دانلود کتاب The European Banking Union and Constitution: Beacon for Advanced Integration or Death-Knell for Democracy?

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Contents\nContributors\nList of Abbreviations\n1. The European Banking Union and Constitution – The Overall Challenge\n I. The Challenge\n II. An Introduction to the Constitutional Panorama\n III. The European Banking Union \ras a Boost to Integration?\n IV. The European Banking Union \ras a Blow to Democracy?\n V. Conclusions: The European Banking \rUnion as a Constitutional Challenge\nPART I:\r SOME CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN BANKING UNION\n 2. The Constitutional Dimension of Banking Union\n I. Banking Union and the Constitutional \rIntegrity of EU Law\n II. Differentiated Integration and the Principle \rof Equal Treatment\n III. The Division of Powers Between \rthe EU and the Member States\n IV. The Legal Bases of BU: Novelties \rat the Outskirts of Constitutionality\n V. The Role of the CJEU\n VI. Conclusions\n 3. The Thin Red Line Between the OMT Decision and the Banking Union\n I. The OMT Decision\n II. The Banking Union: Background and Main Features\n III. The Interplay between the OMT \rand the Banking Union\n IV. Conclusion\nPART II: EUROPEAN BANKING UNION AND FULL INTEGRATION\n 4. The European Banking Union and Integration\n I. What Role for the Banking Unionin Integration Dynamics?\n II. Survey on Substantive Laws \r(Rulebook) and Institutions\n III. Some Theoretical Background on Integration \rand Regulatory Diversity\n IV. Integration and Remaining Diversity Within \rthe European Banking Union\n V. Integration Dynamism Triggered Beyond \rthe European Banking Union\n VI. Conclusions\n 5. Banking Union and the European Economic Constitution: A Brief Comparison of Regulatory Styles in Banking Regulation and Competition Law\n I. Introduction\n II. The Economic Constitution of the European Union\n III. The Constitutional Relevance of the Banking Union\n IV. The Structure of the Banking Union\n V. Banking Union – Constitutional Principles and Regulatory Styles\n VI. Managerial Regulation vs Rule-based Approach\n 6. Technocratic and Centralised Decision-making in the Banking Union’s Single Supervisory Mechanism: Can Single Market and Banking Union Governance Effectively Co-exist in a Post-Brexit World?\n I. EU Financial Governance in Steady State?\n II. Centralised Decision-making and the SSM: \rInternal Effects\n III. SSM Decision-making, the EBA \rand Brexit: ESFS Effects\n IV. Conclusion\n 7. Single Resolution Board: Lost and Found in the Thicket of EU Bank Regulation\n I. Explaining the Complex Regulatory Architecture \rof EU Bank Oversight\n II. Legitimacy and Accountability\n III. What is ‘Specific’ about the Single \rResolution Board?\n IV. Resolution Planning and ‘Going Concern’ \rCooperation Between Financial Regulators\n V. Resolution-Planning ‘Joints’ of the Banking \rUnion Regulatory Architecture\n VI. The SRB in the Thicket of EU Bank Regulation \rand the Value of ‘Constraints’\nPART III: EUROPEAN BANKING UNION, DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOCRACY\n 8. Some Reflections on the State of European Democracy with Regard to the Banking Union and the ECB\n I. Introduction\n II. Overlapping Lines of Political Contestation \rin the EU\n III. A View on the ECB\n IV. Democracy, Accountability and Independence\n V. Accountability of the ECB\n VI. Conclusion\n 9. The European Banking Union: A Case of Tempered Supranationalism?\n I. Introduction\n II. The Making of the BU\n III. The Institutional Outcome: The SSM\n IV. The Institutional Outcome: The SRM\n V. Conclusions\n 10. Prudential Supervision and the European Central Bank Credit Data Registry (AnaCredit): Legal Basis and Democratic Accountability\n I. Introduction\n II. The Banking Union and the Credit-Risk Reporting \rof the European Central Bank (‘AnaCredit’)\n III. Theoretical Framework of Credit-Risk Data\n IV. Credit-Risk Data and Prudential Supervision\n V. Credit Registries in the EU\n VI. The Legal Basis of AnaCredit: A Democratic Gap?\n VII. Concluding Remarks\n 11. The Internal Market and the Banking Union\n I. Introduction\n II. Crisis\n III. Actor\n IV. Means\n V. Ex Ante vs Ex Post\n VI. Regulatory Technique\n VII. Substance vs Procedure\n VIII. Accountability and Responsibility\n IX. Culture\n X. External/Internal\n XI. Interim Conclusion\n XII. Instead of Conclusion\n 12. Should Non-participating Member States Join the Banking Union? A Legal Perspective\n I. Introduction\n II. The Outcome of Entering Close Cooperation\n III. Wider Ramifications of Opting \rIn or Out of the Banking Union\nIndex