دانلود کتاب Regulating Food-borne Illness: Investigation, Control and Enforcement

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Cover\nHalf-title\nTitle\nCopyright\nAcknowledgements\nContents\nExplanation of Alpha-numeric Identifiers\nTable of Cases\nTable of Legislation\n1. The Response to Food-borne Illness\n I. Introduction\n II. Regulating Food\n III. The Role of the Network\n IV. Regulating Risk\n V. The Issue of Illness\n VI. Collection of Information\n VII. The Control of Realised Risk\n VIII. Enforcement and Sanctioning\n IX. Examining the Response to Food-borne Illness: Methodological Considerations\n X. Examining the Response to Food-borne Illness: A Structural Guide\n XI. Summary\n2. The Regulatory Network\n I. Introduction\n II. The EU and the UK Government\n III. The Food Standards Agency\n IV. Local Authorities\n V. Medical Actors\n VI. The Police\n VII. Food Businesses and Their Employees\n VIII. Consumers\n IX. Conclusion\n3. The Regulatory Landscape\n I. The Governance of Food Production\n A. Regulations Governing Food Products: Regulation 178/2002\n i. Unsafe Per Se\n ii. Injurious to Health\n iii. Unfit for Human Consumption\n B. Regulations Governing Food Premises: Food Hygiene Requirements\n i. The General Obligation\n ii. Temperature Control Requirements\n iii. Microbiological Safety Requirements\n iv. Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point\n v. Condition\n vi. Notification\n II. The Control, Enforcement and Advisory Toolbox: Powers Available to Local Authorities\n A. Four Species of Control Power Used During Incidents of Food-borne Illness\n i. Powers that Control Products\n ii. Powers that Control Premises and Processes\n iii. Powers that Control People\n iv. Powers that Control The Environment\n B. Two Enforcement Powers Used Following Incidents of Food-borne Illness\n i. Prosecution\n ii. Caution\n C. The Power to Advise\n i. Improvement Notices\n III. Conclusion: The Powers of the Network\n4. The Investigation of Incidents of Food-borne Illness\n I. Notification\n II. Investigation of Incidents of Food-borne Illness\n III. Epidemiological Investigations\n A. Identifying Cases and Controls\n i. Case Definition\n ii. Snowballing from Consumers\n iii. Utilising the Business\n iv. Utilising the Event Organiser\n v. Identification by Medical Professionals\n B. Questioning Affected Persons\n i. Information about the Case/Control\n ii. Information about Symptoms\n iii. Food History\n iv. Information about Other Risk Factors\n C. Analysing Epidemiological Information\n i. Building a Hypothesis\n ii. Testing a Hypothesis\n IV. Microbiological Investigations\n A. Human Samples\n i. From Consumers\n ii. From Employees\n B. Food Samples\n C. Environmental Samples\n D. Testing and Analysis of Samples\n V. Environmental Investigation\n A. Contacting the Food Business\n B. Physical Inspections of Premises\n C. Examination of Documentation Retained at Premises\n i. Food Safety Management System Documentation\n ii. Temperature records\n iii. Preparation Instructions\n iv. Absence and Sickness Records\n v. Other Documents\n D. Questioning Businesses\n i. Under Caution\n ii. Not Under Caution\n E. Questioning Employees of Food Businesses\n F. Observation of Working Practices\n VI. Supply Chain Investigations: Tracing\n VII. Conclusion: Investigation of Incidents of Food-borne Illness\n5. The Key Goal: Control of Food-borne Illness\n I. Introduction\n II. Biosecurity: The Theoretical Framework\n III. Control in Action\n IV. Two Techniques of Control\n A. Control Through Spatial Separation\n B. Control Through Market Management\n V. Enforcing Biosecurity\n VI. Control in a Regulatory Context\n VII. Conclusion\n6. Enforcement Following Incidents of Food-borne Illness\n I. Introduction\n II. Unavailability of Epidemiological Evidence and its Impact on Enforcement\n A. Information Limited by Consumers’ ‘Source Fixation’\n B. Information Limited by Consumers’ Incomplete Memory\n C. Information Limited by the Special Features of Buffets\n D. The Effect of the Limitations on Enforcement Decisions\n III. Unavailability of Food Sample Evidence and its Impact on Enforcement\n IV. Unavailability of Faecal Sample Evidence and its Impact on Enforcement\n V. ‘Inadmissibility’ Due to ‘Medical Confidentiality’ and its Impact on Enforcement\n A. Two Case Studies\n i. Cadbury Salmonella\n ii. R v South-West Water (1997)\n B. Three Legal and Ethical Reasons Offered for the Inadmissibility of Medical Information\n i. ‘Medical Privilege’\n ii. Data Protection\n iii. Ethical Obligations of Confidentiality\n C. Policy Reasons for the ‘Inadmissibility’ of Medical Information\n VI. Inadmissibility of Outbreak/Incident Control Team Reports and Its Impact on Enforcement\n A. Case Study: R v South-West Water (1997)—The (In)Admissibility of OCT Reports on Hearsay Grounds\n i. The Enforcement Decision\n ii. The Prosecution\n iii. The OCT Report\n iv. After the Ruling\n B. The Effect of Inadmissibility of OCT Reports on Enforcement Following Food-borne Illness\n VII. Inadmissibility of Information Gained from Conversations with Businesses and Employees and Its Impact on Enforcement\n A. Obtaining Information from Businesses\n B. Obtaining Information from Employees\n C. The Effect of Inadmissible Interview Information on Enforcement\n VIII. Conclusion\n7. Reacting to Incidents of Food-borne Illness: The (Im)Possibility of Investigation, Control and Enforcement\n I. Key Themes in Investigation, Control and Enforcement\n A. The Power of the Network\n B. The Centrality of Information\n C. Evidential Decision Making is not Discretionary\n D. Strict Liability Cases are Epistemically Difficult\n E. Prioritising Control over Enforcement\n F. Difficulties Taking Enforcement Action—Four Additional Explanatory Factors\n i. Delay in the Collection of Evidence\n ii. Causation Matters\n iii. Resourcing and Evidence Collection\n iv. Inexperience of Environmental Health Officers\n G. Environmental Health Officers as Risk-averse Actors\n i. Desire for Success and Positive Results\n ii. The Unwillingness to Rely upon Epidemiological Evidence\n iii. Rejecting Risk Aversion\n iv. Are Environmental Health Officers Risk-averse Actors?\n H. Summary\n II. Meeting the Epistemic Challenges of Incidents of Food-borne Illness\n A. Improving the Collection of Evidence: Seven Suggestions for Increasing Expertise and Experience\n i. The Need to Build an ‘Evidential Culture’\n ii. Greater Use of Guidelines, Check-lists and Aides-memoires\n iii. A Two-team Solution—Dividing Control and Enforcement\n iv. A National Body with Responsibility for Incidents of Food-borne Illness\n v. Increased Investigative Cooperation on a Regional Basis\n vi. Involvement of Specialist Lawyers in Case-building\n vii. The Possibility of Civil Sanctions\n B. Easier Prosecution Case-building: Adapting to or Altering the Legal Framework\n C. Can the Epistemic Challenges be Met?\n8. Conclusions\n I. Summary of Findings and Conclusions\n II. Limitations\n III. Recommendations\nBibliography\nIndex