دانلود کتاب The making of a transnational capitalist class: Corporate power in the twenty-first century

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About the author\nTables and figures\n Tables\n 1.1 Strata in the 1976 and 1996 samples\n 1.2 Mean degree by type of line for the global network\n 1.3 Mean degree of interlocking for corporations domiciled in four regions, by type of line\n 1.4 National and transnational interlocks in the global network\n 1.5 Cross-classification of national networkers and transnationalists by highest status held\n 2.1 Classification of five leading global policy groups\n 2.2 The nucleus of six corporate directors and their organizational affiliations\n 2.3 Eleven additional members of the core group and their organizationalaffiliations\n 2.4 Distributions of companies and inner circle members by national domicile\n 2.5 Numbers of directorships on five global policy boards\n 3.1 Degree of interlocking, twenty most central cities in the global network\n 3.2 Primary and secondary interlocking in the global network\n 5.1 Internal and external ties for major segments of the global corporate elite\n 6.1 Leading billionaire families in the global corporate elite, 1996 and 2006\n 7.1 Mean degree for Top Dogs and other G500 European firms, 1996 and 2006\n 7.2 Bonding and bridging analysis, 1996 and 2006\n 7.3 Mean inter-corporate distances, with and without ERT mediation\n 7.4 Financial institutions in the European corporate network, 2006\n 7.5 Elite linkages between corporate Europe and the rest of the world\n 8.1 Eleven key transnational policy boards, 1996–2006\n 8.2 Policy-board memberships and corporate directorships, 1996 and 2006\n 8.3 Organizations ranking highest in coreness, 2006\n 8.4 Distribution of inter-corporate relations brokered by policy boards\n 9.1 A judgement sample of eight key organizations for paired comparisons\n 9.2 Eight key organizations: constituencies, organizational forms, action repertoires\n Figures\n 1.1 The core of the transnational network, 1976\n 1.2 The core of the transnational network, 1996\n 2.1 Number of interlocks among five global policy groups, 1996\n 2.2 Mean international distances among 271 corporations, based on corporate interlocks only\n 2.3 Mean international distances among 271 corporations, including paths mediated by five global policy groups\n 3.1 Participation in the transnational network, twenty-two cities\n 3.2 Mean degree of interlocking in the transnational network, fourteen cities\n 3.3 The transnational inter-urban network, showing all ties carried by transnationalists\n 3.4 The transnational inter-urban network, cities linked by four or more interlocking directorships\n 3.5 The Paris archipelago\n 3.6 The global inter-urban network of seventy connected cities\n 3.7 The network of primary inter-urban interlocks: twenty-eight cities with transnational ties\n 4.1 Industrial composition of the G400, 1996–2006\n 4.2 Regional trends in capital accumulation, 1996–2006\n 4.3 Main urban domiciles for G500 corporations, 1996–2006\n 4.4 UNCTAD transnationality among G400 industrial corporations of the triad\n 4.5 Mean board size for G500 corporations, 1996–2006\n 4.6 Degree of national and transnational interlocking for G500 corporations, 1996–2006\n 4.7 Proportions of national and transnational interlocking, key countries, 1996–2006\n 4.8 Financial and industrial interlocks among G7 countries, 1996\n 4.9 Financial and industrial interlocks among G7 countries, 2006\n 4.10 The international network of transnational interlocks, 1996\n 4.11 The international network of transnational interlocks, 2006\n 5.1 Distribution of G500 interlocking and non-interlocking directors, 1996–2006\n 5.2 Numbers of interlockers: national (G5 countries) and transnational\n 5.3 Typology of corporate interlockers in the global network\n 5.4 Domicile of principal corporate affiliation, trans-Atlantic linkers\n 5.5 National networkers and transnationalists in the global corporate elite, 1996\n 5.6 National networkers and transnationalists in the global corporate elite, 2006\n 6.1 Numbers of Forbes and G500 billionaires, 1996–2006\n 6.2 Distribution of Forbes and G500 billionaires, 1996\n 6.3 Distribution of Forbes and G500 billionaires, 2006\n 6.4 Main groupings of billionaires and their organizational affiliations, 1996\n 6.5 Main groupings of billionaires and their organizational affiliations, 2006\n 6.6 Social circles of billionaire networkers, 1996\n 6.7 Social circles of billionaire networkers, 2006\n 7.1 National domiciles in corporate Europe, 1996\n 7.2 National domiciles in corporate Europe, 2006\n 7.3 Degree of transnational interlocking within Europe, 1996 and 2006\n 7.4 Ties among thirty-six European firms most involved in pan-European interlocking, 2006\n 7.5 Types of interlockers in corporate Europe, 1996 and 2006\n 8.1 Typology of corporate interlockers: policy-board affiliations\n 8.2 The corporate-policy elite’s inner circle, 1996\n 8.3 The corporate-policy elite’s inner circle, 2006\n 8.4 Inter-organizational relations, 2006\n 8.5 Weighted sectoral densities, 1996\n 8.6 Weighted sectoral densities, 2006\n 8.7 Total brokerage scores for transnational policy boards, 1996 and 2006\n 8.8 Inter-corporate brokerage within and between regions for four global policy groups\n 8.9 Inter-corporate brokerage within and between regions for four transnational business councils\nAcronyms\nAcknowledgements\nIntroduction\n The debate on the transnational capitalist class\n A global corporate community?