China and International Adjudication: Caution, Identity Shifts, and the Ambition to Lead

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کتاب چین و داوری بین المللی: احتیاط، تغییر هویت و جاه طلبی برای رهبری نسخه زبان اصلی

دانلود کتاب چین و داوری بین المللی: احتیاط، تغییر هویت و جاه طلبی برای رهبری بعد از پرداخت مقدور خواهد بود
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توضیحاتی در مورد کتاب China and International Adjudication: Caution, Identity Shifts, and the Ambition to Lead

نام کتاب : China and International Adjudication: Caution, Identity Shifts, and the Ambition to Lead
عنوان ترجمه شده به فارسی : چین و داوری بین المللی: احتیاط، تغییر هویت و جاه طلبی برای رهبری
سری :
نویسندگان :
ناشر : Nomos
سال نشر : 2021
تعداد صفحات : 590
ISBN (شابک) : 384877108X , 9783848771080
زبان کتاب : English
فرمت کتاب : pdf
حجم کتاب : 4 مگابایت



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فهرست مطالب :


Cover
Table of Cases
National Legislation
Treaties and Other International Legal Instruments
I. Introduction – International Adjudication and China’s Rise
I.1. A New Ambition – ‘Guiding’ International Order
I.2. How Nations Behave – China’s Growing Impact on International Adjudication
II. Framework – Theoretical and Methodological Approach
II.1. Introduction
II.2. Previous Approaches and New Endeavor
II.3. Theory and Methodology
II.3.1. Theory – Conceptual Framework
II.3.1.1. An Interdisciplinary Approach – Questions About Both the ‘Engine’ and the ‘Driver’
II.3.1.1.1. Positivism – Facts of Engagement
II.3.1.1.2. International Law and International Relations – Reasons for Engagement
II.3.1.2. Neoclassical Realism – Power, Structure, and All of Those Intervening Variables
II.3.1.2.1. A Complicated History
II.3.1.2.2. Reinventing Realism
II.3.1.3. Image and Perception – Structure Relayed
II.3.1.4. The Chinese Case – Characteristics and Caveats
II.3.1.4.1. General Notions
II.3.1.4.2. Articulated Perception and Cognitive Beliefs
II.3.1.4.3. Published Elite Perception Since 2014
II.3.1.5. Final Remarks on Theory – Composite Approach
II.3.2. Methodology, Structure and Sources
III. Image – Historical Evolution of Chinese Positions on International Law
III.1. Introduction
III.2. History of Chinese Legal Thought
III.2.1. General Questions of Law
III.2.1.1. Roots – Confucianism Against Legalism
III.2.1.2. Imperial Era – Confucian Legal Thought
III.2.1.3. Modernity – Western and Soviet Influence
III.2.1.3.1. Late Qing and Republican Reforms
III.2.1.3.2. Soviet Models, Sino-Marxism and Pragmatism
III.2.1.3.2.1. Soviet Influence
III.2.1.3.2.2. Sino-Marxism
III.2.1.3.2.3. Pragmatism
III.2.1.4. Conclusion
III.2.2. International Law – Sovereignty, Intervention, Adjudication
III.2.2.1. Pre-Imperial Times – A ‘Chinese Community of Nations’?
