دانلود کتاب The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment

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Acknowledgements\nContents\nNotes on Contributors\nIntroduction\n The State of the Art in Constitutional Amendment\n I. Defining the Field\n II. The Architecture of Constitutional Amendment Rules\n III. Amendment as Constitution\nPart I The Foundations of Constitutional Amendment\n 1\n Amendment Power, Constituent Power, and Popular Sovereignty\n I. Introduction\n II. Unamendability and Constituent Power\n III. The Constitutionalisation of Primary Constituent Power\n IV. The Spectrum of Constitutional Amendment Powers\n V. Conclusion\n 2\n Constitutional Theory and Cognitive Estrangement\n I. Introduction: The Person of \'The People\' and a Three-fold Cognitive Estrangement\n II. Beyond \'The People\': New Tropes, Old Anxieties\n III. Three Forms of Estrangement-prevention: Holmes, Pettit, Dworkin\n IV. Tertium Datur: Mapping Constitutional Change Between the Revolution and the Amendment\n V. Towards a Different Familiarity: \'The People\', the Paradox and the Sacrifice\n 3\n Constraints on Constitutional Amendment Powers\n I. Introduction\n II. A Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments\n III. Constraint and Powers of Constitutional Change\n IV. The Types of Constraint on Constitutional Amendment Powers\n V. Distribution of Power and the Justification of Constraint\n VI. Justification of Constraints on Constitutional Amendment Powers\n VII. Conclusion\n 4\n Comment on Doyle\'s Constraints on Constitutional Amendment Powers\n 5\n Constituting the Amendment Power\n I. Introduction\n II. Conclusion\n 6\n Sieyès: The Spirit of Constitutional Democracy?\n I. Introduction\n II. Towards a Representative Democracy\n III. Towards a Constitutional Democracy\n IV. Conclusion\n 7\n Revolutionary Reform in Venezuela\n I. Introduction\n II. Carl Schmitt\'s Unfortunate Victory over Hannah Arendt in the Analysis of Popular Constitution-Making\n III. Hannah Arendt\'s Revolutionary Reform\n IV. Hugo Chávez\'s Radical and Original Constituent Power\n V. The Turning Point: The Electoral Rules for the Constituent Assembly\n VI. Radical Breaks and Exclusionary Mandates\n VII. Conclusion\n 8\n \'Revolutionary Reform\' and the Seduction of Constitutionalism\n I. A Revolution in Crisis: Braver\'s Narrative of the Creation of the 1999 Constitution in Venezuela\n II. The Dilemma of the Sovereignty of the People\n III. The Seduction of Constitutionalism: When Constitutionalism Faces the Contingencies of Social Life\n IV. Conclusion\nPart II The Traditions of Constitutional Amendment\n 9\n Constitutional Sunrise\n I. Introduction\n II. Sunrise Clauses\n III. Contingent Constitutional Change Between Retrospective and Foresight\n IV. The Constitutionality of Sunrise Clauses\n V. Conclusion\n 10\n Constitutional Change and Interest Group Politics\n I. Introduction\n II. Referendums and Constitutional Change\n III. Political Cleavages and Narratives for Change\n IV. Children\'s Rights: From Lawyers to Interest Groups and Back Again\n V. The Referendum Campaign\n VI. Conclusion\n 11\n Amendment-Metrics\n I. Introduction: Does the Frequency of Amendment Relate to Constitutional Quality?\n II. Constitutional Length and the Economy: An Unexpected Relationship\n III. Poor Countries, Lengthy Constitutions and High Amendment Rates: In Search of an Explicable Correlation\n IV. Is There Such Thing as the \'Ideal Constitution\'?\n V. Conclusion\n 12\n Comment on Amendment-Metrics: The Good, the Bad and the Frequently Amended Constitution\n I. Introduction: Does the Frequency of Amendment Relate to Constitutional Quality?\n II. The Notion of a Bad Constitution\n III. Criteria for a Good Constitution\n IV. The Purposes of Amendment\n V. The Fallacy of Confusing Correlation with Causation\n VI. Conclusion\n 13\n Constituting \'the People\'\n I. Introduction\n II. Evaluation and Conclusion\n 14\n Hard Amendment Cases in Canada\n I. Part V and Hard Amendment Cases\n II. Principles of Application\n III. The Case of Mandatory Bilingualism at the Court\n IV. Conclusion\n 15\n Formal Amendment Rules and Constitutional Endurance\n I. Introduction*\n II. The Rationale for the Inclusion of Formal Amendment Rules in Commonwealth Caribbean Constitutions\n III. Post-Independence Constitutional Reform and Amendment Culture\n IV. Conclusion\n 16\n The French People\'s Role in Amending the Constitution\n I. The Position of the People: Fundamental and Absolute, in Appearance\n II. The Position of the People: Limited and Relative, in Law\n 17\n The Implication of Conflation of Normal and \'Constitutional Politics\' on Constitutional Change in Africa\n I. Introduction\n II. Decision Making in a Polity\n III. Expression of Normal Politics in Constitutional Politics\n IV. Revisiting Effectiveness and Stability\n V. Constitutional Irrelevance\n VI. Conclusion\n 18\n Direct Democracy and Constitutional Change in the US\n I. Introduction\n II. Article V of the US Constitution\n III. State Laboratories\n IV. Alterations to the Federal Amendment Procedure\n V. Conclusion\n VI. Attachment: Methods for Constitutional Amendment Provided by the State Constitutions\nConclusion\n The Emergence of Comparative Constitutional Amendment as a New Discipline\n I. A Paradigm Shift in Comparative Constitutional Change\n II. The Amendability Factor: Understanding Constitutions through their Change\n III. New Taxonomies of Constitutional Change\n IV. Symbolism and Functionality of Formal Amendment Rules\n V. Conscious Constitutional Design: Drafting Amendment Rules\n VI. Legitimacy and Constitutional Change\n VII. Conclusion: Toward a Holistic Conceptualisation of Comparative Constitutional Amendment\nIndex