\n Forms of corporate power\n Networks of corporate power\n What follows\nPART ONE The formation of a transnational corporate community\n 1 | Is there a transnational corporate community?\n Internationalization of ownership\n A transnational capitalist class?\n Corporate governance in international perspective\n Evidence from earlier studies\n The datasets of 1976 and 1996\n Table 1.1 Strata in the 1976 and 1996 samples\n Changes in the global network of corporate interlocks\n Table 1.2 Mean degree by type of line for the global network\n Table 1.3 Mean degree of interlocking for corporations domiciled in four regions, by type of line\n National and transnational interlocking\n Table 1.4 National and transnational interlocks in the global network\n The network core and the transnationalists\n Figure 1.1 The core of the transnational network, 1976\n Figure 1.2 The core of the transnational network, 1996\n Table 1.5 Cross-classification of national networkers and transnationalists by highest status held (percentages)\n Conclusion\n 2 | Forging a new hegemony: the transnational corporate-policy network, 1996\n Policy groups as construction sites for transnational hegemony\n Table 2.1 Classification of five leading global policy groups\n Five key transnational policy groups\n The transnational corporate-policy network, circa 1996\n Table 2.2 The nucleus of six corporate directors and their organizational affiliations\n Table 2.3 Eleven additional members of the core group and their organizational affiliations\n Table 2.4 Distributions of companies and inner circle members by national domicile\n The network as an inter-organizational field\n Figure 2.1 Number of interlocks among five global policy groups, 1996\n The integrative contribution of elite policy groups\n Table 2.5 Numbers of directorships on five global policy boards\n Figure 2.2 Mean international distances among 271 corporations, based on corporate interlocks only\n Figure 2.3 Mean international distances among 271 corporations, including paths mediated by five global policy groups\n Conclusion\n 3 | Global cities in the global corporate network\n Introduction\n Global cities: a networked hierarchy\n Corporate networks and corporate power\n Working hypotheses\n Participation and centrality in the transnational network\n Figure 3.1 Participation in the transnational network, twenty-two cities\n Figure 3.2 Mean degree of interlocking in the transnational network, fourteen cities\n Mapping the inter-urban transnational network\n Figure 3.3 The transnational inter-urban network, showing all ties carried by transnationalists.\n Figure 3.4 The transnational inter-urban network, cities linked by four or more interlocking directorships.\n Figure 3.5 The Paris archipelago\n Mapping the global network\n Table 3.1 Degree of interlocking, twenty most central cities in the global network\n Figure 3.6 The global inter-urban network of seventy connected cities\n Table 3.2 Primary and secondary interlocking in the global network\n Figure 3.7 The network of primary inter-urban interlocks\n Conclusion\nPART TWO Into the twenty-first century: the changing organization of corporate power\n 4 | Transnational accumulation and global networking\n Into the twenty-first century\n Recomposition of the accumulation base\n Figure 4.1 Industrial composition of the G400, 1996–2006\n Figure 4.2 Regional trends in capital accumulation, 1996–2006\n Figure 4.3 Main urban domiciles for G500 corporations, 1996–2006\n Figure 4.4 UNCTAD transnationality among G400 industrial corporations of the triad\n The changing global corporate-interlock network\n Figure 4.5 Mean board size for G500 corporations, 1996–2006\n Figure 4.6 Degree of national and transnational interlocking for G500 corporations, 1996–2006\n Figure 4.7 Proportions of national and transnational interlocking, key countries, 1996–2006\n Finance capital and directorate interlocking\n Figure 4.8 Financial and industrial interlocks among G7 countries, 1996\n Figure 4.9 Financial and industrial interlocks among G7 countries, 2006\n The international network, 1996 and 2006\n Figure 4.10 The international network of transnational interlocks, 1996\n Figure 4.11 The international network of transnational interlocks, 2006\n 5 | Transnationalists and national networkers\n Q1: How do transnational and national segments appear within the global corporate elite?