توضیحاتی در مورد کتاب :
این مطالعه پیشگام در مورد تقلب و اصلاحات در انتخابات، بر کاستاریکا متمرکز است، کشوری که احزاب به تدریج یک سیستم سیاسی پر از تقلب را به سیستمی تبدیل کردند که در اواسط قرن بیستم به دلیل ثبات و انتخابات عادلانه مشهور بود. Lehoucq و Molina از یک پایگاه داده منحصربفرد از بیش از 1300 اتهام تقلب در رای گیری استفاده می کنند تا نشان دهند که مستقل از محدودیت های ساختاری اجتماعی، احزاب تقلب را در جایی که قوانین انتخاباتی مبارزه برای قدرت را رقابتی تر می کرد، محکوم کردند. آنها توضیح می دهند که چگونه ترتیبات نهادی فرصت هایی را برای چندین مدیر اجرایی ایجاد کرد تا ائتلاف های قانونی را برای اجرای اصلاحات گسترده تشکیل دهند.
فهرست مطالب :
Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 5
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Dedication......Page 9
Contents......Page 11
Tables......Page 12
Figures......Page 13
Preface......Page 15
Central Questions......Page 19
Presidentialism, Collective Dilemmas, and Institutional Reform......Page 21
Theories, Approaches, and Hypotheses......Page 25
Existing Research......Page 30
Sources and Methods......Page 32
Definitions and Scales......Page 35
Explaining Electoral Fraud......Page 37
The Magnitude of Electoral Fraud......Page 40
Theoretical Guideposts......Page 42
Methodological Reflections......Page 46
An Overview of the Book......Page 47
Introduction......Page 52
The Political Economy of Presidentialism......Page 53
Public Finances and Electoral Competition......Page 54
Presidentialism and the Classical Theory of Electoral Governance......Page 57
The Size and Nature of the Electorate......Page 59
Electors and Second-Stage Elections......Page 61
The Nature and Spatial Basis of Electoral Fraud......Page 63
The Intensity and Magnitude of Electoral Fraud......Page 70
Congress, Reform, and Dispute Resolution......Page 71
Institutional Controls......Page 72
Political Conflict and Electoral Reform......Page 73
Politicizing the Judiciary......Page 75
Parties and Electors: Principal-Agent Problems......Page 77
Conclusions......Page 78
Introduction......Page 81
Watershed Elections and Political Mandates......Page 83
The Struggle to Reform the Constitution......Page 84
Factionalism and the Reforms......Page 85
Committee Reports......Page 87
Midterm Elections, Legislative Alignments, and Reform Possibilities......Page 89
Partisanship, Roll-Call Votes, and the Constitutional Amendments......Page 90
The Proposed Electoral Law......Page 97
Electoral Incentives, Committee Power, and the Reforms......Page 98
Conclusions......Page 101
Introduction......Page 104
Political Instability......Page 106
Parties and Their Voters......Page 108
Parties and Voter Turnout Rates......Page 110
The Nature and Spatial Basis of Electoral Fraud......Page 112
The Intensity and Magnitude of Fraud......Page 122
Institutional Controls and the Separation of Powers......Page 124
A Crisis of Political Succession......Page 126
The President’s Dilemma......Page 128
Congress, Partisanship, and the Classical Theory of Electoral Governance......Page 130
Conclusion......Page 132
Introduction......Page 136
The Struggle to Reform Institutions......Page 137
Legislative Alignments and Reform......Page 138
Institutional Configurations and Reform Possibilities......Page 139
The President’s Response......Page 140
Political Threats and Committee Reports......Page 142
The Dilemmas Posed by Female Suffrage Rights......Page 143
Institutional Design and Strategic Interplay: Electoral Tribunals......Page 148
Parties and Voters: Maintaining the Links That Bind?......Page 150
Final Debates......Page 153
Veto Games and Political Coalitions......Page 154
Constitutional Reform and Double-Ballot Elections......Page 157
The Reform of Electoral Laws (II)......Page 160
The President’s Bill......Page 161
Partisan Alignments and Election Year Politics......Page 162
Committee Responses......Page 163
Delay, Opposition, and Public Opinion......Page 164
Conclusions......Page 170
Introduction......Page 174
Parties Lose Control......Page 176
Parties and Voter Turnout Rates......Page 178
Electoral Fraud, 1925–38......Page 180
The Nature and Spatial Basis of Fraud......Page 181
The Intensity and Magnitude of Fraud......Page 189
Institutional Controls......Page 193
The Ruling Bloc Splits......Page 196
Social Reform and Coalitional Politics......Page 198
The Nature and Spatial Basis of Electoral Fraud......Page 200
Electoral Fraud and Institutional Controls......Page 206
Conclusion......Page 209
Introduction......Page 213
The Production and Scope of the Reform Bill......Page 215
Legislative Alignments and Strategic Possibilities......Page 217
Killer Amendments and Their Outcomes: The Pressure Mounts......Page 219
Debate, Delay, and Compromise......Page 224
The Political Center Stabilizes......Page 228
Rival Strategic Calculations: The Opposition Splits......Page 230
The Collapse of the Centrist Compromise......Page 232
Political Polarization and Electoral Reform......Page 235
Election Results and the Charges of Fraud......Page 236
Negotiation, Civil War, and a New Constitution......Page 241
Conclusion......Page 243
Introduction......Page 246
Electoral Fraud: Principal Findings......Page 249
Social Structural and Institutional Accounts: A Balance Sheet......Page 250
The Magnitude of Electoral Fraud......Page 257
Assessing the Classical Theory of Electoral Governance......Page 260
Electoral Reform: Theories and Evidence......Page 263
Office-Seeking Theories......Page 264
Sociological Approaches......Page 267
Institutionalist Approaches......Page 270
Rethinking Costa Rican Democratization......Page 274
Promoting the Study of Electoral Fraud: Beyond Costa Rica......Page 278
Reformulating Existing Accounts of Institutional Reform......Page 281
Index......Page 287
توضیحاتی در مورد کتاب به زبان اصلی :
This pioneering study of electoral fraud and reform focuses on Costa Rica, a country where parties gradually transformed a fraud-ridden political system into one renowned for stability and fair elections by the mid-twentieth century. Lehoucq and Molina draw upon a unique database of more than 1,300 accusations of ballot-rigging to show that, independently of social structural constraints, parties denounced fraud where electoral laws made the struggle for power more competitive. They explain how institutional arrangements generated opportunities for several executives to assemble legislative coalitions to enact far-reaching reforms.