheWar onDrugs\n 7.2 Incentivizing Multiple Tasks\n 7.2.1 High Stakes Testing\n 7.3 Takeaways\n 7.4 Further Reading\n 7.5 Exercises\n 8 Dynamic Inconsistency\n 8.1 Time Inconsistency\n 8.1.1 The First Best\n 8.1.2 WhatWill the Government Do?\n 8.1.3 How Much Will a Consumer Consume?\n 8.1.4 Is the Government Time Consistent?\n 8.1.5 Time Inconsistency and Externalities\n 8.1.6 Rules vs. Discretion\n 8.1.7 Applications\n 8.2 Fiscal Manipulation\n 8.2.1 The First Best\n 8.2.2 Electoral Risk\n 8.2.3 Discounting the Future\n 8.3 When Policy Affects Future Power\n 8.3.1 The (Political) Second Best\n 8.4 Takeaways\n 8.5 Further Readings\n 8.6 Exercises\n 9 The Need for Information\n 9.1 Auctions\n 9.1.1 Second Price Auction\n 9.2 Providing a Public Good\n 9.2.1 Split the Costs\n 9.2.2 Veto and Split\n 9.2.3 General Mechanisms\n 9.2.4 The Second Best\n 9.3 Regulating a Monopolist\n 9.3.1 Monopolistic Equilibrium\n 9.3.2 Regulation with Full Information\n 9.3.3 Regulation with Uncertainty\n 9.3.4 An Informed Regulator\n 9.4 Takeaways\n 9.5 Further Reading\n 9.6 Exercises\n 10 Influence over Elected Officials\n 10.1 Particularistic Interests\n 10.2 Special Interests and Campaign Donations\n 10.3 Electoral Accountability\n 10.3.1 Rewards of Office\n 10.3.2 TermLimits\n 10.3.3 Incentives and Screening\n 10.3.4 Voter Information\n 10.3.5 The Risk of Electoral Pandering\n 10.4 Takeaways\n 10.5 Further Reading\n 10.6 Exercises\n 11 Institutions, Incentives, and Power\n 11.1 A Selectorate Model\n 11.1.1 Equilibrium\n 11.1.2 Outcomes and Institutions\n 11.2 Institutions and Development\n 11.2.1 Settler Mortality, Institutions, and the Economy\n 11.3 Foreign Aid\n 11.3.1 Poverty Traps and Foreign Aid\n 11.3.2 Does Foreign AidWork through Poverty Traps?\n 11.3.3 Effective Aid?\n 11.3.4 A Political Economy of Foreign Aid\n 11.4 Takeaways\n 11.5 Further Reading\n 11.6 Exercises\n Summing Up Constraints on Good Governance\n Concluding Reflections on Politics and Policy\nIV APPENDICES ON GAME THEORY\n A Utility, Strategic-Form Games, and Nash Equilibrium\n A.1 Utility\n A.1.1 Expected Utility\n A.2 Games in Strategic Form\n A.2.1 Where to Eat?\n A.2.2 Matching Pennies\n A.2.3 Cleaning an Apartment\n A.2.4 Choosing a Number\n A.3 Nash Equilibrium\n A.4 Why Nash Equilibrium?\n A.4.1 No Regrets and Social Learning\n A.4.2 Self Enforcing Agreements\n A.4.3 Analyst’s Humility\n A.5 Solving for Nash Equilibrium\n A.6 Nash Equilibrium Examples\n A.6.1 Where to Eat?\n A.6.2 Matching Pennies\n A.6.3 Cleaning an Apartment\n A.6.4 Choosing a Number with Two Players\n A.7 Takeaways\n A.8 Exercises\n B Extensive-Form Games\n B.1 Games in Extensive Form\n B.1.1 A Model of International Crisis\n B.2 Game Trees\n B.2.1 International Crisis Game\n B.2.2 A Budget Game\n B.2.3 The Centipede Game\n B.3 Strategies as Complete Contingent Plans\n B.3.1 International Crisis Game\n B.3.2 Budget Game\n B.3.3 The Centipede Game\n B.4 Representing an Extensive-FormGame as a Strategic-FormGame\n B.4.1 The International Crisis Game\n B.4.2 The Budget Game\n B.4.3 The Centipede Game\n B.5 Nash Equilibria of Extensive-FormGames\n B.5.1 International Crisis Game\n B.5.2 The Budget Game\n B.5.3 The Centipede Game\n B.6 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium\n B.6.1 Subgame Perfection\n B.6.2 Backward Induction\n B.6.3 Indifference and Multiple Equilibria\n B.6.4 Continuous Choices\n B.7 Discounted Payoffs\n B.8 Takeaways\n B.9 Exercises\nBibliography\nIndex of Referenced Authors\nGeneral Index