\n Figure 5.1 Distribution of G500 interlocking and non-interlocking directors, 1996–2006\n Figure 5.2 Numbers of interlockers: national (G5 countries) and transnational\n Table 5.1 Internal and external ties for major segments of the global corporate elite\n Q2: How does the regionalized character of global capitalism structure the global corporate elite in its national and transnational segments?\n Figure 5.3 Typology of corporate interlockers in the global network\n Figure 5.4 Domicile of principal corporate affiliation, trans-Atlantic linkers\n Figure 5.5 National networkers and transnationalists in the global corporate elite, 1996\n Figure 5.5a\n Figure 5.5b\n Figure 5.6 National networkers and transnationalists in the global corporate elite, 2006\n Figure 5.6a\n Figure 5.6b\n Conclusion\n 6 | Billionaires and networkers: wealth, position and corporate power\n Billionaires and networkers\n Forbes billionaires and G500 billionaires\n Figure 6.1 Numbers of Forbes and G500 billionaires, 1996–2006\n The spatial distribution of billionaires\n Figure 6.2 Distribution of Forbes and G500 billionaires, 1996\n Figure 6.3 Distribution of Forbes and G500 billionaires, 2006\n Gendering the global corporate elite\n Kinship and policy-group affiliations\n Figure 6.4 Main groupings of billionaires and their organizational affiliations, 1996\n Figure 6.5 Main groupings of billionaires and their organizational affiliations, 2006\n Table 6.1 Leading billionaire families in the global corporate elite, 1996 and 2006\n Figure 6.6 Social circles of billionaire networkers, 1996\n Figure 6.7 Social circles of billionaire networkers, 2006\n Transnational billionaires?\n Conclusion\nPART THREE A transnational historic bloc?\n 7 | Constituting corporate Europe\n Corporate Europe as a community\n Research questions\n Empirics\n 1 The unequal structure of national representation\n Figure 7.1 National domiciles in corporate Europe, 1996\n Figure 7.2 National domiciles in corporate Europe, 2006\n 2 The social organization of corporate Europe\n Table 7.1 Mean degree for Top Dogs and other G500 European firms, 1996 and 2006\n Table 7.2 Bonding and bridging analysis, 1996 and 2006\n Figure 7.3 Degree of transnational interlocking within Europe, 1996 and 2006\n Table 7.3 Mean inter-corporate distances, with and without ERT mediation\n 3 The issue of institutional completeness: towards European finance capital?\n Table 7.4 Financial institutions in the European corporate network, 2006\n Figure 7.4 Ties among thirty-six European firms most involved in pan-European interlocking, 2006\n Figure 7.5 Types of interlockers in corporate Europe, 1996 and 2006\n 4 Corporate Europe and the rest of the world\n Table 7.5 Elite linkages between corporate Europe and the rest of the world\n Conclusion\n 8 | Consolidating the transnational corporate policy network, 1996–2006\n Introduction\n Eleven transnational policy boards\n Table 8.1 Eleven key transnational policy boards, 1996–2006\n Consolidating a global corporate-policy elite\n Table 8.2 Policy-board memberships and corporate directorships, 1996 and 2006\n Figure 8.1 Typology of corporate interlockers: policy-board affiliations\n Mapping the inner circle\n Figure 8.2 The corporate-policy elite’s inner circle, 1996\n Figure 8.3 The corporate-policy elite’s inner circle, 2006\n Figure 8.4 Inter-organizational relations, 2006\n Figure 8.5 Weighted sectoral densities, 1996\n Figure 8.6 Weighted sectoral densities, 2006\n A core–periphery structure?\n Table 8.3 Organizations ranking highest in coreness, 2006\n Policy boards as brokers: the structure of mediations\n Figure 8.7 Total brokerage scores for transnational policy boards, 1996 and 2006\n Table 8.4 Distribution of inter-corporate relations brokered by policy boards\n Figure 8.8 Inter-corporate brokerage within and between regions for four global policy groups\n Figure 8.9 Inter-corporate brokerage within and between regions for four transnational business councils\n Conclusion\n 9 | Hegemony and counter-hegemony in a global field\n Global civil society as an emergent field\n Paired comparisons\n Table 9.1 A judgement sample of eight key organizations for paired comparisons\n Table 9.2 Eight key organizations: constituencies, organizational forms, action repertoires\n Conclusion\nConclusion\n The geography of global corporate power\n Continuity and change in the power structure\n The issue of class hegemony\n Unity and difference within the TCC\n The crisis of 2008–10 and beyond\nNotes\n Introduction\n Chapter 1\n Chapter 2\n Chapter 3\n Chapter 4\n Chapter 5\n Chapter 6\n Chapter 7\n Chapter 8\n Chapter 9\n Conclusion\nBibliography\nIndex