III.2.2.2. Imperial Era – Hierarchical Tributary System
III.2.2.3. Unequal Treaties – Late Empire and Republican Period
III.2.2.3.1. Definitional Issues
III.2.2.3.2. Late Qing (1839–1911): Confrontation and Lasting Attitudes
III.2.2.3.3. Republic (1912–1949): Struggle for Renegotiation
III.2.2.4. Maoism (1949–1978)
III.2.2.4.1. Early Years and Soviet Legal Thought (1949–1957)
III.2.2.4.2. Sino-Marxism Outside the UN (1957–1971)
III.2.2.4.2.1. Divergence from the Soviet Path
III.2.2.4.2.2. Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence
III.2.2.4.3. Pre-reform PRC in the UN (1971–1978)
III.2.2.5. Pragmatism (1978-): Reform and Opening
III.2.2.5.1. A new mindset
III.2.2.5.2. Sources of International Law and Domestic Application
III.2.2.5.3. Sovereignty and Human Rights
III.2.2.5.4. Sovereignty and Intervention
III.2.2.5.5. Sovereignty and Adjudication
III.2.2.6. Conclusion
IV. Object – PRC Practice in International Adjudication
IV.1. Introduction
IV.2. Economy
IV.2.1. Phase One – the PRC and Investment Arbitration
IV.2.1.1. China’s Accession to the ICSID Convention
IV.2.1.2. China’s Evolving BIT Practice
IV.2.1.2.1. Introduction
IV.2.1.2.2. First Generation – Cautious Beginnings
IV.2.1.2.3. Second Generation – Access to ICSID
IV.2.1.2.4. Third Generation – ‘Any Dispute Concerning an Investment’
IV.2.1.2.5. Fourth Generation – Americanization
IV.2.1.2.6. Comparative View – Last BRIC standing: Chinese exception to the restrictive turn
IV.2.1.3. Investment Arbitration with Chinese Participation
IV.2.1.3.1. Limited Arbitration Clauses – Interpretation and MFN Use
IV.2.1.3.1.1. Broad or Narrow Interpretation
IV.2.1.3.1.1.1. Tza Yap Shum v Republic of Peru (ICSID)
IV.2.1.3.1.1.2. Ekran Berhad v People’s Republic of China (ICSID)
IV.2.1.3.1.1.3. Sanum v Lao People’s Democratic Republic (ad hoc, PCA)
IV.2.1.3.1.1.4. Beijing Urban v Republic of Yemen (ICSID)
IV.2.1.3.1.1.5. China Heilongjiang v Mongolia (ad hoc, PCA)
IV.2.1.3.1.1.6. Hela Schwarz GmbH v People’s Republic of China (ICSID)
IV.2.1.3.1.1.7. Discussion
IV.2.1.3.1.2. MFN Application to Procedural Provisions
IV.2.1.3.1.2.1. Relevant case law
IV.2.1.3.1.2.2. Discussion
IV.2.1.3.2. Temporal Issues – Successive BITs and Time-limits
IV.2.1.3.2.1. Ping An v Kingdom of Belgium (ICSID)
IV.2.1.3.2.2. Ansung v People’s Republic of China (ICSID)
IV.2.1.3.2.3. Discussion
IV.2.1.3.3. Geographical Scope – Application of Chinese BITs to Hong Kong and Macao
IV.2.1.3.3.1. Relevant case law
IV.2.1.3.3.2. Discussion
IV.2.1.3.4. Availability of the ICSID Convention to SOEs
IV.2.1.3.4.1. Relevant case law
IV.2.1.3.4.2. Discussion
IV.2.1.4. Conclusions on China and Investment Arbitration
IV.2.2. Phase Two – the PRC and the WTO DSM
IV.2.2.1. China’s Accession to the WTO and the WTO DSM
IV.2.2.2. DSM Case Law with Chinese Participation
IV.2.2.2.1. China as a ‘rule-taker’ – November 2001 to February 2006
IV.2.2.2.1.1. China on the Complainant Side – Safeguard Measures
IV.2.2.2.1.2. China on the Respondent Side – National Treatment
IV.2.2.2.1.3. Conclusion
IV.2.2.2.2. China as a ‘rule-shaker’ – March 2006 to August 2008
IV.2.2.2.2.1 China on the Complainant Side – Countervailing & Anti-Dumping Duties
