دانلود کتاب The Fate of Wonder: Wittgenstein's Critique of Metaphysics and Modernity

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Preface and Acknowledgments\nIntroduction\n I.1. Background to the central questions and claims\n I.2. Methodological Issues A: resolute and therapeutic readings; “early” and “later” Wittgenstein; the “constancy” of Wittgenstein’s cultural views; the scope of the book; a point about Heidegger; a point about Charles Taylor\n I.3. Methodological Issues B: on the use of the Nachlass and other “nontext” sources for interpreting Wittgenstein\n I.4. O verview of the book\nPart I\n 1. Interpreting the Tractatus\n 1.1. The problem of ethics and nonsense in the Tractatus\n 1.2. The “ineffabilist” reading of the Tractatus\n 1.3. Schopenhauer and the ineffabilist reading\n 1.4. Diamond and Conant’s resolute reading of the Tractatus\n 1.5. “Intention and ethics”: Early Wittgenstein and the logial positivists on the nature of ethical utterances\n 2. The Ethical Purpose of the Tractatus\n 2.1. A remaining task for resolute readings\n 2.2. Conveying intention in the context of the Tractatus\n 2.3. Overview of anxiety, the “they,” and authenticity in Being and Time\n 2.4. The Tractatus and cultural critique\n 2.5. The law of causality, mechanics, and “wonder at the existence of the world”\n 2.6. Wonder and die ganze moderne Weltanschauung\n 2.7. Wonder, anxiety, and authenticity\n 2.8. A possible problem with the relation between wonder and anxiety\n 2.9. A uthenticity and truth in the Tractatus and Being and Time\n 2.10. What did Wittgenstein imagine that Heidegger meant?\n 2.11. A crucial difference between the ethical point of the Tractatus and authenticity in Being and Time\n 2.12. Kremer and Conant on the ethical point of the Tractatus\n 2.13. A problem with Kremer’s and Conant’s views\n 2.14. The ambitions of the Tractatus\n 3. A Resolute Failure\n 3.1. A significant difference between the Tractatus and Being and Time that points to a more significant underlying convergence\n 3.2. The method of the Tractatus and the essence of language\nConclusion to Part I\nPart II\n 4. The Concept of Progress in Wittgenstein’s Thought\n 4.1. Introduction\n 4.2. Some preliminary literary-critical questions concerning the motto to the Investigations\n 4.3. One sense of progress in the Investigations\n 4.4. The relevance of the remarks on rule-following\n 4.5. Rule-following, progress, and the disengaged view of rationality\n 5. The Truly Apocalyptic View\n 5.1. Preliminary observations\n 5.2. Spengler’s influence on Wittgenstein\n 5.3. Wittgenstein is not a metaphysical pessimist (or optimist)\n 5.4. Cultural decline and the disengaged view\n 5.5. Wittgenstein and religion\n 5.6. Wittgenstein and conservatism\n 6. The Fate of Metaphysics\n 6.1. Introduction\n 6.2. Presentation and criticism of McDowell’s view\n 6.3. Presentation of Cavell’s view\n 6.4. Cavell and the significance of practices in Wittgenstein\n 6.5. Some evidence for and against Cavell (and McDowell)\n 6.6. Wittgenstein and the end of metaphysics\nNotes\nBibliography\nIndex