توضیحاتی در مورد کتاب Revolutionary Constitutionalism: Law, Legitimacy, Power
نام کتاب : Revolutionary Constitutionalism: Law, Legitimacy, Power
عنوان ترجمه شده به فارسی : مشروطیت انقلابی: قانون، مشروعیت، قدرت
سری :
نویسندگان : Richard Albert (editor)
ناشر : Hart Publishing
سال نشر : 2020
تعداد صفحات : 433
ISBN (شابک) : 9781509934577 , 9781509934591
زبان کتاب : English
فرمت کتاب : pdf
حجم کتاب : 4 مگابایت
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فهرست مطالب :
Table Of Contents\nNotes on Contributors\nIntroduction: A Global Tour of Constitutionalism\n A Celebration and a Challenge\n In this Volume\n A Word of Thanks\n1. A Political, not a Legal History of the Rise of Worldwide Constitutionalism\nPART I: THE LEGITIMATING FOUNDATIONS OF REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONALISM\n 2. A Defence of Non-representational Constitutionalism: Why Constitutions Need not be Representational\n I. Introduction\n II. The Representational and the Reason-Based Modes of Legitimation\n III. Illustrations: Germany and Israel\n 3. Constitutionalism and Society: Ackerman on Worldwide Constitution-Makingand the Role of Social Forces\n I. Republican Narratives\n II. Constitutions at the Level of Society\n III. Systems of Government\n IV. A Darker Future?\n 4. Bruce Ackerman\'s Theory of History\n I. Introduction\n II. Constitutionalism\'s Different Pathways\n III. Descriptive Problems\n IV. A Procrustean Approach?\n V. Which Theory of History?\n VI. From \'We the People\' to \'We the Judges\'\n VII. The Normalisation of Domination\n 5. Constitutionalism and the Predicament of Postcolonial Independence\n I. Introduction\n II. The Spectre of Neo-colonialism and the Turn to Centralised Authority\n III. Who are the \'People\' of the Postcolonial State?\n IV. Conclusion\n 6. Revolution on a Human Scale: Liberal Values, Populist Theory?\n I. Introduction\n II. Defining Revolution\n III. Subsuming Cases: Israel and Iran\n IV. Intermediate Theoretical Reflections\n V. Poland and South Africa\n VI. The Exception Revisited\n VII. Constitution-Making under Occupation\nPART II: CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS\n 7. Charismatic Fictions and Constitutional Politics\n I. Three Paths?\n II. On Charisma and Constitutions\n III. Italy\n IV. Myanmar\n V. Gaullism\n VI. Quibbles and Bits\n VII. Conclusion\n 8. Uncharismatic Revolutionary Constitutionalism\n I. Two Types of Revolutionary Constitutionalism\n II. Charisma and Constitutionalism\n III. Judicial Supremacy?\n IV. Conclusion\n 9. Unconventional Adaptation and the Authenticity of the Constitution\n I. Varieties of Unconventional Adaptation\n II. Authenticity and the Constitution\n III. Conclusion\n 10. Constitutional Revolution, Legal Positivism and Constituent Power\n I. Constitutional Revolution and Legal Positivism\n II. Rousseau\'s Lawgiver and Constitutional Revolution\n III. Conclusion\n 11. The Traditions of Constitutional Change\n I. Introduction: Constitutionalism and Constitutional Change\n II. The Revolutionary Tradition in France\n III. The Establishmentarian Tradition in Great Britain\n IV. The Elite Tradition in Japan\n V. A Hybrid Tradition in Canada?\n VI. Conclusion: A Constructive Complication\nPART III: THE FUTURE OF EUROPE\n 12. Constitutional CrossroadsA View from Europe\n I. Introduction: Temporal and Conceptual Crossroads\n II. The UK and the Limits of Pragmatic Adaptation\n III. The EU and the Limits of Elite Construction\n IV. At the Crossroads: Towards Managed Revolution?\n 13. How Europe Brought JudicialReview to France: A Response to Bruce Ackerman\n I. Introduction\n II. The Fourth Republic’s Stalemate: International Treaties, Domestic Law and Judicial Review\n III. The Fifth Republic Meets the European Community\n IV. The French Tribunals React to European Law\n V. Conventionnalite versus Constitutionnalité:A Rose by Any Other Name …\n VI. What’s Sauce for Europe …\n VII. Conclusion\n 14. Constituting the Judiciary, Constituting Europe\n I. Introduction\n II. The European Judicial Appointment Reforms\n III. Why Think of these Reforms as Constitutional Interventions?\n IV. Ackerman\'s Constitutional Perspective\n V. Value Added\nPART IV: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF REVOLUTION\n 15. Sustaining Revolutionary Constitutions: From Movement Party to Movement Court\n I. Introduction\n II. Aims and Structure of the Chapter\n III. What is the Ackermanian Method?\n IV. India’s Movement Party\n V. The Movement Court and the Consolidation of Constitutionalism\n 16. The Italian Constitution as a Revolutionary Agreement\n I. Introduction\n II. Revolution and Constitution: A Multi-faceted Relationship\n III. The Meandering Implementation of the Constitution\n IV. Difficult Consolidation\n V. A Revolutionary Agreement\n 17. Constitutional Strateg yfor a Polarised Society: Learning from Poland’s Post-revolutionary Misfortunes\n I. Constitutional Challenges of a Polarised Society\n II. Polarised Society: A Case Study\n III. Polarised Society and Revolutionary Struggle\n IV. Constitutional Opportunity\n V. Constitutional Ethics in a Polarised Society\n VI. Avoiding the Authoritarian Equilibrium\n VII. Presidential and Parliamentary Polarised Republics\n VIII. The Overlooked Solution\n IX. The Federalist Imagination\n 18. Choosing to Have Had a Revolution Lessons from South Africa’s Undecided Constitutionalism\n I. Introduction\n II. An Undecided Revolution: A Summary of the Argument\n III. A Concluding Thought: What Legal Revolution Looks Like\n 19. The Race against Time\n I. Never Again\n II. Revolutionary Failures\n III. Broader Perspectives\n IV. Fundamental Critiques\nIndex