IV.2.2.2.2.2. China on the Respondent Side
IV.2.2.2.2.2.1. National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation
IV.2.2.2.2.2.2. TRIPS & Censorship
IV.2.2.2.2.2.3. GATT-GATS Relations & Systemic Position of the Accession Protocol
IV.2.2.2.2.2.4. Settled Cases
IV.2.2.2.2.3. Conclusion
IV.2.2.2.3. China As a ‘Rule-Maker’ – Since September 2008
IV.2.2.2.3.1 Using the Accession Protocol Against China – Export Restrictions
IV.2.2.2.3.1.1 Relevant case law
IV.2.2.2.3.1.2 Discussion
IV.2.2.2.3.2 Reversal of Obligations – Using the Accession Protocol in China’s Favor
IV.2.2.2.3.2.1 Accession Protocol and Safeguards
IV.2.2.2.3.2.1.1 Relevant case law: US-Tyres
IV.2.2.2.3.2.1.2 Discussion
IV.2.2.2.3.2.2 Accession Protocol and Anti-Dumping Duties
IV.2.2.2.3.2.2.1 Relevant case law
IV.2.2.2.3.2.2.2 Discussion
IV.2.2.2.3.3 Double Remedies
IV.2.2.2.3.3.1 Relevant case law
IV.2.2.2.3.3.2 Discussion
IV.2.2.2.3.4 Countervailing Duties
IV.2.2.2.3.4.1 Relevant case law: US-Countervailing Measures (China)
IV.2.2.2.3.4.2 Discussion
IV.2.2.2.3.5 Anti-dumping Duties
IV.2.2.2.3.5.1 Relevant case law
IV.2.2.2.3.5.2 Discussion
IV.2.2.2.3.6 Remaining Cases – National Treatment, MFN & Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions
IV.2.2.2.3.6.1 Relevant case law
IV.2.2.2.3.6.2 Discussion
IV.2.2.2.3.7 Cases at the Consultation Stage
IV.2.2.2.3.8 Market Economy Status – ‘D-Day’ Gone Wrong & China’s Controlled Frustration
IV.2.2.2.3.9 Conclusion
IV.2.2.2.4. Comparative View – BRICS Lessons: Some Learn, Some Don’t
IV.2.2.2.4.1. Introduction
IV.2.2.2.4.2. Brazil
IV.2.2.2.4.3. India
IV.2.2.2.4.4. South Africa
IV.2.2.2.4.5. Russia
IV.2.2.2.4.6. Concluding Remarks on BRICS Experiences in the WTO DSM
IV.2.2.2.5. Conclusion – China and the WTO DSM
IV.3. Territory
IV.3.1. Chinese Territory and the People’s Republic of China
IV.3.1.1. Land Borders
IV.3.1.2. Maritime Borders
IV.3.2. Ongoing Territorial and Law of the Sea Disputes
IV.3.2.1. South China Sea – Of Rocks and Frontiers
IV.3.2.1.1. Background to the Dispute
IV.3.2.1.2. Significance and Limits of Jurisdiction
IV.3.2.1.3. Respective Claims and Legal Steps Taken
IV.3.2.2. East China Sea – Same, Same, But Different
IV.3.2.3. Sino-Indian Border Disputes – Himalayas from Kashmir to Arunachal Pradesh
IV.3.3. Interactions With Dispute Settlement Bodies Below the Threshold of Contentious Proceedings
IV.3.3.1. Advisory Proceedings
IV.3.3.1.1. ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo
IV.3.3.1.2. ITLOS Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area
IV.3.3.1.3. ITLOS Advisory Opinion on Illegal Fishing
IV.3.3.1.4. ICJ Advisory Opinion on Chagos
IV.3.3.2. Engagement with the CLCS
IV.3.4. The First Case – Philippines v China on the South China Sea
IV.3.4.1. Background
IV.3.4.2. Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility
IV.3.4.2.1. China’s Non-Participation
IV.3.4.2.2. The Tribunal’s Jurisdiction
IV.3.4.2.3. The Chinese Government’s Reaction
IV.3.4.3. Award on the Merits
IV.3.4.3.1 China’s Non-participation
IV.3.4.3.2 Historic Rights and the Nine-Dash Line
IV.3.4.3.3 Status of Maritime Features
IV.3.4.3.3.1 Low-tide Elevations
IV.3.4.3.3.2 ‘Islands’ or ‘Rocks’?
