دانلود کتاب Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic

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Cover
Half-title
Title page
Copyright information
Dedication
Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction
I.1 Properties as Second-Order Existents
I.2 The Concept Horse Paradox
I.3 Properties as Satisfaction Conditions
I.4 Williamson on Absolute Generality
1 Substitution in a Sense
1.1 Some Counterexamples to the Reference Principle
1.2 Sense-Substitution
1.3 A New Reference Principle
1.4 The Sense in Sense-Substitution
1.5 A Circularity Objection
1.6 The Differences between Reference Principles
2 The Term/Predicate Distinction
2.1 The Senses of Terms and the Senses of Predicates
2.2 Substituting Predicates for Predicates
2.3 Substituting Predicates for Terms
2.4 Substituting Terms for Predicates
2.5 Type-Shifting Principles
2.6 An Assumed Distinction
3 Ramsey\'s Challenge
3.1 Socrates and Wisdom
3.2 Complex Predicates
3.3 Ramsey’s Alternative Scheme
3.4 Subsentential Monism
3.5 Back to the Term/Predicate Distinction
4 Two Types of Reference
4.1 The Argument in Brief
4.2 Preliminaries: Disquotation and Singular Terms
4.3 The Disquotation Problem for Predicate-Reference
4.4 Disquotation and Sense-Substitution
4.5 A Different Type of Reference
4.6 No Co-reference between Terms and Predicates
4.7 Looking Ahead
5 The Reference Principle
5.1 Sense-Substitution
5.2 Premise 0
5.3 Premise 1
5.4 Premise 2
5.5 Premise 3
5.6 The Proof
6 Fregean Realism
6.1 Predicate-Reference and Satisfaction
6.2 Properties Are Satisfaction Conditions
6.3 The Property/Object Distinction
7 Fregean Nominalism
7.1 Two Different Ways of Reading (S)?
7.2 Against a Quinean Suggestion
7.3 Non-Nominal Quantification
7.4 Set-Theoretic Semantics
7.5 Quantification over Satisfaction Conditions
7.6 Beyond Nominalism and Realism
7.A Appendix: Second-Order Semantics
8 Some Alternatives
8.1 Wright’s Ascription
8.2 Hale’s Primary/Secondary Distinction
8.3 MacBride’s Impure Reference
8.4 Wiggins, Strawson and the Copula
9 The Concept Horse Paradox
9.1 The Property Horse Is Not a Property?
9.2 Categorial Differences
9.3 Categorial Similarities
9.4 Saying and Showing
10 The Metaphysics Exam
10.1 The Problem of Universals
10.2 Bradley’s Regress
10.3 Are Properties Immanent or Transcendent?
10.4 Converse Relations
11 States of Affairs
11.1 Fregean Realism about States of Affairs
11.2 Negative and Disjunctive States of Affairs
11.3 Facts as Obtaining States of Affairs
11.4 The Structure of States of Affairs
12 The Prenective View of Propositional Content
12.1 Propositional Content
12.2 Two Views of Propositional Content
12.3 Formalising Inferences
12.4 The Prenective View versus Natural Language
12.5 The Standard View versus Natural Language
13 On Content and Object
13.1 The Limits of the Standard View
13.2 A Truth Conditional Approach
13.3 The Constituents of Propositions
13.4 Propositions Are Propositional Contents
13.A Appendix: Contemporary Approaches to Structured Propositions
14 The Identity Theory of Truth
14.1 An Immodest Identity Theory
14.2 The Core of the Identity Theory
14.3 The Identity Theory as a Form of Direct Realism
14.4 Falsehood and Unity
14.5 The Individuation Problem
14.6 Truths Unmade and Ungrounded
14.7 Believing the Facts
References
Index