دانلود کتاب The Mathematics of Voting and Elections: A Hands-On Approach

فهرست مطالب :

What's So Good about Majority Rule? 16 The Mayor of Stickeyville 16 Anonymity, Neutrality, and Monotonicity 18 Majority Rule and May's Theorem 20 Quota Systems 21 Back to May's Theorem 25 Questions for Further Study 26 Answers to Starred Questions 28 2 Perot, Nader, and Other Inconveniences 32 The Plurality Method 33 The Borda Count 35 Preference Orders 37 Back to Borda 39 May's Theorem Revisited 41 Questions for Further Study 43 Answers to Starred Questions 48 3 Back into the Ring 52 Condorcet Winners and Losers 54 Sequential Pairwise Voting 58 Instant Runoff 63 Putting It All Together 66 Questions for Further Study 67 Answers to Starred Questions 70 4 Trouble in Democracy 74 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 75 Arrow's Theorem 80 What is a Voting System? 81 Arrow's Conditions 83 The Punchline 85 Pareto's Unanimity Condition 86 Questions for Further Study 88 Answers to Starred Questions 91 5 Explaining the Impossible 94 Proving Arrow's Theorem 95 Potential Solutions 104 Weakening the Pareto Condition 104 Approval Voting 105 Intensity of Binary Independence 109 Concluding Remarks 111 Questions for Further Study 112 Answers to Starred Questions 114 6 One Person, One Vote? 118 Weighted Voting Systems 120 Dictators, Dummies, and Veto Power 123 Swap Robustness 124 Trade Robustness 128 Questions for Further Study 131 Answers to Starred Questions 133 7 Calculating Corruption 136 The Banzhaf Power Index 138 The Shapley-Shubik Index 141 Banzhaf Power in Psykozia 145 A Splash of Combinatorics 147 Shapley-Shubik Power in Psykozia 150 Questions for Further Study 152 Answers to Starred Questions 155 8 The Ultimate College Experience 162 The Electoral College 164 The Winner-Take-All Rule 165 Some History 167 Power in the Electoral College 169 Swing Votes and Perverse Outcomes 172 Alternatives to the Electoral College 177 Questions for Further Study 178 Answers to Starred Questions 181 9 Trouble in Direct Democracy 184 Even More Trouble 186 The Separability Problem 188 Binary Preference Matrices 191 Testing for Separability 192 Tool # 1 : Symmetry 192 Tool # 2: Unions and Intersections 193 Some Potential Solutions 195 Solution # 1 : Avoid Nonseparable Preferences 196 Solution # 2: Set-wise Voting 197 Solution # 3: Sequential Voting 198 Solution # 4: Contingent Ballots 201 Solution # 5: To Be Determined 201 Questions for Further Study 201 Answers to Starred Questions 204 10 Proportional (Mis) representation 206 The U. S. House of Representatives 207 Hamilton's Apportionment Method 209 Jefferson's Apportionment Method 212 Webster's Apportionment Method 217 Three Apportionment Paradoxes 219 Hill's Apportionment Method 222 Another Impossibility Theorem 224 Concluding Remarks 225 Questions for Further Study 226 Answers to Starred Questions 229 Bibliography 232 Index 236