IV.3.4.3.4 Lawfulness of Chinese Actions
IV.3.4.3.5 Aggravation of the Dispute and Future Conduct
IV.3.4.4. Implications and Aftermath
IV.3.4.4.1. Political Reactions and Outlook
IV.3.4.4.2. Criticism, Evaluation, and Legal Implications
IV.3.4.4.2.1. Criticism Relating to Jurisdiction
IV.3.4.4.2.2. Criticism Relating to the Merits
IV.3.4.4.2.3. Criticism Relating to the International Rule of Law
IV.3.4.4.2.4. Legal Implications
IV.3.4.4.3. Conclusions – the Way(s) Forward
IV.3.5. Comparative View – Last BRIC to Be Touched, Three Choices Ahead
IV.3.5.1. The BRICS Experience – Stocktake and Comparison
IV.3.5.2. Relevance for China’s Future Path
IV.3.6. Conclusions – Territorial and Law of the Sea Disputes
V. Perception – Academic Debates on Engagement with International Adjudication: Chinese International Law Scholars
V.1. Introduction
V.2. Economy
V.2.1. Participation in the WTO DSM
V.2.1.1. General Attitude – From Stockholm Syndrome to Confident Offense
V.2.1.2. Criticism – Jurisdictional Issues, Protection of Developing States and Implementation
V.2.1.2.1. General Points of Criticism
V.2.1.2.2. Phase-Dependent Criticism – From Defense to Offense
V.2.1.3. Policy Recommendations – The Art of War
V.2.1.3.1. Observe, Study, Shape – General Approaches and Early Recommendations from the WTO Accession 2001 to 2006
V.2.1.3.1.1. Research, Training and Cautious Engagement
V.2.1.3.1.2. Demonstrating Compliance
V.2.1.3.1.3. Participating in Reform Negotiations
V.2.1.3.1.4. Using China’s Position As a Developing State
V.2.1.3.1.5. The Role of Individuals
V.2.1.3.2. Engage, Defend, Shape – Recommendations Since the Shift to Active Participation in 2006
V.2.1.3.2.1. Confidence, Pragmatism and More Active Participation
V.2.1.3.2.2. Continued NME Treatment and Chinese Responses
V.2.2. Participation in Investment Arbitration
V.2.2.1. General Attitude – March Towards Liberalism
V.2.2.2. Criticism – Ambiguous Jurisdiction, Imbalances and ‘Legitimacy Crisis’
V.2.2.2.1. Supposed Ambiguities and Interpretation Issues
V.2.2.2.2. Nature and Legitimacy of Investment Arbitration
V.2.2.3. Recommendations – Identity Shift: From Host State to Home State
V.2.2.3.1. Pre-Engagement – Chinese Views on International Investment Arbitration Ahead of the First Case in 2007
V.2.2.3.2. Walking a Tight Rope – Chinese Views on International Investment Arbitration as Threat and Protection from 2007
V.2.2.3.2.1. Research and Progress – Steady As She Goes
V.2.2.3.2.2. Reforms and Influence – Making the Case
V.2.2.3.2.3. Identity and Engagement – on What Has Changed
V.2.3. Preliminary Conclusions
V.3. Territory
V.3.1. General Attitude – From Imperialist Oppressor to Guarantor of Peaceful Dispute Resolution
V.3.2. Criticism – The Roots of Caution
V.3.2.1. General Criticism – Surprising Similarities
V.3.2.2. The South China Sea Arbitration – Recent Flare-up
V.3.2.2.1. General Criticism and Jurisdictional Matters
V.3.2.2.2. Criticism on the Merits
V.3.3. Policy Recommendations – How to Tame a Dragon
V.3.3.1. General Recommendations – Prepare Yourself and the Arena
V.3.3.1.1. Master the Rules – Research & Training
V.3.3.1.2. Have a Seat at the Table – Reform & Influence
V.3.3.2. Recommendations on Engagement – A Contested Field
V.3.3.2.1. Negotiations & Joint Development
V.3.3.2.2. Adjudication & Arbitration
V.3.3.2.2.1. Criticism of Political Declarations, Negotiations & Joint Development
V.3.3.2.2.2. General Preconditions for and Significance of Engagement
V.3.3.2.2.3. Engaging to Refute Jurisdiction
V.3.3.2.2.4. Advisory Opinions
V.3.3.2.2.5. Trial Balloons: Conciliation, Arbitration & Adjudication – New Mechanisms & Special Separate Tribunals
V.3.3.2.2.6. Full Embrace – Tackling the Issues Head On
V.3.4. Preliminary Conclusions
VI. Conclusion – China’s Behavior in International Adjudication
VI.1. Imperatives of Greatness – of What ‘Has to Be Done’
VI.2. China and International Adjudication – Different Speeds, Same Direction
VI.2.1. Round One – Trade Law
VI.2.2. Round Two – Investment Law
VI.2.3. Round Three – Law of the Sea and Territorial Disputes
VI.3. Comparison and Outlook
VI.3.1. A Chinese Path – Not Your Ordinary BRIC
VI.3.2. The Way Forward – Engaging to Rise
References




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